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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
This work is an attempt to describe the perceptual, 
cognitive, and action processes that account for highly 
skilled human performance in complex task environments. In 
order to study such performance in a controlled setting, a 
laboratory task was constructed and three experiments were 
performed using human subjects. Then, a general framework 
was developed for describing the organization of perceptual, 
cognitive, and action processes. This framevork is intended 
to apply not only to the laboratory task but .to a hopefully 
much vider range of task environments. 
The laboratory task vas a simulation that required 
human crews to perform manual and supervisory control of a 
fleet of vehicles. The term "supervisory control" stems 
from the analogy between a supervisor of a subordinate staff 
in an organization of people and the human controller of a 
modern, computer-based, semi-automatic control system 
(Sheridan, 1987). In such systems, the human operator is 
typically described as performing many knowledge intensive 
functions such as prediction, planning, and decision-making. 
1 
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At a minimum, the operator is responsible for directing the 
activity of the automated systems, monitoring the status of 
the controlled process, and intervening in the case of 
unexpected environmental disturbances or equipment mal- 
functions. Examples of such systems include semi-automated 
manufacturing systems, air traffic control systems, and 
large electricity generation plants. 
While the laboratory task used here was quite complex, 
especially when contrasted with most other experimental 
tasks, it vas of Couzse far simpler than the example control 
systems mentioned above. One major dissimilarity betveen 
the simulated task and actual supervisory control tasks vak 
that the former did not require crews to detect, diagnose, 
and repair failed system components. As a result, the human 
cognitive processes involved in dealing with novel or rare 
events vtre not studied in this research. On the other 
hand, the laboratory task did preserve many other properties 
of actual complex control tasks. Perhaps most important 
vere those requiring crevs to decompose the overall task 
goal into a set of subgoals, to constrain and coordinate the 
many degrees of freedom available for system control, to 
rapidly process a large s e t  of graphically displayed 
information, and to cope with simultaneous task demands. 
What made the study of human behavior in the laboratory 
task particularly challenging from a modeling perspective 
was the breadth of issues that had to be considered to 
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provide a comprehensive description of the psychological 
procesqes underlying skilled performance. Much psych- 
ological research has relied upon decompositions of phe- 
nomena into discrete categories, such as perception, 
cognition, and rotor control. There is little doubt that 
this has been a productive research strategy, at least from 
a methodological perspective. But fror a theoretical 
perspective, the po8slbility exists that decompobinq 
psychological processing into these discrete probler areas 
may be counterproductive. A 8  Pylyshyn (1982) ha8 noted, 
ITIhi8 is not to imply that ve cannot study problems 1 
in these areas, but rather to suggest that cateqor- 
k i n g  them in such terms ray not reveal (indeed, 
nay cover up) the way in which they indivldually 
and collectively contribute to producing intelligent 
behavior. (p. 70) 
As Pylyshyn's comment suggests, it sometimes appears as if 
too little attention is paid to the task of theorizing hov 
the collection of these distinct psychologlcal modules are 
interfaced and coordinated to yield goal directed behavior 
in complex, dynamic environments. 
In this research, though, the issues of system-level 
organization and coordination among these modules occupied 
center stage. Two factors prompted this research focus. 
The first concerned the need to allov for the theoretical 
possibility that skilled behavior i n  the laboratory task vas 
due as much to efficiencies arising fron the Organization of 
psychological processes as it was due to the presence of 
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individually efficient processes. In other words, it could 
be possible that much of what accounts for high level skill 
might involve the way in which the information processinq 
demands of a complex task are effectively decomposed into 
separate tasks for the perceptual, cognitive, and motor 
systems. Oiven that each of these systems mlqht have its 
own "preferred" mode of information processing, it would 
appear at least possible that skill development mlqht 
involve obtaininq an efficient division of labor among these 
systems so that each system performs operations suitable to 
its preferred processing s t y l e .  To a t  least  a l lov  for t h l 8  
possibility, it vas imperative that issues of organization 
and coordination among these systems be given primary 
consideration. 
The second reason that organizational issues were 
emphasized in this research concerns the methodological 
difficulties associated with the unobservability of psych- 
ological processes. Independent of the validity of the 
skill development hypothesis stated above, it is still 
mandatory that distinct functional roles for. the perceptual, 
cognitive, and motor systems be identified for the purpose 
of psychological modeling. This problem is particularly 
acute with respect to cognitive processes, because neither 
the input nor output interfaces are anchored in observable 
phenomena. While the inputs to the perceptual processes and 
the outputs of the motor processes are typically available 
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for empirical measurement, neither interface of the cog- 
nitive system is amenable to such study. No matter how 
tasks are constructed in an attempt to observe the behavior 
of cognitive processes, we find we are once again only 
directly observing the behavior of aotor processes, whether 
they be arm moveaents or the production of speech. Similar 
problew are associated with trying to clearly identify the 
inputs to cognitive processes when only the inputs to 
perceptual processes can be observed. 
These comments are not intended to be construed as a 
neo-behavioristic argument against the utility of postulat- 
ing cognitive processes. Rather, all that is suggested ib 
that it may be dangerous to make naive assumptions about the 
nature of the information that is contended to serve as the 
inputs and outputs of coqnitive processes. The danger is 
due of course to the fact that if the assumptions concerning 
the input and output languages are false, there is no 
possible way for the characterization of cognitive process- 
ing to be correct. In addition, representational assump- 
tions concerning cognitive processes also constrain theories 
of perception and action, since models of these processes 
then become obligated to communicate with cognitive process- 
es in a certain format. 
Perhapr, then, the greatest potential contribution of 
this research is the development of an overall framework for 
describing how perceptual, cognitive, and action systeas 
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might be organized and integrated to produce highly skilled 
performance in complex task environments. Unfortunately, 
the global nature of this research is also likely to be its 
greatest potential source of criticism. This point is vel1 
taken, since very few questions concerning the independent 
and detailed activity of perceptual, cognitive, or action 
mechanism8 have been addressed vlth much depth. On the 
other hand, the vork does address a set of novel issues that 
vould appear to surface only vhen this discrete set of 
psychological mechanisms is viewed as an integrated vhole 
operating within the context of complex human action. Thg 
modeling framevork developed in this vork is concerned 
primarily vith these system level issues concerning the 
global organization of psychological processes. 
i4ethodolouical Issues 
In this vork, the modeling frarevork played the role of 
a psychological theory for vhich a generative process model 
vas developed and applied to describing the psychological 
processes of h u m n  c r e w  performing the laboratory task. A 
uenerative model is one vhich uses similar information 
(inputs) and controls (outputs) to those used by human 
subjects to perform a task. A generative model typically 
produces a stream of behavior vhich can be compared to human 
behavior to assess the validity of the model. For example, 
a regression model that only indicates the statistical 
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relations betveen task parameters and summary human perform- 
ance measures would not be generative. A process model is 
one that is contended to describe, at some level, the actual 
time course of human information processing that occurs 
during task perforrance. 
Process models, like the one constructed in this vork, 
typically postulate the existence of directly unob8ervable 
p8ychological rechanisrs and processes. Within cognitive 
psychology, thls approach to describing behavior haa its 
origins at least as early as the vork of Hiller, Galantar, 
and Pribram ( 1 9 6 0 ) .  With their TOTE unit mechanisr for 
describing plans, they were among the first researchers tb 
break with behaviortstic tradition and employ theoretical 
constructs that mediated betveen stimulus and respon~e. 
With the adoption of the @'information processinga metaphor 
(Neisser, 19671, cognitive p8yChOlOgi8ts began to postulate 
theoretical constructs of increasing complexity to account 
for behavior that did not appear to be easily described 
vithin the language of behaviorism. 
Although these information processing rodels appeared 
to offer the theoretical resources to describe a wider range 
of behavior than could the behavioristic models, some have 
faulted this type of theorizing for its vagueness. For 
example, Neisser (1976)  criticized the proliferation of ill- 
defined @'boxes" and @'arrovs@' vithin many of these models. 
He pointed out that models Constructed by simply decomposing 
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an information processing task into a set of presumably 
simpler processors (boxes) connected by paths (arrovs) of 
information flov left many critical questions unansvered. 
Little consideration vas given to the mechanisms by vhich 
the processors operated or to specifying the exact nature of 
the information that vas assumed to flov between them. 
An explicit focus on ~echanism, on the other hand, has 
been one of the major concerns of researchers operating 
vfthin the '8yabOl manipulation' metaphor (Nevell and Simon, 
1972). While Newel1 and Simon vere far from being the only 
researchers concerned with being explicit about mechanism8, 
they vere among the first to make this concern an activb 
constraint on their theories and models of cognition. By 
their adherence to the constraint that psychological models 
should be implemented as computer simulations to ensure 
completeness and explicitness, these researchers vere highly 
influential in lessening the scientific acceptablllty of 
vaguely stated models of the type criticized by Neisser. 
Nevell and Siron's research has had a large impact on 
psychological methodology in other vays as vell. Nevell 
(1973) has made the observation that the purely ubottom-upu 
or data-driven approach in psychology has, as of yet, mainly 
produced a discrete set of laboratory curiosities of 
questionable significance. He then forcefully argues that a 
*top-dovnu, or theory-driven approach offers the best hope 
for advancing the field. Although actual scientific 
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progress vould seem to rely upon a rich interplay between 
these two approaches, Neve11 appears to have been in- 
fluential in at least tilting the balance tovard a top-dovn 
approach to cognltive prrychology research. Of course, it is 
still too early to tell with certainty vhether or not this 
strategy vlll be sclentlflcally revardlng. On the other 
hand, a top-dovn strategy appears to be almost a method- 
ological necessity for structuring the approach to invest- 
igating rich behavioral situations such as the one studied 
in thls research. 
This ls not to say, o f  course, that by using a top-down 
methodology in this research the scientific obligation tb 
empirical adequacy is ignored. Rather, one of the primary 
reasons for using generatlve models is to provide a method 
for indirectly measuring the properties of the theorized 
psychological mechanisms. Such measurements are performed 
by using the model to assess the degree to which hypotheses 
about the rechanisrs' properties are i n  agreement with 
observable behavior. Specifically, the behavior o f  the 
model parameterized in accordance with a aet o f  hypotheses 
ls compared to human behavior. If the parameterlzed model 
produces behavior in agreement with human behavior, the 
sufficiency of the s e t  of psychologlcal hypotheses is 
established . 
The sufficiency demonstration in thls vork vas per- 
program that formed by implementlng the model a3 a computer 
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vas capable of performing the task at the performance level 
of the.most highly skilled human crews. BY a process of 
parameter manipulation, the model vas then used to attempt 
to mimic the behavior of three human cfev8. A set of 
performance measures vera constructed to provide detailed 
conparison8 betveen model and crev performance. The model 
vas able to generate behavior in approximate agreement vith 
each of the three crevs. In addition, the model constructs 
provided for a reasonably concise description of inter-crev 
differences. 
Given that the computer program wa3 able to achieve 
approximate behavioral validity, an important question 
becomes determining what ps~chOlogica1 significance should 
be attached to this sufficiency demonstration. One aspect 
of this question concerns the breadth of the possible 
psychological implications, and its ansver lies in properly 
identifying those aspects of the modeling framevork that are 
task-Independent. For this reason, the framevork is 
presented in a task-independent fashion before It is applied 
to describing performance in the laboratory task. 
A second component of the question of significance 
concerns the appropriate psychological interpretation of the 
behavior of the computer program. To answer this question, 
it is critical that the distinction betveen the psych- 
ological theory and its model as a computer program be kept 
clear. This distinction must be maintained so that con- 
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f u s i o n s  v i 1 1  not  occur regarding t h e  intended r e l a t i o n s h i p  
betveen t h e  ope ra t ion  of t h e  computer program and t h e  
ope ra t ion  of p s y c h o ~ o g i c a ~  processes .  
The p8ychological t heo ry  vhich is developed i n  t h i s  
vork is a set of statements or assumptions about  t h e  na tu re  
of possible p8ychological processes operative dur ing  human 
performance i n  t h e  l a b o r a t o r y  t a s k .  Under t h e  s tandard 
model t h e o r e t i c  d e f i n i t i o n ,  a model o f  a theo ry  is a 
s t r u c t u r e  i n  vhich t h e  s t a t emen t s  of t h e  t h e o r y  can be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  as t r u e .  The computer program 1s one 8uch 
model, f o r  it has  been designed t o  operate i n  agreement v i t b  
t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  of s t a t emen t s  comprising t h e  theory: 
Computer programs expressed i n  d i f f e r e n t  languages and o t h e r  
adequately chosen structures may a l s o  s e r v e  as  models of t h e  
same theory. The reason it is important t o  keep the 
d i s t i n c t i o n  betveen t h e  p8yChOlogical t h e o r y  and t h e  
conputer  program clear is t h a t  there e x i s t  an a d d i t i o n a l  
c o l l e c t i o n  of statements t h a t  are t r u e  of t h e  program b u t  
are Jnd eoendent of t h e  theory.  These statements concern 
i r p l e ~ e n t a t l o n  detai l8  vhich are specific t o  t h e  choice  of 
t h e  model f o r  t h e  theory,  b u t  are not a part o f  t h e  t heo ry  
itself 0 I t  is crucial t h a t  these implementation details  
should n o t  be er roneous ly  construed as  r a k i n g  claims about 
psychologica l  pzocesses.  
While t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  betveen t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  claims of 
t h e  t h e o r y  arid t h e  detai ls  o f  computer i r p l e n e n t a t l o n  is 
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clear enough in principle, it can be quite difficult to make 
this distinction in practice. The design of the computer 
model is a product of both the top-dovn constraints imposed 
by the psychological theory and the bottom-up constraints 
imposed by the structure of the computer hardvare and 
softvare. It can be quite difficult to determine vhether a 
particular section of computer code should be interpreted 
literally a8 simulating the operation of a hypothesized 
psychological mechanism, or on the other hand, vhether that 
code should be construed as a SOmevhat arbitrary implement- 
a t i o n  t h a t  only preserves t h e  gross functional (input- 
output) CharaCtmistiC8 of a p8ychological mechanism. 
In order to reduce the possibility of such confusions, 
the modeling components of this re8earch are presented in an 
incremental fashion. The presentation begins vith a 
discussion of the general rodeling framevork, folloved by an 
application of this framevork to modeling performance in the 
laboratory task, and ending vith an explicit description of 
the operation of the task-speclfic mechanisms that is 
closely tied to the computer implementation of the model. 
This decomposition of the work and other issues related to 
presentation are described in the last section in this 
chapter. 
\ 
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Overviev of Results 
As mentioned above, the computer model constructed in 
this research vas able to perform the laboratory task at the 
level of the most highly skilled hu8an crevs. In addition, 
by manipulating model parameters to mimic the behavior of 
three different crevs, the model could be used to provide a 
reasonably concise description o f  inter-crev differences, 
The computer model vas an implementation of a psychological 
framevork developed to describe hov a complex information 
pKOCeS8ing task might be decomposed into separate tasks for 
the perceptual, cognitive, and action systems. Although the 
modeling exercise vill be discussed in detail In later 
chapters, some o f  the more interesting results of this vork 
vill be discussed here. 
One class of results concerns the psychological 
assumptions that vere made concerning the decomposition o f  
the inforration processing task into functions for the 
perceptual, cognitive, and action systers. Since these 
assumptions vere shovn to be sufficient for the generation 
of skilled behavior, they should at this point be considered 
candidate descriptions of the 8eChanis.8 underlying complex 
control skills. Due to the problems of unobservability 
discussed above, the assumptions vere generated in a data- 
driven fashion vhere possible. lince at least the displayed 
information and observable control activity could be 
identified, the approach that vas used to identify distinct 
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functional roles for the perceptual, cognitive, and action 
system8 Vas to vork from the aoutside-ina. 
Working in from the action side, the issues that vere 
addressed concerned hypothesizing how the development of 
highly structured action mechanisms could possibly simplify 
the functional role of the cognitive system by constraining 
and defining its effective outputs. Working in from 
pezception, consideration vas given to the problem of 
understanding how the development of highly 8tructured 
perceptual mechanism8 might simplify the role of the cog- 
nitive system by constraining and defining its effective 
inputs . Only after these ta8k-speCifiC perceptual a d  
action mechanisms vere defined could questions concerning 
cognitive 8ystem be addressed. 
By approaching the problem in this fashion, the viev of 
p8ychological processes in skilled performance that emerged 
in this research vas one of heavy reliance upon highly 
8tructured, task-specific perceptual and action systems. 
The high degree of complexity present in these peripheral 
systems vas described as allowing for much of the burden for 
the production of complex behavior to be removed from the 
central, or cognitive system. The role played by the 
perceptual systems in this regard vas suggested to derive 
from their ability to abstract information from the dia- 
played environment that vas highly relevant to the task of 
action selection. 
1s 
8pecifically, the perceptual systems vere described 
vithin the frarevork of ecological perception as mechanism8 
devoted to the detection of action-oriented inforration, or 
waffordancesw (Gibson, 1966) .  Assuming a Sensitivity to 
affordances allowed for assumptions to be made concerning 
hov perceptual syste~s might categorize and differentiate 
the displayed environment along di80nsiOns that vere 
efficient for the task of action selection. With affordance 
derived categorization, efficiencies resulted from the fact 
that many apparently distinct environmental 8ituation8 could 
be treated in an identical vay by tho cognitive syste~. 
With affotdance derived differentiation, efficienclek 
resulted from the fact that many apparently similar environ- 
mental situations could be beneficially treated as distinct 
by the cognitive syste8. 
Another type of efficiency that vas found to derive 
from action-oriented perception vas that the dlstlnctlon 
batvaen sUppO8edly dl8tlnCt types Of cognitive tasks could 
be collapsed. Thls alloved for the assurption of a single 
cognitive rechanisr to perform a major component of all 
action selection tasks, independently of vhether these tasks 
vould traditionally be described as involving decision- 
raking, coordination, or planning. All three o f  these types 
of tasks shared a single cognitive mechanisa, the operation 
o f  vhlch vas quite simple. NaBely, this mechanism vas 
assured to select the action vith the highest affordance 
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value, subject to a single constraint that te8Olved COW- 
petition between proposed actions. 
Whether behavior typically described as involving 
decision- king, coordination, or phnning vas generated by 
this mechanism was determined by the affordance information 
upon which the mechanism operated. Decision-making was 
produced by allowing the cognitive mechani8m to operate upon 
the current action affordances for each of the independent 
craft under crev control. Coordination among the craft vas 
produced by applying the same cognitive mechanhm to a 
different set of affordanccs. These affordances vere based 
on a perceptual sensitivity to higher-order relations among 
the multiple craft. These relations indicated opportunities 
for potential beneficial cooperation among the craft. In 
this way, the distinction between decision-making and 
coordination could be assumed to be primarily perceptual, 
rather than cognitive in nature. 
For planning the future activities of the craft, once 
again the same cognitive mechanism vas used. For planning, 
though, the cognitive mechanism was assumed to operate upon 
the affordances that vere predicted to exist in the environ- 
rent at a future time. Thus, the planning process was more 
complex than the decision-making and coordination processes 
since an ability to predict future environmental states had 
to be assumed. On the other hand, the planning process vas 
still quite efficient since it used- the same cognitive and 
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perceptual m8Chanlsms as vere u8ed for the decision-making 
and coordination tasks. Additional perceptual mechanisms 
vere not required for planning because the original set of 
perceptual ~ c h a n i s m s  vere a8sumed to be able to operate 
upon the predicted, internally imaged environmental state. 
Although this discussion ha8 focused on the important 
role that vas assumed to be played by perceptual systems, 
the modeling frarevork vas a180 ba8ed on the assumption that 
highly structured action sy8te.s rake a significant con- 
tribution to the production of 8killed behavior. The action 
sy8te.s vere assumed to operate as a hierarchically struc- 
tured control system. This arrangement of action mechanismB 
vas assumed to be responsible for the generation of routin- 
ized control activity. In such bystem8, the lover-level 
mechanisms possess a degree o f  control autonomy so that much 
of the burden for the production of complex behavior can be 
relieved from the higher-level 8echanisms. In this way, the 
assumption of  highly structured action 8y8taDS help8 to 
allov for the assurption of relatively siaple cognitive 
processing mechanisms. 
This brief overview of the modeling results has left 
out many of the interesting empirical findings concernlng 
crev performance and inter-crev differences. It is hoped, 
though, that this discu8slon has provided enough of an 
Introduction to the vork to encourage the reader to explore 
both the theoretical and empirical issues in greater detail. 
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Document Orq anizatioa 
Polloving a description of the laboratory task and 
experiments in Chapter 11, a performance characterization of 
each of the human crevs are developed in Chapter 111. 
Readers primarily interested in the empirical aspects of 
human performance in the laboratory ta8k MY then skip to 
the dlscuasion of the conclusions of the modeling results In 
Chapter VI. This discussion provide8 an intarpretatlon and 
explanation of the lndivldual differences in human perform- 
ance that vere observed in the experiments. 
Chapter IV d i s c u s s e s  the g e n e r a l  t h e o r e t i c a l  frarevork 
that vas developed for describfng the possible organization 
of perceptual, cognitive, and action mechanisms accounting 
for skilled performance. This framevork is independent of 
the specifics of the laboratory task and is intended to 
apply to a wide range of task environments. Result8 from 
the literature are revieved here to motivate the present 
approach. Readers, though, vho are primarily interested in 
the design and operation of the task-specific model ray 
choose to omit this chapter and move to Chapter V where the 
task-specific constructs are discussed. A famlllarlty vith 
the issues raised in Chapter IV is not crucial to under- 
standinq the design of the task-specific model, although 
readers who find the model's design to be arbitrary or 
unconventional may flnd a discussion of these issues to be 
beneficial. 
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The most specific description of the model is given in 
Chapter V I .  Here, the model parameters are identified and 
the vay in vhich they vera manipulated for describlng 
individual h u M n  crevs is di8CU88ed. This chapter describes 
the equations and logically based routines that vere used to 
implement the model as a computer program. This level of 
description adds meaningful psychotogica~ content to the 
modeling approach. Rather, these equations and routlnes are 
relevant only in that .they allov for the computer-based 
irplementatlon of the hypothesized p8ych~blogical con8tructs. 
The paychological meaning of the equations and routines ir 
restricted to vhat they inherit by virtue of their functlonL 
a1 role as somevhat arbitrary implementations of t h e m  
meaningful constructs. For this reason, this chapter may be 
bypassed by readers whose primary interest is in the novel 
psychological contributions of this vork. 
The results of the modeling effort are discus8ad in 
Chapter VII. In t h i s  chapter,  t h e  behavior of each o f  t h e  
three human crevs is interpreted in terms o f  the model 
constructs. Finally, research concluslons .are presented in 
Chapter V I I I .  These conclusions include observations 
concerning the psychological relevance of this vork and 
concludes vith a discussion of hov this vork might be 
extended to provide a Dore comprehensive framevork for 
describing the operation of human perceptual, cognitive, and 
action mechanisms enqaged in skilled paf0rMnCe. 
CHAPTER I 1  
TASK AND BXPBRIHEWTS 
In this chapter, the simulated supervisory control task 
and the three experiments that vera porforwd uslng huaan 
subjects vi11 be described. Perhaps a word of caution is 
necessary concerning use of the term aexpetimenta in this 
work. As will be clearly seen in the modeling corponents of 
this vork, this research does not follov the traditional 
pattern of hypothe818 formulation and subsequent testing via 
experiment that is commonplace i n  experimental psychology. 
Although a few independent variables vera identified and 
systematically manipulated (crev s ize ,  e . g . ) ,  the exper- 
iments must be seen a8 both a 8ource of hypotheses as vel1 
as providing a means for assessing their validity. What 
rakes thls a defensible methodology is the distance betveen 
the level of description at which the empirical data are 
av8ilable and the level at vhich the psychological theories, 
8bChani888, and hypothesis are described. The empirical 
data exist in terms button pushes, key presses, and joystick 
manipulations. The psychological theories and mod818 used 
to describe this behavior include constructs such as 
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planning horizon, environmental. affordance,  and other 
direct ly  unobservable e n t i t i e s .  The d i s t a n c e  betveen these 
tvo l e v e l s  of d e s c r i p t i o n  makes  t h e  task of invent ing  
s u i t a b l e  high-level  con8truct8,  m c h a n i s a s ,  and methods for 
measurement of their properties a necessary  p r e r e q u i s i t e  t o  
formula t ing  and t es t ing  h y p ~ t h S O b  i n  term of these 
constructs. 
There is still some danger when us ing  such  a strategy 
of co8ing up v i t h  p 8 ~ c h o l o g i C a l  mechanisms t h a t  are pro- 
foundly ad hoc, i d iosync ra t f c ,  and a t  h8t, good for 
undets tanding human behavior on ly  i n  t h e  task from which 
t h e i r  e x i s t e n c e  vas induced. TVO l i n e s  of defense  are 
o f f e r e d  a g a i n s t  t h i s  p o t e n t l a l  clrlticism. P l r s t ,  t h e  
p8ychologlcal t h e o r i z i n g  was s t r o n g l y  con8t ta ined  by a n  
array of other  e n p l r i c a l  data concerning hUMn cogni t ion .  
Th i s  f a c t  make8 I t  more l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  c o n s t r u c t s  used here 
u y  have a vider domain o f  app l i cab l l i t y  than  for  modeling 
t h i s  t a s k  alone. A 8econd defense  again& this Critic188 is 
t o  accept t h e  task-specific nature of t h e  model, b u t  deny 
t h a t  t h i s  is really such a bad r e s u l t .  Perhap8 a detailed 
account  of human behavior in even t h i s  one complex t a s k  can 
provide i n s i g h t 8  that  could no t  be galncd from accounts  w i t h  
much greater range b u t  posslbly less deta i l .  I t  1s also t h e  
case t h a t  a clear and empirically grounded d i s t i n c t i o n  
be tveen task-dependent and task = i ndependent coqn 1 t ive 
Mchanisms and processes does no t  y e t  e x i s t .  Therefore, a n  
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a p r i o r i  criticism of s t r o n g l y  task-dependent modeling 8ry 
be premature and may be subsequent ly  found t o  be t h e  
somevhat ha rmfu l  result  of a naive 8earch for simple, 
gene ra l  purpose mechanisms, vhere h i g h l y  task-dependent and 
i d i o s y n c r a t i c  c o g n i t i v e  processes  r a y  be t h e  r u l e  (Claxton, 
1988; Al lpor t ,  1980) . 
T a s k  0 escr in t i o n  
The empirical p o r t i o n  of t h i s  research is based on a 
l a b o r a t o r y  s imula t ion  of a supe rv i so ry  c o n t r o l  t a s k .  The 
interface could be configured f o r  ei ther one- or two-peraon 
c r e v  experiments .  The vork s ta t ion  f o r  t h e  one-person c r e v  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n  is shovn i n  F igure  1. The tvo-person con- 
f i g u r a t i o n  is similar a l though a subject  is seated i n  f r o n t  
of each of t h e  t v o  large d i s p l a y s ,  and t v o  but ton  panels  a r e  
used. The t a s k  required subjects t o  earn p o i n t s  by guid ing  
f i v e  " f r i e n d l y a  craf t  through a f o r e s t e d  100 squa re  mile 
mvor lda  in search of aenemya c raf t  t o  be des t royed  and cargo  
vhich vere  t o  be loaded and taken  t o  home base t o  be 
unloaded. P o i n t s  vere  avarded fo r  des t roy ing  enemy craf t  
and unloading cargo  a t  home base. Poin t8  ve re  deducted for  
t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  of f r i e n d l y  craft  (due t o  attack from enemy 
craf t  o r  by c o l l i s i o n )  and by having f r i e n d l y  craf t  run ou t  
of f u e l .  Each s e s s i o n  lasted t h i r t y  m i n u t e s  a l though I t  
could be p r e n a t u r e l y  terminated i f  t h e  main f r i e n d l y  craft ,  
called t h e  scou t ,  vas des t royed  by an enemy craft or by 
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colliding vith another friendly craft or vith a tree. 
The Interface vas intended to represent the cockpit of 
the scout craft occupied by the subjects. Subjects had 
unual control over the 8cout via joystick8 and push- 
buttOn8. A three-dimensional rate control joystick alloved 
for lateral, longitudinal, and yaw control of the scout. 
The manual control task vas simplified by excluding pitch 
and roll from the simulated helicopter dynamic8. In 
addition, the dynamics that vere used resulted in inherent 
stability for the 8cout. Therefore, vhen 8UbjeCts diverted 
attention from t h e  manual control task t h e  8cout coa8ted to 
a zest at fixed altitude. A one-diaensional rate control 
joystick vas used for altitude control of the scout. 
Subject8 could also choo8e to u8e automatic controls for 
these purposes. Tvo buttons could be used to autonatically 
tranaition the scout to a fixed high or low altitude (above 
or belov tree level) in lieu of t h e  manual altitude control. 
An autopilot vith a tree avoidance mechanism could be u8ed 
instead of the manual control joystick, although autopilot 
control only operated at 7 5 1  maximur ground 8peed vith 
double normal fuel consumption. 
In addition to the scout craft in which the crev 
resides, subjects also had control of four additional semi- 
automated friendly craft. These craft vere functionally 
similar to the scout craft although they could not be 
manually controlled. Instead, subjects vere required to 
25 
construct lists of action commands for the friendly craft on 
a text. editor specifically designed for the 8irulation. A 
CULLlOr on the M p  display (a top-dovn display Of the entire 
100 8quare mile vorld) could be used to send the friendly 
craft to specified locations in the vorld and to enter scout 
autopilot vaypoints. The friendly craft action8 vhich vere 
u8ed to construct action strings include: - goto 
vaypoint specified by the map cursor location3 wAw - attack 
an enemy craft vith a missile; aLa - load cargo; W a -  
unload cargo and replenish fuel and missiles at home ba8e; 
rP* - patrol in a circular pattern; a n a  - rise above tree 
level; - descend below tree level. SubJocts could 
construct string. of these actions prior to the time at 
which their execution vas desired. This feature va8 
included in an attempt to make some components of planning 
behavior directly ob8ervable. These command strings could 
be modified in real time by a series of pu8h-buttons that 
alloved 8UbjeCt8 to abort current strings, enable nev 
strings, interrupt active strings, and s k i p  single actions 
within active 8tring8. 
Twelve cargo and eighteen enemy craft vere distributed 
throughout the vorld and vere not shovn on the map display 
until they vere sighted by sensor8 cantered at the scout and 
each of the four friendly craft. The density of cargo in 
the lightly forested regions vas5 approximately tvice the 
cargo density in the open and heavily forested regions. 
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Actual cargo locations vere determined by generating 
locatiqns vith a pseudo-randor number generator according to 
the forest density constraints. 
The sensors used by the five craft to sight cargo and 
enemy craft vi11 be LnfOtmally referred to ab "radar", 
although explicit radar properties vere not simulated. The 
radar had a range of 1.5 miles vhile the scout vas above 
tree levol, and a range of 0.4 miles for the scout belov 
tree level and for the friendly craft at all altitudes. The 
eighteen enery craft Consisted of six enemy helicopters that 
roved at the same speed as the friendly craft, six tank? 
that moved 8lightly slover than the friendly craft, and six 
stationary emplacements. The locations of the stationary 
emplacements vere generated vith the same method w e d  to 
place the twelve cargo. The initial locations of the mobile 
enemy craft vere random, and the enemy craft motions veze 
determined vith a seri-random valk algorithm. The motions 
vere only semi-random in that each one of the s i x  tank8 and 
each of the six helicopters vere constrained to occupy one 
o f  six rectangular sectors into vhich the vorld vas divided. 
This feature kept the mobile ene8y craft dispersed within 
the vorld. An enemy craft could only exit its designated 
sector if it vas attacking a friendly craft. 
The primary task involved searching the vorld vith 
radar to discover and process the twelve cargo and eighteen 
enemy craft. A major component of the ta8k involved 
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management of the scout and friendly craft resource8. All 
five craft began the mi88iOn vith a full tank of fuel and 
five missiles that could be used to attack enemy craft. 
Fuel consumption rates vere designed so that each craft vas 
required to return to home base to refuel at least once at 
SOM point in the middle thizd of the mission. Each enemy 
attack episode typically u8ed betveen one and three mis- 
siles. An unarmed friendly craft that engaged an enemy 
craft from vhich it could not escape (an enemy helicopter) 
va8 destroyed. The scout helicopter and fri8ndly heli- 
copters could not escape from enemy helicopters because all 
the helicopters traveled at the 8ame M X h U m  speed. Tha 
scout and friendly craft could, though, 
tanks as the tanks traveled at 75% of the 
escape from enemy 
B8%imU8 Speed Of 
the helicopters. 
Pliendly craft could be zesupplied vith missiles at any 
tine by returning to home base. The number of cargo that 
could be carried by a friendly craft at any one tire vas 
constrained and thus repre8entad another complication for 
resouzce management. Although this number depended on the 
(random) veiqht o f  the loaded cargo, the maximum number of 
cargo that could typically be carried vas three. The 
problem of achieving an efficient utilization of craft 
resouzces required behavior that vould typically be de- 
scribed as requiring extensive planning and anticipation. 
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Subjects used tvo dynamic, color, computer-generated 
information display8 to perform the task. The map display, 
the center display in Figure 1, shoved irregularly shaped 
regions of open ground, light forest, and heavy forest in 
different colors (brovn, light green, and dark green, 
respectively). Home base va8 displayed as a vhite circle, 
and the po8itions of the scout and four friendly craft vere 
displayed as small, numbered, blue circles. Any enemy craft 
and cargo that had been discovered vere also displayed as 
small Color coded circles. The positions of moving objects 
vere updated once per second. 
A second display, the rightmost di8play in Figure 1; 
vas divided into three distinct areas. The bottom portion of 
this display shoved a dynamic inside-out viev of the terrain 
through vhich the scout was traveling. When the scout was 
in an open region, zero to three trees vera typically vithin 
the 2000-foot scout viewing range and appeared on the 
inside-out display. When the scout vas in heavy forest, 
eight to thirty trees appeared, and the resulting tree 
avoidance task vas considerably more difficult. The mlddle 
portion o f  this display lndicated resource information, 
varning messages (for fuel, lock-on by enemy radar, e.g.1, 
mission time remaining, the state of scout control modes 
(manual vs. automatic), and points earned. Re8OUrCe 
information for the scout (fuel, altitude, number of 
misailes remaining, weight capacity remaining) vas the 
i 
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default information shown in the resource area, although 
corresponding information for each of the four friendly 
craft was available on a call-up basis. The top portion o t  
this display indicated the lists of couand8 that had been 
assignod to each of the friendly craft. 
In the tvo-person crev condition, one 8ubject, called 
the navigator, was primarily re8pon8ible for tho control of 
the four friendly craft via the text editor and push- 
button8, The other: subject, called the pilot, vad primarily 
responsible for the control o f  the rcout craft via u n u a l  
control joystick8. the pilot was provided with a duplicate 
set of pU8h-bUttOn8 to aid the navigator in the control OS 
the friendly craft although such activity was rarely 
observed in the experiments described below. 
In the one-perron condition, the subject was required 
to time-share between the task dorands of friendly craft 
control via the text editor and control of the scout. 
Autopilot control of the 8cout vas available to relieve the 
subject from the demands of manual scout control but at the 
coat of the significant resource penalties mentioned above. 
EXDOE iDents 
Three experiments were performed by three different 
experimenters. The first tvo experiments (Plamondon, 19851 
Lytton, 1987) were identical except for the manipulation of 
Crew 8120. Each of the80 experiment8 Used five subjects (or 
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tvo-person teams) for tventy sessions: ?our different 
forest.configurations and four different placements of the 
cargo and enemy craft vere used so that subjects vould not 
be able to remember the locations of these objects from 
session to session. Two different point payoff structures 
vere used to vary vhether cargo loading and unloading or 
enemy craft destruction vas emphasized each mlssion. The 
maximum point8 attainable for each mission, though, vas held 
constant across payoff structure. Detail8 of these exper- 
iments and a descriptive characterization of performance 
differences due to crev 8ize can be found in Lytton (1967) 
and Hiller, Jagacin~ski, Plamondon, Lytton, and Klrlik 
(1967) . The task instructions given to subjects are 
provided in Appendix A. 
One rcrjor result of the tvo initial experiments vas 
that very large performance differences vere observed 
betveen crevs vithin the same crev s i ze  groups. Although 
the m a n  performance of the five one-person crevs vas about 
one third the mean tvo-person crev performance (758 vs. 2514 
points), one of the one-person crevs vas able to score 
higher th8n the mean tvo person 8core. Due to these strong 
individual difference8, the modeling approach used here 
attempt8 to describe behavior at the level of the individual 
subject, since aggregating data over 8ultlph subjects could 
lead to misleading or meaningless information. Ipecifical- 
ly, the data from these experiments that vi11 be modeled are ' 
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t h e  h ighes t  s c o r i n g  tvo-person c r e v  and t h e  h i g h e s t  s co r ing  
one-person CLOV. The h ighes t  s c o r i n g  one-person c r e v  v i11  
be referred t o  as Crev 1. The h i g h e s t  scoring tvo-person 
crev vi11 be referred t o  as  Crev 2. 
Another iapllcation of thaso  s t r o n g  l n d l v l d u a l  d i f -  
f e rences  fo r  8odel ing  s k i l l e d  performance i8 t h a t  t v e n t y  
ses8ions m y  not have been enough exper ience  t o  a l l o v  a l l  
subject8 t o  reach a n  a s p p t o t i c  performance level. I n  order 
t o  better understand the  na tu re  o f  sk i l l ed  one-person crew 
performance, an  a d d i t i o n a l  expe r i aen t  vas performd by t h e  
present au tho r  u s i n g  three subjects for a larger number of 
80SLliOn8. One O f  the80 subject8 (the pZe8ent a u t h o r )  V a b  
h i g h l y  8ki l led a t  t h e  t a s k  and 8erVed aa a n  %xper tm subject 
and as a t r a i n e r  for  t h e  o t h e r  t v o  subjects. T h i s  s u b j e c t  
v i11  be referred t o  as Crev 1. 
The o n l y  data from t h i s  las t  experiment cons idered  here 
is t h e  performance of t h e  expe r t  subject. As one goa l  of 
t h i s  experiment vas  t o  develop and d e f i n e  a consan8ual 
e x p e r t  strategy for performing t h e  task, the e x p e r t  rrubject 
played tho role of an on-l ine adv i so r  t o  t h e  tvo t r a i n e e s  
fot most o f  t h e  duration of t h e  experiment. A t  t h e  end of 
t h e  e x p e r i ~ e n t ,  e ight  one-person c r e v  s e s s i o n r  were per- 
formed by each of t h e  trainees v i t h  limited i n t e r a c t i o n  v i t h  
t h e  expert adv i so r .  Although no e x p l i c i t  adv ice  vas  g lven  
by t h e  e x p e r t  in these las t  e ight  s e s s i o n s ,  verbal trans- 
c r i p t i o n s  indicated some i n t e r a c t i o n  betveen t h e  t r a i n e e s  
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and the expert so this data vas excluded from analysis. 
To suuarize, empirical data for three crev8 vas chosen 
for use in the modeling exercise discussed belov: the best 
one-person and best tvo-per8on crev8 fro8 the first tvo 
experiments, and the expert subject from the last exper- 
iment. The final eight sessions for each crev vere used. 
These eight sessions comprise tvo sessions each on four 
different vorld configurations (forest location and object 
placement 1 . One of the tvo sessions vith each vorld 
configuration vas perfor8ed vith the point structure payoff 
favoring loading and unloading cargo, while the other 
ses8ion v88 performed vith the point payoff 8tructuie 
favoring attacking enemy craft. The entire experimental 
design is summarized in Table 1 on the follovlng page. 
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TABLE 1 
EXPIAIHBNTAL DBBIOW 
Design f o r  Crews 1 and 2 
Session World Configurat ion Payoff hpha8 18 
. 0 ~ 0 . ~ 0 . . 0 . . 0 0 ~ 0 0 . ~ ~ ~ ~ . . . 0 . ~ . ~ . ~ ~ 0 0 ~ . ~ ~ . 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 ~  
1 World 1 Snemy Craft 
2 World 4 Cargo 
3 World 1 Cargo 
4 World 4 Bnemy C r a f t  
S 
6 
3 
0 
World 2 
World 3 
World 2 
World 3 
Design for  Crew 1 
Ihreay C r a f t  
Cargo 
Cargo 
Snemy C r a f t  
S 
6 
7 
8 
World 1 
World 4 
World 1 
World 4 
Snemy C r a f t  
Cargo 
Cargo 
Bnemy Craft 
Mote: Sess ions  1-6 are the f i n a l  8 Se8SiOns f o r  a l l  sub jec t s  
Payoff S t r u c t u r e s  
P o i n t s  
W e n t  
oo~~.~oo.oo~~~~o..-o~.o~~oo.~.o~ 
Cargo Unloaded a t  HOM 
Bnery Hel icopter  Destroyed 
I n e r y  Tank Destroyed 
Snemy Smplacement Destroyed 
Friendly Craf t  De8troyed 
Friendly out  o f  Fue l  
n 8 X h U D  PO88iblO S C O l S  
Avarded with Emphasis on: 
Cargo Enemy C r a f t  
~o....~~~-oo.o~.~-.~~.~..~~o 
400 100 
100 400 
60 240 
4 0  160 
-400 -400 
-100 -100 
6000 6000 
CJiAPTm I f f  
CREW PII(P0RWCIC PROFILIS 
Jn t roduc t ion  
I n  t h i s  chapter, performance p r o f i l e s  o f  each of t h e  
three crew w i l l  be dovelopod. Tho goal is t o  oxplore  any 
performance d i f f e r e n c e s  between c r e v s  - t h a t  should be 
captured by a gene ra t ive  dO8CriptivO model. First, a set  of 
performance reasures is described t h a t  were developed t o  8id 
i n  identifying strategic and compotency related d i f f e rencob  
between t h e  three crevs. Uext, t h e  performance profiles of 
t h e  three C L e V 8  based on these I e a 8 U Z O d  are compared. 
l i n a l l y ,  i n fe rences  ba8ed on these prof i les  are made t h a t  
suggest differences betveen crev8 i n  terms of t h e  d i ~ e n 8 i o n s  
along which they  have decomposed t h e  t a s k  i n t o  8ubtask8, and 
t h e  vays in vhich they  have created and prioritized task 
subgor ls  . These inference8 8erve t h e  role of hypothem8 
t h a t  v i11  be sub8equently eva lua ted  i n  t h e  modeling e x e r c i s e  
which I8 di8cu8sed i n  t h e  fol lowing chapters. 
P e r f  otaance ne asutes 
Though it provides  a gene ra l  summary of prof ic iency,  a 
scalar performance raasure s u c h  a8 p o i n t s  8cored is far too 
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coarsely grained to provide meaningful diagnostic infor- 
mation In a task of the complexity studied in this research, 
Bven in a relatively simple task such a8 single axis 
tr8cking, there are many di8tinct ti- hl8tOri8S the 8ubject 
may produce and yot achieve the same scalar measure (0.9. 
rms error) of performance. This im OSmCi811y true of sub- 
optimal performance, since optimal performance usually 
constrains tho number of alternative strategies that can 
result in the theoretically maximum performance score. In 
the case of sub-optimal performance, the degroes of fteedom 
available to the operator to control the system can usually 
b. coordinated in numerou8 V8y8 to 8Chi8Ve the 88W result: 
This phenomenon MY be summarized by noting that a 
given measore, in addition to providing a metric of perform- 
ance, defines an equivalence class of  behaviors that lead to 
each level of performance defined by that measuze. Con- 
strued in this vay, the task of developing meadures that are 
suitably diagnostic is one and tho same aa deterrtning tho8e 
behavioral differences that are meaningful and those that 
are not, given the purposes o f  analysis. Maningf ul 
behavioral differences for the purposes of generative 
modeling include those that are indicative of differences in 
the way crews have decomposed the task into Subtask8 and 
created and prioritized subgoals. O f  particular interest is 
hov the overall task demand8 veze decomposed into separate 
demands for scout and friendly craft activity. 
i 
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The performance wasures have been designed t o  be 
s e n s i t i v e  t o  the a l t e r n a t i v e  vays t h a t  crevs can  use  t h e  
capabilities of t h e  scout and friendly craft t o  search t h e  
vo r ld  f o r  cargo and enemy, process  these o b j e c t s ,  and manage 
craft  resources .  M a s u r e r  i n c l u d e  p o i n t s  scored,  cargo and 
enemy craft sighted (friendly craft vezsus s c o u t ) ,  cargo 
loaded ( f r i e n d l y  craft  versub s c o u t ) ,  enemy craft  des t royed  
( f r i o n d l y  cr8ft versus s c o u t ) ,  and amount of t he  vo r ld  
searched, also by f r i e n d l y  and s c o u t .  The time s p e n t  idle 
by t h e  s c o u t  and f r i e n d l y  craft vas  a l so  meamred as  an 
indicator of t h e  I n a b i l i t y  of t h e  operator to  cope with t h e  
m u l t i p l e  t a s k  demands. The average t i r e  betveen load ing  a 
cargo and unloading it a t  hone base vas  measured as a 
pO88lbh i n d i c a t o r  of strategic d i f f e r e n c e s  between crevs. 
The average number of cargo unloaded per t r i p  t o  home base 
V a s  8 e a 8 U t O d  as a pO88ibh i n d i c a t o r  O f  whether CLOVb ve re  
process ing  cargo s e r i a l l y  or i n  parallel. (8ee Lytton, 
1987; and Hiller et .  al.,  1987 for  an  a p p l i c a t i o n  of these 
measures t o  a l l  Live one and tvo-person c r e v s . )  
Iriguro 2 on t h e  f o l l o v i n q  page shov8 t h e  p o i n t s  scored 
by each c r e v  f o r  each of t h e  e ight  f i n a l  s e s s i o n s .  A8 
i nd ica t ed  i n  t h e  diagram, each crev had one s e s s i o n  v i t h  
t o t a l  p o i n t s  scored  cons ide rab ly  lover  t h a n  t h e i r  average 
score over these e ight  s e s s i o n s .  For t h i s  reason, t h e  
l o v e s t  s c o r i n g  s e s s i o n  for each c r e v  vas  discarded f ror  t h e  
a n a l y s i s .  Comparisons ve re  then  made between each palt of 
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c r e v s  for each performance w a d u r e  over t h e  seven remaining 
s e s s i o n s  us ing  t-tests v i t h  a lpha  level = 0.05 .  
One p o t e n t i a l  criticirm o f  t h i s  method o f  data analysis 
is t h a t  t h e  probabili ty of Type I error for  t h e  conjunct ion  
of test8 18 underestimated by probabi l i ty  O f  T W  I error 
for t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  crev comparison tests. Tho mthod is 
defended on t h e  ground8 t h a t  b o t h  c r e v  size  (one ve r sus  t v o  
parsons)  and exper ience  l e v e l  ( l o v  ve r sus  high)  should be 
i n d i v i d u a l l y  treated a t  t h e  0.05  l e v e l  i n  analogy v i t h  t h e  
vay i n  vhich m u l t i p l e  experimental  manipulat ions are treated 
i n  an analpi8 o f  variance (ANOVA). The p t e sen t  experiment- 
a1 d e s i g n  is e s s e n t i a l l y  a n  incomplete 2 x 2 f ac to r id  
design. I t  is i n c o ~ p l e t o  s i n c e  no obse rva t ions  are a v a i l -  
able i n  t h e  high experience,  2-persOn crev condi t ion .  A 
standard AWOVA on t h i s  2 X 2 factorial  des ign  vould t y p i c a l -  
l y  treat  each of t h e  t v o  ~ n i p u l a t i o n s  a t  the  0.05 alpha 
l eve l .  as is done here. 
rison of Czev P e r f o w n c e  
t h e  avezage number of p o i n t s  scored per s e s s i o n  appears 
i n  Wigure 3 on t h e  f o l l o v i n g  page. The black bars i n  t h i s  
and 8ucceedlng f i g u r e s  i n d i c a t e  va lues  of t h e  mean p lus  and 
minus one standard d e v i a t i o n .  Crevs 2 and B did  no t  d i f f e r  
on t h i s  measure but  both of these CLIVS scored higher than  
Crev 1. Recall t h a t  Crev 1 indicates t h e  h i g h e s t  scoring 
(exc luding  t h e  e x p e r t  s u b j e c t )  one-parson crev, Crev 2 
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indicates t h e  h ighes t  s co r ing  tVO-p~rsOn crev,  and Crev B is 
t h e  expe r t  one-person crew. While it is n o t  s u t p r i s i n g  t h a t  
t h e  tvo-porson c r e v  scored higher  than  t h e  one-person crev, 
it is s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  t h e  expe r t  crev vas able t o  
s c o r e  as v e l 1  as t h e  tvo-person crev. 
I t  1s clear t h a t  it must be explained how t h e  export 
crev,  a l though  t ime-sharing t h e  demands of scou t  and 
f r i e n d l y  craft con t ro l ,  was ab10 t o  score as  woll as t h e  
tvo-person c r e v  vho vere  able t o  decompose t h e  t a 8 k  of scou t  
and friendly craft c o n t r o l  betveen t v o  people. I t  should be 
noted that  the time-sharing demand8 for Crev I vere quite 
extans lve ,  as t h i s  crev alvaya used manual c o n t r o l  of the 
scout .  The o the r  one-person crev ,  Crev I,  con818tent ly  wed 
a u t o p i l o t  c o n t r o l  of t h e  scout ,  presumably as  a vay of 
coping v i t h  t h e s e  t i R O - s h 4 ~ r i n q  demands. Crev 2, t h e  tvo- 
person c r e v  v i t h  a m e m b e r  dedicated t o  s c o u t  con t ro l ,  
cons i s t en t ly  used scou t  manual c o n t r o l .  
The next  three graphs i n  Figure 3 indicate a s i ~ i l a r  
performance trend f o r  t h e  three crevs i n  terms of enemy 
craft  t h a t  vere destroyed. Whether measured i n  t o t a l  or by 
scou t  and f r i e n d l y  craft independently,  Crews  B and 2 
destroyed t h e  same number of enemy craft, and both of these 
c r e v s  vare superior t o  Crev 1. T h i s  measure, then, is no 
more d i a g n o s t i c  than  p o i n t s  scored f o r  expla in ing  perform- 
ance differences. l i g u r o  4 on t h e  fo l lov ing  pa90 suggests 
t h a t  t he  same t r e n d  hold8 for  t o t a l  cargo unloaded and cargo 
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unloaded by f r i e n d l y  craft. For cargo unloaded by t h e  
s c o u t , ~ h o v e v e r ,  there vas no d i f f e r e n c e  betveen Crevs 1 and 
2. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  Crev 1 actually unloaded more cargo v i t h  
t h e  scout t han  d id  Crev E, a l though t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  is s ~ a l l  
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  Crev E ' s  superiority t o  Crev 1 i n  terms of 
t h e  number of cargo unloaded by the  f r i e n d l y  craft. There 
vaa also no difference betveen any pair of c r e v s  i n  terms of 
number of f r i e n d l y  craf t  l o s t  per s e s s i o n  due t o  
d e s t r u c t i o n  by enemy craft .  
The primary reason t h a t  Crev 1 unloaded fever cargo 
than t h e  o t h e r  t v o  s u b j e c t s  can  be seen  i n  t h e  a n a l p i s  of 
cargo discovery i n  Irigure S. Note t h a t  CreV 1 discovored 
less cargo v i t h  t h e  s c o u t  t han  t h e  o t h e r  t v o  c revs ,  a l though 
he discovered t h e  same number of cargo v i t h  t h e  friendly 
craft as Crevs 1 and 1. A l l  three c r e v s  d iscovered  about 
4.4  cargo per session v i t h  t h e  friendly craft .  Crev 1 
unloaded an average of 4.3 cargo  per s e s s i o n  v i t h  t h e  
f r i e n d l y  craft, vhereas  t h e  other t w o  creva unloaded about 
t v i c e  t h i s  many v i t h  t h e  f r i e n d l y  craf t .  Thus, Crev 1 
appears  t o  have been able t o  use  t h e  friendlies t o  unload 
a11 and on ly  t h e  cargo  s i g h t o d  by t h e  friendlies, vhereas  
t h e  o t h e r  czevs vere able t o  unload these cargo v i t h  t h e  
f r i e n d l i e s  i n  addi t ion t o  a n  equal number of cargo  t h a t  vere  
sighted by t h e  scou t .  T h i s  fact sugges t s  t h a t  Crev 1 rarely 
sighted cargo v i t h  t h e  s c o u t  and t h e n  passed these cargo o f f  
t o  t h e  f r i e n d l i e s  t o  be loaded, vhereas  t h i s  vas  a common 
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occurrence f o r  Crevs 2 and B. T h i s  difference is most 
l i k e l y , t h e  r e s u l t  of t h e  fact t h a t ,  f o r  Czev 1, t h e  s c o u t  
s i g h t e d  so f e v  cargo t h a t  t h e  scout could b8 used t o  load 
a l l  those t h a t  vere sighted. For t h e  other tvo czevs,  t h e  
s c o u t  vas  used much more e f f e c t i v e l y  t o  s i g h t  cargo and t h u s  
coopera t ion  v i t h  t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft vas  r equ i r ed  t o  load 
these cargo and carry them t o  ho8e base. 
?igure 5 a180 sugges t s  t h e  f i rs t  d i f f e r e n c e  betveen 
c r e v s  2 and I, and t h i s  difference also appears  t o  be due t o  
coopera t ion  betveen t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft and t h e  scou t .  Note 
that Crev 8 unloaded a greater p ropor t ion  of t h e  cargo t h a t  
veze d iscovered  ( v i t h i n  each mi8sion) t o  home ba80 t han  did 
Crev 2 (938 vs. 8 0 8 ) .  One exp lana t ion  of t h i s  result is 
t h a t  Crev E simply di8covered t h e  cargo earlier i n  t h e  
mission than  Crev 2 (vhich  vould a lso result  i n  a greater 
p ropor t ion  unloaded a t  home), bu t  a n  a n a l y s i s  of t he  cargo 
8 i g h t i n g  times does not  suppor t  t h i s  exp lana t ion .  (No 
differences ve re  found betveen any pair of czevs  on t h i s  
D O O I U t O  ) 
? igure  6 on t h e  f o l l o v i n g  page i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  both 
Crevs 2 and B unloaded t h e  same nu8ber of cargo  per t r i p  
home by t h e  s c o u t  (0 .41 ,  and they unloaded t h e  same number 
of cargo per t r i p  home by each f r i e n d l y  craft ( 1 . 6 ) *  Thus, 
these t v o  c r e v s  ve re  similar i n  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  usage of 
t h e  scout and f r i e n d l y  craft. Both c r e v s  unloaded approx- 
imately four  tires a s  many cargo per t r i p  home by a f r i e n d l y  
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craft as vere unloaded per trip home by the scout. On the 
other hand, Crev 1 shoved no such differential usage of the 
scout and friendly craft. Both the scout and friendly craft 
unloaded approximately the same number of cargo per trip to 
home base for thi8 crev. These facts sugge8t that one 
factor that may have contributed to Crev 1 's  poor per- 
formance vas that he vaa inaensitive to the functional 
dlfferences betveen the scout and friendly cr8ft. By 
essantlally treating the scout as another friendly craft 
vith regard to cargo processing, Crev 1 did not appear to 
make beet use of the superior ability of the s c o u t  to 
dhcover cargo and enemy craft. Crevs 2 and 1, on the other 
hand, appeared to have recognized that the scout va8 best 
used to search the vorld due to its larger radar radius. 
these crevs used the friendly craft to proces8 the cargo 
that vere discovered, incrtead of diverting the scout from 
its primary task of searching the vorld. 
The next diagrams presented in ?iguro 7 suggest some 
addltional dlfferences betveen the three crevs in terms of 
the utiliaation of the scout and friendly craft. A measure- 
ment of craft idlaneas vas performed by calculating the 
percentage of session time that each craft va8 stationary. 
While this measure slightly overestimates true idleness due 
to stationary craft activity (cargo loading, e.g.1, these 
stationary actlvltles comprised a very small fraction of 
total mlrslon time. While it is not surprlslng th8t Crev 2 
a 
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va8 superior t o  both t h e  one-person c r e v s  i n  terms of 
minimizing s c o u t  i d l eness ,  it 18 s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  Crev B vas  
s u p e r i o r  t o  t h e  other t v o  c r e v s  i n  terms of minimizing 
f r i e n d l y  craft i d l ~ ~ ~ 8 .  Th i s  fact 1s p e c u l i a r  given that 
Crev H had t o  time share c o n t r o l  of t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft v i t h  
manual c o n t r o l  of t h e  scou t ,  whereas Crew 2 had one c r e v  
member dedicated t o  f r i e n d l y  craft c o n t r o l ,  and Crev 1 used 
8 U t O p i l O t  Cont ro l  O f  t he  s c o u t  and V a 8  thu8  p r e s ~ ~ b l y  di8- 
tracted from friendly craf t  c o n t r o l  less o f t e n  t h a n  vas  Crev 
H. Perhaps one reason for Czev E ' s  superiority i n  t h i s  
regard is t h e  drastic d i f f e r e n c e  i n  the number o f  infor:- 
mation requests t h a t  were made f o r  f r i e n d l y  craft s ta tus ' .  
T h i s  information COn818ted of re80urce levels ( f u e l ,  
missiles, and ve igh t  c a p a c i t y  remaining) and craft a l t i t u d e .  
While t h i s  major d i f f e r e n c e  betveen t h e  c r e v s  v i l l  be 
dlscussed i n  greater detai l  later, it appears t o  have been 
t h e  case t h a t  Crev E vas able t o  make decisions concerning 
f r i e n d l y  craft a c t i v i t y  v i t h o u t  e x p l i c i t l y  c o n s u l t i n g  t h i s  
information,  r e s u l t i n g  in more speedy d e c i s i o n s  and t h u s ,  
1088 f r i e n d l y  craf t  id l eness .  
t h o  f i n a l  graphs i n  Figure 8 suggest t h a t ,  a l though 
Crew 1c vas  less able t o  keep t h e  s c o u t  from id lane88 than  
vas  Crev 2, Crev B searched t h e  vor ld  v i t h  t h e  s c o u t  i o t a  
completely than  Crev 2. These facts vould sear t o  sugges t  
that t h e  search p a t h s  generated f o r  t h e  s c o u t  by Crev B verb 
superior i n  term8 of t h e  amount of unsearched area covered 
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per u n i t  of time t o  the  pa ths  generated by Crev 2. Crev 1 
vas  i n f e r i o r  t o  t h e  o t h e r  t v o  crevb i n  terms of both area 
searched i n  t o t a l  and area searched by t h e  s cou t .  The fact 
t h 8 t  t h i s  crev covered more area e x c l u s l v a l y  with t h e  
f r i e n d l y  craft  than  t h e  other t v o  c r e v s  is probably due t o  
t h e  fact t h a t  t h i s  crev searched less area with t h e  scout. 
Summdrv and H ~ ~ O t h e 8 8 s  
I t  is clear t h a t  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  of performance is no t  
equal t o  t h e  t a 8 k  of c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f y i n g  a l l  t h e  8trategic 
and competency related difference8 betveen t h e  three crevb. 
M ~ e t t h e h s s ,  some t e n t a t i v e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  can  be made'; 
they are o n l y  t e n t a t i v e  s i n c e  t h e y  v i 1 1  8Ub80qUently be 
evalua ted  i n  t h e  modeling t h a t  f o l l o v s .  
I t  is clear t h a t  Crev 1 vas  i n f e r i o r  t o  tha  o t h e r  c r e v s  
on most performnce measures. The primary teason appears t o  
be a n  i n a b i l i t y  t o  e f f e c t i v e l y  search t h e  vo r ld  v i t h  t h e  
s c o u t .  By u s i n g  a u t o p i l o t  rather t h a n  manual c o n t r o l ,  this 
c r e v  vas  able t o  maintain e f f e c t i v e  f r iendly craft c o n t r o l ,  
but  s u f f e r e d  i n  t h e  long run since f e v e r .  ca rgo  and enemy 
craft ve re  d iscovered ,  and therefore t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft 
could n o t  be used t o  greatest bene f i t .  Sore of t h e  s c o u t ' s  
8earchinq  ine f fec t ivene88  v88 s u r e l y  due t o  t h e  increased  
f u e l  usage and s l a v e r  speed under a u t o p i l o t  c o n t r o l ,  bu t  it 
vas  a l so  due t o  t h e  fact  t h a t  Crev 1 used t h e  scou t  t o  load 
s l q n l f i c a n t l y  more cargo t h a n  d id  t h e  other one-person crev .  
5 1  
T h i s  reflects an  i n s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  t h e  major func t iona l  
d i f f e r e n c e  botveen the s c o u t  and t h e  friendly craft (seatch 
r a d i u a ) .  On t h e  other hand, Crev 1'8 behavior can  also be 
vieved as a method for a impl i fy ing  the  t a s k  by on ly  operat- 
ing v i t h i n  a restricted s e c t i o n  of t h e  vor ld .  A 8eCOnd 
possible 8trategy is rugge8ted by the  fact  t h a t  t h i s  crew 
- never queued a c t i o n  scripts for t h e  friendly craft, possibly 
i n d i c a t i n g  reactive behavior or  behavior v i t h  a 8 h O Z t  
p lanning horizon. T h i s  hypothesi8 is p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  e v a l u a t e  s i n c e  a lack of queued a c t i o n  acr ipts  does n o t  
eliminate t h e  po8s ib i l i ty  t h a t  f u t u r e  scripts vera  planned 
but  n o t  implemented v i a  t h e  t e x t  editor u n t i l  they verb  
needed . 
'S ince  Crevs 2 and E vere  slmllar i n  terms of most o f  
t h e  o v e r a l l  performance ~ a s u r e s ,  t h e  major fact t o  be 
expla ined  is hov Crev B, as a one-person crev ,  a t t a i n e d  
performance equal  t o  t h a t  of a tvo-person crev .  I t  has  been 
noted t h a t  a l though Crev B vas  le88 able t o  keep t h e  s c o u t  
i n  motion, he covered more unsearched area v i t h  t h e  scout 
than  d id  C r e V  2. T h i s  fact suggest8 t h a t  Crew B ' 8  8 C O U t  
search p a t h s  vere  r o ~ h o v  more e f f i c i e n t .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
a l though Crew B had t o  tire-share s c o u t  c o n t r o l  v i t h  
f r i e n d l y  craft c o n t r o l ,  he  vas  able t o  minimize f r i end ly  
craft  idlOne88 better than  could Crew 2. Perhaps t h i s  fact 
is due t o  a more r a p i d  decision-making process t o  determine 
friendly craft a c t i v i t y ,  as  Crev B ' s  l a c k  of information 
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request8 would suggest. Finally, Crew B vas seen to be more 
effective in bringing the cargo that were discovered to home 
base than vas Crev 2. Perhaps this difference vas due to a 
degree of coordlnatlon betvoen the scout (vhlch dlscovered 
most of the cargo) and the friendly craft (vhlch carried 
most of the cargo home). 
Clearly, the performance mabures used above do not 
entail any of these hypotheses concerning crev differences. 
The generative 8odeling approach di8CUSSed In the following 
chapter8 vas designed to provido a method by vhlch the88 
i88Ue8 can b8 addressed more precisely. 
cnaQ(rm xv 
MODELXlM ARPROACH 
You would be surprised hov hard 
it often is to translate an action 
into thought. - Karl Kraus 
ll&mmmQ 
In this chapter the approach for robeling the three 
crev8 performing the laboratory task will be 6i8CU88ed. 
First ,  though, a brief statement concerning the focus ob 
this investigation is -de. This is done to reatrict the 
scope of the problem to 8anageable size, to halp define vhat 
other p8ycho1oglcal research is relevant to the problem, and 
to identify candidate approach88 for modeling crev perform- 
ance Then, other empirical and theoretical results 
concerning human information proce88inq and 8killed human 
performance are discussed that are relevant to the problem 
as defined. Then, an array of candidate modeling approaches 
are dlsCU88ed and their strenqths and weaknesses are 
identified vith respect to demands of this modeling task. 
Oinally, a general rodeling fZa8eVOrk for describing human 
perception, cognition, and action is developed. 'Phi8 
framework vi11 be made mbre specific and applied to crevs 
performing the experimental task in the folloving chapter. 
53 
54 
The ?ocus of Inauirv 
Perh8p8 it is best to preface the review of existing 
p8yChOlOglCal evidence by delineating exactly which psych- 
ological phenomena are o f  central importance to this 
investigation. This step is required due to the fact that 
the complexity of the t88k 8ervos to raise 8 bvildering 
array of p8ychologlcal is8ues. ?lrst, i 8  8hould be clear 
fro# the d8ta 8election procems (aggregating over tho final 
sessions) that learning (whether perceptual, cognitive, or 
motor) vi11 not be dealt vith h e m .  In addition, very mlow 
levelw or t88k-independent porcoptual and rotor processes 
are also excluded from consideration, as thuse phenomena arb 
better studied in more tightly controlled experiments and 
more highly constrained tasks than the one w e d  here. 
The primary phenomenon of interest is hov the three 
crews used the resources available (the four friendly craft 
and the scout) to accomplish the single goal of scoring 
points. O f  lesser interest is hov the  crews %anageda their 
physical interaction vlth the interface in order to imple- 
w n t  the friendly craft control activity, although, for the 
purposes of generative modeling, this issue rust be ad- 
dres8ed to some extent. Of major interest, then, is hov 
crevb decomposed the single goal of scoring points into a 
set of interaedlate goals or tasks, hov they constrained and 
coordinated the many degree8 of freedom available for craft 
control, and hov particular craft actions vere cho8en at 
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particular times (both current and planned actions). The 
analysis of  performance in the previous chapter suggested 
that crevs may have differed along all these task di- 
mensions. 
It must be kept in mind that although the task of craft 
management is quite complex, there vas not much time 
available for crevs to perform their planning and decision- 
making tasks. This fact becomes clear vhen the number o f  
action CO~nand8 that vere entered for th. friendly craft via 
the text editor is taken into consideration. Crev 1 entered 
an average of 44.7 CO.Dand8 per session, Crev 2 entered an 
average o f  67.4 commands por session, and crev 1~ averaged 
51.7 friendly control co~mands per session. Taking 50 
commnds as an average, this means that a decision to change 
friendly craft activity vas implemented, on average, every 
36 seconds. This figure doea not include decisions pertain- 
ing to control of the scout craft. In addition, the time 
interval betveen command implementations vas not spent idly 
pondering information display8 since many physical inter- 
actions vith the Interface (editing, maintaining scout 
control, e.g.) also  had to be performed. 
The picture of required control behavior that emerges 
is one of decision-making and planning that vas rapid and, 
at least in the case of Crew IC, potformed simultaneously or 
rapidly tine-shared vith the scout control ta8k that 
required (at least) perceptual-motor performance. The other 
. i  
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tvo crevs ha4 considerably more time to perform the friendly 
craft control task (due either to the use of autopilot scout 
control or a second crev merber) but neither of these crews 
vere able to exceed the performance of CreV 8 .  thus, 
p8ychologiCal mechanisms that are capable of producing 
effective decision-naking and planning in the face of 
considerable task complexity and time pressure appear to be 
required to explain the behavior of skilled crew8 in this 
task . 
P8YChOlOU~Cal Bvidence 
Due in part to the desire to produce wintelligentb 
machines, investigations aiaed at understanding the diffet- 
ences betveen novice and expert behavior in a variety of 
cognitive tasks have become more numerous since the onset of 
the discipline o f  artificial intelligence. Those studies 
that are most interesting from the perspective of this work 
are tho8e that require the huran to solve corplex infor- 
nation proces8lng tasks rapidly. While some findings vlll 
be revieved in this section, additional evidence vi11 also 
be discussed in the folloving section vhere alternative 
modeling approaches are identified and evaluated. 
Chase and ShOn'3 (1973)  studies of expert and novice 
Chess players have suggested that the major difference 
botveen the tvo is in the amount and organization o t  
prestored knowledge rather than in general information 
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plcOCe8808 Experts and novices vere seen to be quite 
similar in terms of search depth, for example, but experts 
vere found to be highly superior in t e r m  of their ability 
to recognize Cha88 configurations a8 similar and meaningful. 
Summarizing hi8 ovn studies O f  Ch888 OXmEt8, DNZOOt ha8 
concluded that: 
the gist of the argument is that a chess po8ltlon, 
and a fortiori an entire game are m i c a L  to the 
one belonging to a certain class, that can be 
handled in a certain vay. (1965)  
W8ter. A Chess position 18 8a8ily recognized a8 
Note the similarity o f  DaOroot's statement above with 8. 
Dreyfus' characterization of skilled decision-making ip 
CODpl8X Mn4Bgethl taskst 
The significant pattern pervading the skill 
acquisition process, as we have described it, 
is the progression from abstract, rational under- 
8tanding in terms o f  isolated elements and rules 
relating them, to immediate situation recognition 
and response based on holistic similarity t o  prior 
concrete experiences. (1984)  
Thus, at least in these tvo complex ta8k domains, it appears 
a8 i f  highly skilled decision-making take8 on a recognition 
and response flavor vhere the altuations that are recognized 
are very complex, yet very quickly assessed. 
Whlle these tvo examples shed little light on the 
nature of the processes underlying situation rocognition and 
response information processing, they do tend to suggest 
that such processing is more similar to perceptually 
oriented processing than the types of 'higher level" 
cognitive information processing that are typically studied 
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by cognitive scientists. Perceptual processing seems not to 
be restricted to simple visual discrimination and identifi- 
cation, but rather seems to be present in wide variety of 
ta8ks in addition to the ches8 and BanagOtial declsion- 
making task8 discussed above. The complex task of playing 
00 ha8 been modeled a8 a perceptual ta8k (Reitman, Wado, and 
Uilcox, 19781, and Smolensky (1986) ha8 even de8cribed the 
task o f  intuiting ansvers to phy8ics problems as perceptual 
i n  nature. The use of Chernoff faces €or the display of 
multidimensional information (Jacob, 1978) is an example 
vhare the format of information presentation ha8 been 
deliberately be8iqned to promote a perceptual mode 02 
processing ln8tead of a serial and deliberate integration of 
t h e  multiple diBen8lOn8. 
POrCOptUal solution8 to cognitive tasks tend to be 
characterized by high 8peed, para1101 processing of spatial 
information (Shifftin and Schneider, 1977; Treisran and 
Golade, 19801, and a radical reduction in the number o f  
decision alternative8 that must be considered by .higher 
levela processing (Chase and Simon, op. cit.). It may be 
the cad0 that, as Keil (1984) has commented, the human 
cognitive system may naturally gravitate tovard this mode of 
proce8sing and will, with experience, di8pen88 vith general 
purpose multi-stage processing routines and opt for reliance 
upon ta8k-specific pre8tored knowledge of the type hypoth- 
esized by Chase and Simon. Anderson (1983) has gone 80 far 
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as t o  sugges t  t h a t  t h e  natural mode of information process- 
i n g  i n  t h e  b r a i n  is h igh ly  parallel and p a t t e r n  o r i en ted .  
While t h e  previous c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of s k i l l e d  c t e v  
performance in t h e  complex c o n t r o l  t a s k  used i n  t h i s  
research I s  p o s s i b l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h i s  perceptua l  s t y l e  
of information processing,  it is q u i t e  clear that a percept- 
url approach 1s not  entailed by t h e  analysis of c r e v  
performance d i 8 C U 8 8 O b  previously.  It vould severely 
misrepresent t h e  re8earch reported here i f  a d i f fe ren t  se t  
of eapirical, albeit  anecdotal ,  evidencm v88 n o t  reported 
that had a s t r o n g  effect  on t h e  selection of a mdelinq 
approach . A s  mentioned pxeviously,  the p r e s e n t  au thor  
served  as a n  e x p e r t  crew and t r a i n e r  for t v o  other crews i n  
t h e  t h i r d  e x p e r i r e n t .  The a d d i t i o n a l  evidence is his ovn 
exper iences  w h i l e  s e r v i n g  t h e  r o l e  of e x p e r t  trainer and on- 
l i n e  advisor t o  these czevd. 
While va tch inq  ovez t h e  shoulder of t h e  t v o  trainees, 
it vas no maze d i f f i c u l t  t o  recommend desired c o n t r o l  
a c t i v i t y  t o  t h e  trainees than  it vas  t o  deter8ine c o n t r o l  
ac t iv i ty  v h i l e  performing " in  t h e  loop." What vas  exceed- 
i n g l y  d i f f l c u l t  vas t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  behind those  
recorrrendations.  What was even more d i f f i c u l t  was t o  
attempt t o  create a corpus of v e r b a l l y  represented proced- 
ural knovledge concerning a overall strategy for pe r fo r8 ing  
t h e  t a 8 k .  When encounter ing any speclflc diSp1ayeb sit- 
u a t i o n  v i t h i n  t h e  con tex t  of t h e  c o n t r o l  t a s k ,  dec i s ion -  
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making vas  found t o  be qu i t e  easy,  but i n  t h e  absence of 
mc-t ua 1 lnDut, t h e  t a 8 k  seemed fo re ign  and lt vas 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  make u s e  o f  vhatever  vas  l8arned t h a t  accounted 
f o r  h i g h l y  s k i l l e d  performance. 
To make t h i s  f r u s t r a t i n g  e r p e r i e n c e  more concre te ,  t h e  
reader should consider vhat  h i s  response vould be i f  asked 
t o  v r i t e  dovn a 8et of procedures f o r  t y i n g  h i s  8hoehces. 
The on ly  vay t h a t  many people report be ing  able t o  create 
such procedures is t o  p h y s i c a l l y  perform t h e  task, and 
Ob8erVO t h e i r  ovn behavior.  What is p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t  
is no t  t h a t  t h e  knovledge is somevhat i naccess ib l e ,  but  
rather t h a t  t h e  knovledge becomes immediately and almost 
effortlesmly deployed vhen asked t o  deal v i t h  t h a  t a s k  i n  8 
concrete, rather t h a n  abstract format.  A more r e l e v a n t  and 
perhaps more tenuous obse rva t ion  is t h a t  t h i s  phenorenon 
does n o t  appear t o  be restricted t o  t h e  domain of per- 
ceptual-motor, or a lov - l eve lw  t a s k s .  For example, t h e  
reader r a y  a lso con8ider  h i s  response t o  t h e  demand t o  v r i t e  
dovn eve ry th ing  he knovs about  h i s  ovn domain of e x p e r t i s e .  
T h i s  humbling and e f f o r t f u l  t a s k  should bo c o n t r a s t e d  v i t h  
t h e  ruch  more s a t i s f y i n g  and e a s i l y  performed t 8 8 k  of 
s o l v i n g  a particular, conc re t e  p r O b h 8  i n  t h a t  domain. Even 
i n  t h i s  case, vha t  seems t o  be produced is no t  a stream of 
expert aknovledqea, b u t  a p r O b h 8  s o l u t i o n  t h a t  on ly  
impl ic i t ly  8pcif ie8 vhat  t h e  e x p e r t  must  have "knovn' t o  
produce t h e  s o l u t i o n .  The p o i n t  of t h i s  e x e r c i s e  is t o  
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suggest that much of what accounts for expertise been8 to be 
intimately keyed to the inputs of the information processing 
wchanism8, and cannot be neatly made distinct from percept- 
ual input. 
The C O U O ~  explanation for the phenonena of inaccess- 
ibility of expert knovledge is th8t that knovledge ha8 
become somhov acompiledw or automatized (cf. Bricsson and 
Simon, 1984; and Anderson, 1976, 0 . g . ) .  Under this vlev, 
the phenomenon that accounts for skill is that intermediate 
steps in tho acomputationa are carried out vithout being 
independently evaluated or ainterpreteda, and thu8, althel 
automation of perforunce is therefore quite a ~ ~ o g o u s  to 
executing a computer algoritha in compiled instead o f  
interpreted modea (Bricsson and Simon, 1984). What is very 
important to note about such theorizing is that all of the 
intermediate steps in the original procedure are preserved 
in the automatized PrOCOdUtO, although 8oae of the8 are no 
longer capable of being verbalized. That is, 8killed 
routines are simply un8killed routines that are speeded up 
due to the fact that their inputs and outputs no longer 
require use of short term aeaory (Prics8on and Slmon, 1984). 
The infornation processes underlying skllled performance are 
thus no different in kind from unskilled processes, other 
than for the fact that they have been stipulated not to 
require use of short term memory. 
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What these exp lana t ions  t y p k a 1 l y  f a i l  t o  expla in ,  
though, is hov e x p a r t  knovledge becomes so e f fo r t l e s s ly  
tapped vhen t h e  e x p e r t  is presented  vith a conc re t e  problem 
(or else he would no t  be considered a n  expert). The 
exp lana t ion  offered here, and one t h a t  seems t o  be c o n s i s t -  
e n t  w i th  t h e  f i n d i n g s  discu88eb above, is that 8uch of t h i s  
*knovledge' is o f t e n  comprised of peICeptUally oriented 
r o u t i n e s  t h a t  are effective o n l y  when vorking v i t h i n  t h e i r  
'design s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , *  i.e. when process ing  input  i n fo r -  
mation. These perceptua l ly-or ien ted  r o u t i n e s  are d i f f e r e n t  
in kind from unskilled processeu vhich do not make u8e of a 
perCeptUa1 prOCO88~ng mode. The inaCCe88ib l l i ty  O f  8 k i l l e ; d  
processes is not  expla ined  by s t i p u l a t i n g  t h a t  they do no t  
use shor t  term memory as  under t h e  au tomat iza t ion  theory, 
but ,  rather, it is expla ined  by t h e  fact  t h a t  a s h i f t  t o  a 
pe rcep tua l  mode of process ing  vi11 e x h i b i t  those f e a t u r e s  
t h a t  are typical of pe rcep tua l  processing,  such  as inaccess- 
i b i l i t y ,  high speed, and parallel processing.  While such a 
s h i f t  my indeed r e s u l t  i n  a lessened use of shor t  term 
aeiory, t h i s  fact need no t  be seen  as  a d e f i n i n g  f e a t u r e  of 
e x p e r t  processing,  bu t  rather a8 a feature t h a t  is exh ib i t ed  
due t o  a s h i f t  i n  ptOCO88ing mode. TO 8 U m M I i Z 0 ,  t h8  
offered V i e w  of t h e  t r an r r i t i on  t o  s k i l l e d  ptOCO88ing 18 t o  
be characterized a.8 a s h i f t  t o  a d i f f e r e n t  k i n d  ( p e r c e p t u a l )  
of proces8ing, rather than  as t h e  same processing occur r ing  
i n  u n s k i l l e d  process ing  t h a t  is crimply speeded u p  and 
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stipulated not to require nemory resources. O f  course, this 
viev can be no more precise than the characterization of 
perceptually-oriented processing, and this i8 one of the 
fundamental goal8 of the modeling exercise. 
It 8hOUld perhapa not come a8 a surpriae that much of 
what accounts for high skill might involve becoming attuned 
to the perceptually available specifics of the situations 
th8t are encountered in a task. I t  i8 8 videly held 
principle in engineering psychology that, vith experience, 
hunan behavior becomes a reflection of the task environment 
(Rasmuzmen, 1983) .  In a vider domain it has been suggested 
by the philosopher Jaspers that people in general bacorb 
"their situations p~rsonified,~ (Murphy, 19781, and, in an 
even vider domain, evolutionary theory suggests that all 
organisrs become intimately attuned to the dorand8 of their 
ecological niche. If this line of reasoning is cloae to 
being correct vith respect to modeling skilled performance, 
s o ~ e  rather severe reatrictions rus t  be placed on the nodal8 
that are held to be candidates for description8 of human 
behavior in coaplex 8 y s t e ~ s .  SOM 8UCh models are revieved 
in the folloving section. 
idate M o w l n U  ADDrOaChOQ 
One class of models that has been propo8ed to deacribe 
human behavior in corplex supervisory control sy8ters is 
based on normative construct8 from decision theory, optimal 
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control theory, and operations research. Normative models 
of the. skilled human controller based on utility theory and 
dynamic programing have been developed by Sheridan (1976 
and 1966, respectively). An explicitly stated assumption of 
Sheridan's (1976) model 18 that %he human operator's 
(and/or computet's) purpose 18 to ~axi~ize an explicit or 
Implicit utility function." A model based on queuing theory 
ha8 been developed by Rouse (1977) to determine dynamic ta8k 
allocation in multitask environments. The PROCRU model 
developed by Baron, Xacharias, Muraldiharan and &ancraft 
(1980) is an adaptation of the optimal control model that 
has been tailored to include procedural information. 
In addition to being normative, all these mod018 share 
another important feature in common: they abstract avay the 
contextual features of the decision-making task and focus on 
abstract, formal features of the deci8iOn problem. This is 
in keeping vith the general approach of the decision 
sciences to find solution methods to problers across the 
many domains in vhich those problems may be aembeddeda. As 
such, the80 88thod8 categorize problem8 by their method8 of 
solution, and necessarily dlspen8a vith the particulars of 
the decision task. Thus, this approach tries to find the 
s a w  solution methods to problems in various contexts, vhere 
the solution process that is selected is based on an 
abstract and formal characterization of the problem. 
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If the remarks of the previous section concerning 
skilled human decision prOCe8808 have any validity, the 
features of human decision-making might suggest a decom- 
position of proble8 solution methods along dimensions nearly 
orthogonal to the dimensions respected by these normative 
modela. Rather th8n coming equipped vith an array of 
various decision-making mthods that are variourly selected 
by abstract features of the problem task, and applied in- 
dependently of context, humans m y  e8ploy an array o f  
approaches that are 8elected primarily by context, and are 
applied nearly independently of vhatever formal structure 
the decision task w y  have. Thus, for example, vhile thb 
deci8ion sciences MY employ different solution techniques 
for choice, inference, or planning talks, due to difference8 
in formal problem structure, skilled human cognition may 
gravitate tovard the sa- solution technique (situation 
recognition and re8ponse) given that this technique 18 
enabled by the 8pecifics o f  the context in vhich the problem 
occurs. On the other hand, the decision theoratic approach 
8ight adopt a linear programming rrolutlon technique, for 
exa8pl8, for a task vith the appropriate structure, regard- 
less of the context in vhich it appears. H U M n  cognition, 
though, MY not respect this abstract invariance in problem 
structure and adopt different solution technique8 depending 
on what type8 of information processing are most readily 
supported by the context in which the problem occurs. 
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A v a s t  array of psychological f ind ings  a t tes t  t o  t h e  
c o n t e x t - s p e c i f i c i t y  of hUm8n information processing.  
Context-specif ic  processing is Characterized by s e n s i t i v i t y  
t o  t h e  s u r f a c e  (Or pezcep tua l ly  available) aspects of a n  
information process ing  problem. T h i s  type of processing is 
i d e n t i f i e d  vhen va r i ance  i n  behavior 1. exhibited due t o  
a l t e r i n g  vay i n  vhich t h e  same (vhen formally characterized) 
problem is presented t o  t h e  human. Many 8tubies have shovn 
t h a t  a set of problems v i t h  i d e n t i c a l  formal s t r u c t u r e  i n  
some abstract pzoblem zepresen ta t ion  are attacked q u i t e  
d l f f e t e n t l y  by humans depending on t h e  c o n t e x t  i n  vhich t h e  
problem is couched. I n  studies of reasoning, Wason a d  
Johnson-Laird (1972) and Johnson-Laird (1975) have demon- 
strated t h a t  t h e  in fe rences  humans drav,  and the  v a l i d i t y  of 
these in ferences ,  vhen presented  vith a t a s k  of i n v a r i a n t  
8y l log is t ic  s t r u c t u r e  are s t r o n g l y  dependent upon the  
c o n t e x t  i n  vhich  t h e  t a s k  is presented .  S t u d i e s  of i n f e r -  
ence and dec is ion- lak ing  by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and 
'hrersky and Kahneman (1981) descrlbe cons ide rab le  sen- 
s i t i v i t y  t o  con tex tua l  information over t a s k s  t h a t  are 
i d e n t i c a l l y  represented  i n  terms of p r o b a b i l i t y  theory.  I n  
t h e i r  s t u d y  of problem 8olving, Kotovsky, Hayes, and Simon 
(1985) found reliable performance d i f f e r e n c e s  of a factor of 
s i x t e e n  t o  one i n  t h e  Tower of Hanoi problem vhen t h e  
problem c o n t e x t  vas  altered, even though t h e  problems had 
i d e n t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  i n  t h e  a'probleB space p l u s  operatorsn 
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problem representation developed by Uevell and Simon (1972). 
These facts  see^ to Call into question the psych- 
ological validity of models such as those based on normative 
constructs from decision theory, queuing theory, dynamic 
programing, or optimal control theory. By abstracting avay 
contextual information, none of these 8ppZoaCh@8 may be 
suitable for adequately de8cribing skilled human decision- 
making processes that are notoriously context-sensitive. 
Tho necessity of addressing tho context-sensitive nature of 
human information processing could not be more important 
than in the discipline of human-machine system8 design, 
since the problem o f  interface delrign 1s largely one o'f 
designing a (hopefully supportive) context for human 
information processing to occur. 
A second class of models has been developed t o  ex- 
plicitly account for the domain-specificity of human 
information processing. Sacpert systems and other symbol 
processlnq orlanted model8 of cognition make ube of the fact 
that expert cognition is strongly determined by the prop- 
ertties of the particular domain o f  expertfse. A8 a ze8ult0 
these mod0h are often tarred wknouledge-basedw syste~s. 
These models often encode h u m n  expertise in term of 
verbally represented rules and facts concerning the problem 
domain. The generative solution technique is the appllcat- 
ion of  logical deduction or induction. B%aBph8 O f  t h i s  
rrpproach u8ed to describe cognition in complex dynamic 
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system include, f o r  example, Chon (19851, Uesson (1977) ,  
and Rouse, Rouse, and P e l l e g r i n o  (1980) .  The models con- 
s t r u c t e d  by Chon and Uesson are knovledge based systems t h a t  
genera te  p lans  i n  t h e  domain of f l i g h t  planning. Wesson has 
8ugge8ted t h a t  h i 8  model could be used a8 a n  aid f o r  t h e  
human a i r  traffic c o n t r o l l e r .  The model b u i l t  by Rouse e t .  
a l .  1s a d e s c r i p t i o n  of human problem so lv ing  i n  a dynamic 
system Unlike the  f l i g h t  planning modelb, though, t h i s  
model van demonstrated t o  genera te  behavior i n  approxlmate 
agreement wi th  human behavior.  
Thore are two feature8 of these models t h8 t  make the?  
que8t lonable  from a psychological perspec t ive ,  even assuminb 
t h e y  can produce behaviora l ly  v a l i d  results. The f i r s t  is 
due t o  t h e  fact t h a t  a l though these models are indeed highly 
domain dependent, t hey  are still  con tex t - in sens i t i ve .  These 
models do r ep resen t  knovledge t h a t  is highly  domain spec- 
ific, but  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  form t h a t  is used for t h i s  
knovledqe is almost i n v a r i a b l y  verba l ,  and t h u s  divorced 
from vhatever perceptual p r O C O 8 8 e 8  t h e  domain e x p e r t  might 
use t o  encode and deploy t h i s  knowledge. I f  some e x p e r t i s e  
involves  perce iv ing  complex patterns v i t h i n  t h e  environment, 
it is not  a t  a l l  c e r t a i n  t h a t  n a t u r a l  language has  t h e  
d e s c r i p t i v e  resources t o  economlcally r ep resen t  these 
p a t t e r n s  and support  t h e  processes  t h a t  recognize them. 
These model8 assuw t h a t  t h e  knovledge account ing for  
e x p e r t i s o  is n o t  on ly  verbally encodable (as much knovledge 
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M y  h# a8 O%pOrt htOrV~OV8 m y  8Ugg08t)~ but that the88 
verbal representations are sufficient for the ta8k of 
capturing the expert's intarnal information processing. 
It seem8 to be an almost unquestioned assumption in 
cognitive science research that the (verbal) represent- 
ational systam underlying communication is the s a w  rep- 
resentational system underlying cognition. Given that the 
functional roles of communication and cognition are radical- 
ly different (unless cognition i s  equated vith *talking to 
oneselfa), there is no a priori reason to expect that the80 
tV0 ptOC88S88 should 8hare the sa18 tOprO8OntatiOnal 8Y8tOm.. 
Do cat8 athinka by manipulating various internally r+ 
recrented MOV Sounds, and does a vocabulary of high pitched 
songs serve as the "language of thoughta for the whale? (See 
Churchland, 1906 1 While some human cognition might be 
profitably be described as inner speech, the cognitive 
. 
proce88es o f  the "participantsa to tho di8CU88iOn still 
remain to be accounted for. In other vords, it would appear 
that a theory equating cognition vith inner speech require8 
the as8u~ption of mechanisrs that produce and interpret this 
speech. It seems clear that much of the psychologically 
significant content of such a theory vould have to be 
embodied in as8umptions about these ~chanlbms. But the 
operation of these machani8rs cannot once again be described 
as involvinq inner speech vlthout the pO88lblllty of an 
infinite regress. 
.-.. 
, 
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If, a8 the remarks Of the previous section suggest, 
much of expert processing r8y be perceptually oriented and 
say M k e  expllclt pnd Drofitablq US8 Of the Context in which 
the perceptual system operates, these verbal representations 
may not provide the appropriate representational language. 
It may be the case that, as Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
Suggest, that the Verba1 statements Offered by domain 
experts in response to quorims by knovledge engineers are 
based on a priori,  causal theories that plausibly explain 
StimUlU8-rO8pOn8e relationships. In the shoelace tying 
experiment for example, the verbal rules that the readex vab 
asked to generate can be aeon as de8cribing certain input'. 
output invariances tbat vere noticed vhile observing 
shoelace tying behavior, but there is no guarantee that the 
reader vas actually reporting rules that played a generative 
role in the production o f  that behavior. 
In addition to representational form, the generative 
solution mechanism employed in these procedural models is 
a180 context-insens it ive . While, at a high level of 
description, these models can be described as using domain 
dependent solution strategies, at the level of mechanism all 
these models rhare an Identical generative technique: the 
application of logical inference. One explanation for the 
ubiquity of the logical 8odel of cognition is evidenced in 
Churchland's (1986) comment that: 
I 8U8pOCt that the philosophical tradition of 
venerance for inference and the sentential 
7 1  
(verbal-proposltioncrl) attitude has generated 
a kind of fetishi8m with respect to logic as 
the model for inner processes. 
There is simply no evidence that the logically based model 
vhich adequately captures 80- human reasoning at the 
P Q E S O ~  level (the verbally reportable manipulation of 
syllogisms in philosophical argumentation, e.g.1 is vel1 
suited to capturing expert cognitive processes that are not 
or verbally reportable and occur at the pub - w z s o ~  
cognitive level. 
The distinction between personal and 8ub-personal 
levels of cognition is meant to reflect a category distinc- 
tion that s o ~ t i m e s  appears to bo blurred in cognitivb 
theorizing.. While a person may be usefully described as 
folloving a zule, (when cooking according to a recipe for 
the first time, or vhen attempting to troubleshoot a car's 
ignition system vith Chilton's manual in hand, e.g.), or 
aaking a deduction, (by manipulating syllogisms in a 
freshun logic cour88, 0.9.1, the cognitive processing 
underlying this behavior cannot be generatively described as 
zule following or logical deduction vithout (explicitly or 
Implicitly) invoking circular reasoning. It appears 
8080Vhat idle (from a generative perspective) to explain the 
hUMn'8 ability to follow a rule by contending that hi8 
8ind/brain is rule following, or to explain human logical 
deduction by po8tulating a logical mind. The80 arguments 
contain little more meaningful content than, for exaaple, 
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the explanation that a calculator can be described as 
folloviag the axioms of arithmetic because its arithmetic 
chip is a h 0  folloving those axioms. Just as certain 
properties (obeys arithmetic axioms) apply to calculators 
and a different set of properties apply to chip8 (1s vired 
in a certain vay) by virtue of vhich the calculator has this 
property, different set8 of properties appear to be required 
to describe personal-level behavior and cognitive-level 
behavior in order for explanations of the former in  terms of 
the latter to be productive and non-circular. For addition- 
al arguments against the viev that cognitive processes are 
best vieved as logical manipulations of verbal represent; 
ations see Coulter (1983), Winograd and Irlores (19861, 
Churchland (19861, Hunter (19731, Runeson (19731, ltich 
(19831, Rumelhart and WClelland (19861, and Hinton and 
Anderson (1981). 
It thus appears that the most cautious approach deaands 
that the use of logical-verbal models should be restricted 
to those cases vhere there is evidence that logical infer- 
ence on verbally encoded information i6, in fact, being 
employed by the hunan to perform a task. In these cases, it 
may prove to be a productive research strategy to use logic 
to provide a descriptive account of behavior and to ignore 
the lover level cognitive mechanism that occur, and by 
virtue of which, the human can exhibit this logical be- 
havior . Human problem solving and plan construction in 
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novel situation8 ray, for example, bo phenomena that meet 
these pitoria. In othez Cabeb, though, vheze there is 
little evidence to suggest explicit logical inferences are 
operative, other characterizations of cognition nay be 
neco~sary. 
The robeling approach 18 ba8ed on the vlev, 8uggested 
above, that the boundary betveen perception and cognition is 
a shifting one. Answrs to problem8 that once had to be 
'vorked outa can, vith experience, be aseon*; a change not 
unlike the shift th8t occur8 vhen le8zning to read a recond 
language. The perceptual mechanisms responsible for such a 
change are 888umed to be diffezentiateb by the information 
to vhich they are attuned and the answers they supply, 
zathez than by the formal chazacterization of the problem 
(inference, planning, maximizing utility, e.g.1 that they 
can be described as solving. That 18, there is a unitary 
solution mechanism (seeing ansvers) that is not only 
context-sensitive, it is context determined, and somewhat 
divorced from vhatever formal 8tzucture the task ray have 
vhen defined from the pez8pectlve of the decision sciences. 
The formal and revard structures of the ta8k vi11 be 
zelevant in determining vhich specific perceptual mechanisms 
are developed, so that the operation of these mchanisms can 
contribute to behavior that satisfies these formal con- 
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straints. While the80 task-specifk perCOptU1 mechanism 
have aost 8urely evolved under the pressures of tevard, 
punishment, or 80- similar shaping fOtCe8 that are sen- 
sitive to task goals and 208Ult in expert performance, an 
- appropriate characterization of the operation of these 
aechanisu is essentially ahistorical and non-taleological. 
In other vords, a description of the real-time, physical 
operation o f  these mechani8ms need not refer to the past 
events that vere respOn8ibh for their e~istence, or the 
goals to vhich their operation contributes. An automobile, 
for example, can be described within the dorain of physics, 
vithout knovledge of the marketing research that led to it8 
particular design, or knovledqe of the institutional goals 
that the production of the automobile vas intended to serve. 
Under this viev, any successes of decision theoretic 
modeling of expert performance in perceptually rich d o ~ i n s  
are to be explained by suggesting that perceptual mechanisa8 
have been evolved to supply the optimal 8olution8, although 
no optiaization operations are being performed during the 
time period in vhich the ansver is Supplied. The de- 
scriptive 8UCC88808 of rule-based and other 8 W b O l  PKOCa88- 
ing models for describing highly skilled performance are to 
be explained by contending that the rules and logical models 
are higher level descriptions of perCeptUally-ba8Od be- 
havior, and for some purposes perhaps even redundant 
dO8CriptiOn8. 
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This  is a r a d i c a l l y  s t r o n g  s ta tement  o f  t h e  ideas on 
vhich t h e  modeling approach is ba8Ob. Wen if these ideas 
are on t h e  r i g h t  track, perhaps t h e  above 8tateMnt8 are 
on ly  even close t o  being strictly t r u e  in extremely h ighly  
s k i l l e d  behavior t h a t  occurs  i n  p e r c e p t u a l l y  r i c h  do8ains.  
Mevertheless, t h e  modeling approach ha8 been stated i n  t h i s  
fa8hlon because, v h i l e  t h e  ideas are q u i t e  s i8p1e8  it is a 
direct i8pl iC8t iOn O f  tho8e idea8 that any t a 8 k - 8 p e C i f i C  
8d.1 ba8.d on t h e s e  ideas must  n e c e s s a r i l y  reflect a l l  of  
t h e  t a 8 k ' 8  C O D p l O % i t i O 8  8nd I d f O 8 ~ C r a C i O 8 ,  and thus ,  V i 1 1  
not communicate t h e  s i 8 p l i c i t y  o f  t h e  approach. T h i s  is 
e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  o f  t h e  geneza t ive  model described in thh 
next chapter. 
Given t h i s  perceptua l  c h a z a c t e r i z a t i o n  of s k i l l e d  
performance, t v o  major q u e s t i o n s  need t o  be addressed before 
t h e  framework can be app l i ed  t o  t h i s  or any s i8i lazly 
CO8phX task. ?itst, vhich perceptua l  proces8ors v l l l  
exiat ,  given the ta8k requirement8 and information available 
t o  t h e  human? Second, vhat  is t h e  8eChani88 by vhich these 
pzocecr~ors opezate? The ansver  t o  t h e  first q u e s t i o n  v i 1 1  
determine Which inpUt-OUtpUt mpping8 are produced, v h i l e  
t h e  ansvez t o  t h e  second v i 1 1  determine t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  
I t  is processes t h a t  actually gene ra t e  t h e s e  mappings. 
a8suaed t h a t  t h e  nature of t h e  c o r p u t a t i o n s  producing the 
mappings ( a t  some l e v e l  l ove r  than  a purely f u n c t i o n a l  
level)  is independent of t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  input-output  mapping 
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that is being generated. 
It 18 clear that the ta8k-8pwifiC perceptual mechan- 
isms that occur vi11 be determined by the require~nts of 
the task that is being performed. At the most general 
level, tho task 1s action. m i l e  this may seem to be a 
trivial point, it is clear that i f  it is contended that 
these wchanisma help account for skilled performance, 
rather th8n simply 8killed perception, the role o f  these 
Wchani8W is more than to simply regit~ter, OK provide a 
faithful internal representation of,  the external environ- 
ment. Rather, the  role of t h e  perceptual  mechanisms is to 
provide information upon vhlch the selection of action can 
be efficiently performed. An appropriate model of human 
information processing requires knowledge of vhat action 
PIodUCe, a8 N e i 8 8 e Z  suggest8 bOlOV. 
If ve do not have a good account o f  the information 
that perceiver8 are actually using, our hypothetical 
models of their "information processing" are almost 
sure to be vzong. If ve Qn have such an account, 
hovever, such models may turn out to be almost 
unnecessary. (Neisser, 1987) 
Neisser'8 comment is representative of the ecological 
approach to perception and cognition. The ecological 
approach, stimulated by Oib80nv8 vork in perception, seeks 
to find much more information in the environment than is 
usually a8sumed by the more traditional information process- 
ing approach (aibson, 1966) .  Under this viev, perceptual 
system8 tuned to complex informational invariants can serve 
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to reduce much of the computational burden for the product- 
ion of corplex behavior fro8 central prOCO88ing. Although 
the ecological viev ha8 spavned an hpre88iVO amount of 
research activity, it is still far from uncontroversial (for 
criticis888 800 Podor, 1983, and P y l m h m ,  1981). 
For the purposes of this work, employing an ecological- 
ly oriented approach to modeling human behavior implies only 
the folloving COUit8Ont8t fi28te the infOtMtiOn provided 
by perceptual MChani888 is highly action-oriented; and 
second, these mechanisms operate by M i n g  attuned to 
(possibly complex) invariants present i n  the environmental 
situation. On the other hand, the present approach may part 
company vith ecological vievs that assume that the pick-up 
of information is direct, or totally unmdiat8d by any 
computation or information processing. 
Action-oriented infor~tion, or aaffordancesw (Gibson, 
19661, are properties of the interaction betveen an environ- 
ment and an organism't~ capability for action. For mmrple, 
a chair affords sitting, an apple affords eating, and a 
cigarette affords 88Okhg. While clear enough, these 
examples are 8oMvhat misleading because they azo suggestive 
of an environment that is already neatly differentiated into 
these objects, and the fact that they afford different types 
o f  actions is not essential to the differentiation. 
A more generative conception of the affordance relation 
(and the one adopted hare) is that an affordance is not 8 
benign element that exists after the environwnt is differ- 
entiated, rather, it is a partial source of the dlffer- 
entiation. That is, the environment is differentiated by 
the degree to vhich it variously afford8 actions of differ- 
ent type. A chess player, recalling 00Oroot~s character- 
i2ation, deco8po8es the chess g a m  into situations that "can 
be handled in a certain vaya thu8 reflecting an action- 
oriented differentiation of his environment. ?hi8 idea is 
consistent vith Rosch's influential ecologically oriented 
vork on huran categorization vhere one feature of Qasic 
crtegoriesa i 8  that they are corpri8ad of objoct8 that 
8UpOOrt h U M n  actions Of 8vclfied typa8 (ROsch, 1975). In 
addition, an affordance need not be an all or none property, 
as situations 8ay differ in the decrree to vhich they afford 
productive action (fishing, 8ining, surfing, e . g . ) .  
The idea that environments become differentiated in this 
vay is especially productive in situations vhere a decom- 
position of the environment along solely physically salient 
dimnsions (color, shape, etc.) is not especially efficient 
. 
with re8peCt to the task of action selection. In s o w  
cases, a purely physically oriented decomposition vi11 
under-differentiate the environment. In these cases, 
ignorance concerning possible action-oriented differ- 
entiations can 8ake behavior appear very complex or even 
random . Obtaining an appropriate differentiation can 
sometimes allov such complex behavior to be described in 
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siaple terms, as vi11 be seen in the aodel of h u M n  path 
planning described in the following chapter. 
sometinos, on tho other hand, a purely physlcally based 
environmental decoaposition vi11 over-differentiate the 
environment vith respect to the hPMn'8 capability for 
action. In the80 cases, affordances will deteraine hov the 
perceptually distinct objects in the environment bec0.e 
categorized. That 1 8 ,  one w8y that a 8et of obj8cts can be 
partitioned into categories is by clarsing thor according to 
the actions they afford. The same set of objects can be 
categorized in different vays depending upon tho action 
affordance that is eaployed to generate the deco~position: 
Knovledge of actions is required to identify the categories 
that are formed. For exaaple, the category (children, 
jevelry, legal docurant8, and cameras) is alaost non- 
sensical until it is recognized that the mabors afford 
actions of the same type; in thi8 case, they are *things to 
take from ona's home during a fire" (Barsalou, 1985). Thu8, 
perceptual processors that are individuated by their 
s8nsittvity to affordance-related information are as8UWd. 
The mod81 di8CU88Od in tho folloving Chaptot 18 based on the 
idea that tho crevs differentiated and categorized their 
envlronaent (the siaulated vorld) by the degree to vhich 
situations present in this vorld afforded actions of various 
types (searching, loading cargo, attacking enemles, e.g.1. 
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The question of the mechanis88 by vhich these process- 
ors are a8SU88d to operate 8ust nov be discus8ed. A 8  
mentioned earlier, it i8 assomod that the80 Mchanis88 
operate by processing spatially distributed infor8ation 
rapidly and in parallel. In abdition, mechanis88 based on 
logical operations on verbal representations are rejected, 
although the operation of these WChanl888 may bo consistent 
with a such a high level description. 
The parallel distributed processing (PDQ) approach 
(e.g., Rumlhart and McClelland, 1906; Hinton and Anderson, 
1961) for describing cognition employ8 perceptual a@ 
cognitive mechanisms that appoar to be consistent the 
processing requirements specified above. This approach 
absu8es that input infor8ation is processed in parallel by a 
set of spatially distributed processors that are intercon- 
nected by 818ple com8unication 8echanisms. The operation of 
these mOChani888 are typically described vith a combination 
of matrix algebra and the use of simple non-linear thresh- 
olding functions. While this approach has achieved some 
successes for doscribing perceptual abstraction and categor- 
ization, its utility for describing the processes that 
account for complex human behavior is stlll in question 
(Fodor and Pylyshyn, 19881 NOrMn, 1986) .  
Certain of the  perceptual 8OChani888 employed in the 
folloving model are consistent vith these POP ~ c h a n i s m s  in 
that transfor~ation of vectors via simple matrix operations 
6 1  
are used. Other wchanisms, on the other hand, are lmple- 
rented. via simple logical operations along vith 8atrix 
algebraic methods . A8 logically based de8criptions can 
provide a higher level approximate description of the 
behavior of POP mechanisms, the use of logic for implement- 
ing the model is only done for programming ease only.   he 
entire model structure is still based on the a88u~ption that 
these #Chani888 operate by processing the spatially 
distributed information in parallel vithout the manlpulation 
of verbally based representations. Consistency vith this 
assumption is the -)or motivation of the modeling approach, 
rather than any desire to maintain similarity vith the 
current assumptions underlying POP 8odellng. 
A final point should be made concerning the relation- 
ship of POP modeling vith the present approach. Recall that 
a primary motivation of the present approach is that skilled 
human cognition is extremely sensitive to the context in 
which an information processing proble8 I s  presented. PDP 
8 o d O h  are also completely context sensitive, as they 
operate by processing concrete, primitive perceptual 
features, and may require completely different input-output 
mappings when the foraat of information presentation is 
altered. This feature makes POP models consistent vith the 
present modeling approach. It has also been suggested that 
the context-sensitivity of human information processing 
indicates that models based on abstract, form1 problem 
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representations do not provide adequate descriptive accounts 
of cognition. This is a particularly distres8ing fact for 
the human-machine systems researcher because, if true, 
invariances in problem structure that are re8pected by the 
formal decision sciences MY not bo similarly r88pected by 
human cognition. 
What is suggested then, is that the search for invar- 
ianc.8 in cognition that vi11 havo predictive value for tlm 
system designer MY need to change from the level of 
performance MChanis88 to the level of the processes by 
vhich the context-8pecific ~0Chani8r8 are produced and 
tailored to the interface design and ta8k demands. That 1s; 
the search for predictively valid invariances 8ight need to 
shift to the level of learning, othervise the ta8k-speCific 
perceptual and cognitive structures that are evolved cannot 
easily be determined. The performance-oriented parameters 
of the 8tructur.8 can only be explored after the task- 
specific structures have been identified. That the phe- 
nomena of learning, then, occupies center stage in the POP 
approach to cognition m y  be a reflection of the validity of 
this ob8ervation. 
CHAPTER V 
DIBCRIMIOn - 
I n  t h i s  chapter, the  g e n e r a t i v e  model u8ed 
t h e  bohavior of 8 U b j e C t 8  i n  t h e  laboratory ta8k 
scribed. The model ha8 three main component8: 
a c t i o n  s e l e c t i o n ,  and action implementation 
First, a q u a l i t a t i v e  d e s c r l p t i o n  of t h e  perceptual procesr -  
ing employed i n  t h e  model is given i n  terms of t h e  framework 
developed i n  t h e  previous chapter. Then, t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
o rgan iza t ion  of t h e  model is discussed which includes t h e  
perceptual, a c t i o n  s e l e c t i o n ,  and a c t i o n  implementation 
w c h a n l s m .  Uext, t h e  ope ra t ion  of each of t h e  perrceptual, 
a c t i o n  s e l e c t i o n ,  and a c t i o n  implementation ~ e c h a n i s -  is 
de8crlb.d I n  detail .  The methods by vhlch t h e  rodel vas u8ed 
t o  desc r ibo  i n d i v i d u a l  crews are descrlbad In t h e  fo l lowing  
chapter. The re8Ult8 O f  c r a v  modeling are di8CU88ed i n  
Ch.pt02 VII. 
m e v o t k  for P O t C e D t U a l  PtOCeS8im 
I n  keeping w i t h  t h e  remark8 of t h e  previoua chapter, it 
information process ing  account- is a88UWd t h a t  much of t h e  
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ing for highly skilled performance in this task is performed 
by task-specific perceptual processing mechanis~8. The 
particular perceptual mechanisms that are developed are 
determined by the task requirewnts and the interface 
displays that provide the context in which the task is 
porformed. nore specifically, the perceptual mechanisms are 
a88U~8d to be attuned to the features o t  the displayed world 
that are highly relevant for the purpose of action selec- 
tion. .These mechanisms are assumed to process spatially 
distributed information rapidly and in parallel. 
The environment ia assumed to become dlfferentiated and 
categorized by the degree to vhich it affords actions of 
different types. Differentiation occurs when an originally 
isotropic description of the environment becomes enriched 
due to an inclusion of information concerning how different 
sections ( s o w t i ~ s  wobject8w) in the environment afford a 
specified action to various degrees. Sighting cargo and 
enemy craft, for example, is an action that is afforded to 
different degrees by different locations i n  the simulated 
vorld due to the fact that object densities varied with 
foZe8t den8ity. Locomotion of the Scout 18 a similar such 
action, as ease of locomotion is deterrined by the forest 
denrity in the immediate location o f  the scout craft. The 
complex action o f  searching for objects includes both 
sighting and locomoting as simultaneously performed sub- 
actions, and the differentiation of the environment accord- 
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ing to this complex action can fro. the tvo 
differentiations provided by its component actions. 
Therefore, a complex differentiation of the world is 
provided by search affordances. This differentiation is not 
based solely on the physical attributes of the vorld; 
rather, it is generated by considering how the vorldgs 
physical attributes combine vith the functional Capabilities 
of the scout to produce regions o f  higb and low value. The 
resulting differentiation does not decompose the vorld into 
distinct objects, but rather, it inducos a continuously 
graded affordance structure that includes 'hills' ana 
aridge8' of high degrees of search affordance, and avalley8a 
and mhole8a of lov degrees of search affordance. 
be constructed 
Categorization occurs vhen the onviro~entrl decor- 
position based 8 0 h l Y  upon physical dimensions (e.q., by 
color and shape) is reduced in dimensionality by noting that 
various item i n  this decomposition all afford the same 
action. For example, the model exploits a categorization of 
both enemy helicopter8 and enemy tank8 into the single 
category of mobile enemies due to the fact that both these 
objects are acted upon in an identical vay (with a given 
friendly craft action command) even though the physically 
generated categorlzatlon based on color groups these items 
into separate classes (helicopters appear a8 red circles 
vhereas tank8 appear as orange circles). The .ode1 makes 
use of a different category for fixed ground enemy craft, as 
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these enemies are attacked vith a different command than is 
used for the mobile craft. All categorization that operates 
by abstracting avay the specific numbering of these enemy 
craft operates in a similar vay, as enemy craft are attacked 
in the sa- vay regard1088 of their numeric identifier. 
80MtiM8, the object categorization based solely upon 
physical dimensions is nearly identical to an affordancs 
oriented categorization. lor example, cargo are the only 
gray objects on the display, and each and every cargo (to 
close approximation) is acted upon in the same way (vith the 
sa- friendly craft cargo loading command). This couraM 
directs the friendly craft to travel to the cargo locatlon 
and load the cargo. The only exception to this categor- 
ization arises vhen cargo appear vithin the loading distance 
(0.12s miles) of a friendly craft. In this case, the 
friendly need not be given a command to travel to the cargo 
location, as this constraint is already satisfied. There- 
fore, a different action c o m ~ n d  is executed to load these 
craft. This suggests that there might be a corresponding 
perceptual MChanisB that 18 sensitive tO.thO8O cargo that 
are close to friendly craft, as they afford actions of a 
different type than cargo that require that friendly craft 
travel. 
Note that a comparison of the purely physically based 
categories and differentiations vith the affordance based 
categories and differentiations provides one vay to analyze 
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the CoDwtibillty characteristlcs Of di8phy8, and help8 
define-vhich 8ubtasks are variably mapped and vhich are 
consistently mapped (shiffrin and Schneiber, 1977). This 
latter di8tinCtlOn can be used to predict vhich task8 vi11 
beCOW dUtOutiZed, and Which ta8i8t autONBtiZatiOn. This 
distinction vi11 be discua8ed more precisely in following 
chapters . 
Similar reasoning is used to identify the entire set of 
perceptual meCh.ni8~8 and the hypotheuired af fordance8 to 
Which they aze 8en8itiVO. Perhaps .out interesting are 
tho88 affordances to which the model 18 8On8itiVO thae 
result i n  coordination among the friendly craft, a8 co- 
ordinatlon is an example of one of the behaviors that seem 
to be suggestive of 'higher levelw, central, or aore 
flexible cognitive operations. The general mchanisr by 
vhich coordination is produced i n  the model is by alloving 
action affordances for any one friendly craft to be partial- 
ly composed of information relating to the activities of the 
other frlendly craft. In short, part of the environment of 
each craft i8 CODpri8ed by the other four craft. 
8X.DphS of  coordinated behavior among the scout and 
four friendly craft produced by the model include collision 
avoidance, making sure friendlies do not attempt the same 
action (e.g., loading the a a m  cazgo, 8earching the s a w  
region), and coordlnating the space-time trajectories of the 
scout and other friendly craft so that a friendly craft ls 
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nearby to process any cargo and enemy craft sighted by the 
scout's radar. All these behaviors are produced in a 
similar fashion, namely, by allowing the affordances for one 
friendly craft to be determined by the current and predicted 
activities of the other craft. Por example, in the scout- 
friendly craft coordination task, areas that simultaneously 
are capabl8 of containing both the rcout and friendly craft 
have a high degree of search affordance for the friendly 
craft . The search affordance distribution for a given 
craft, then, is partially constructed from the current and 
predictod location of t h e  scout craft.  A similar method is 
used to avoid collisions betveen the five craft, to coord' 
inate t i w s  at vhich the five craft return to homo base, and 
to make sure that each object and search region is allocated 
to at most one friendly craft. 
Another example of ahigher levela behavior that is 
generated by sensitivity to environmental affordances in the 
model is planning the future activities of the five craft. 
For planning, the identical set of perceptual mechanisms 
that provide for current craft action selection is used. 
What is changed, though, is the information to vhich these 
DOChani888 are applied. The mod01 select8 future aCtlVitie8 
for each of the craft by forvard simulation of the vorld 
based on difference equations that specify vorld dynamics. 
These equations describe hov the vorld state (the existence 
of cargo and enemy craft) and the friendly craft state 
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(locations, fuel levels, missiles, cargo carried) change 
over t$me due to scout and friendly craft activities. Using 
these equations, the vorld is essentially advanced to a 
future time point, and the perceptual ~ c h a n i s m r  operate by 
a88088ing the affordance8 that Vi11 exist in this future 
vorld. The relevant future time points are the end points 
of current or already planned activity. The psychological 
MChani8m that i8 assured to provide this function for the 
human crevs is visual imagery. There is SOM evidence (and 
much more conjecture) that the same perceptual MChani8m8 
that are respon8ible for abstracting information from t h  
environment can be partially stimulated in a top-dovn mode 
to produce visual imagery (Weisser, 1976). 
The selection of friendly craft is quite simple: each 
craft is cormnded to take the action that ha8 the highest 
affordance. A 8  described in the previoua chapter, an 
afforbance is a relation of the interaction betveen the 
environment and an organism's capability for action. The 
way in vhich the environment can differentially support 
action8 ha8 been mentioned above, but the organism's side of 
the relation need8 to be discussed. One important set of 
hfOrMtlOn to Which friendly action deC18iOn8 must ba 
8en8itiVe 18 each Craft'8 tObOUICe8 (fuel, 8i88ile8, Veight 
carrying capacity). lansitivity to this infornation is 
nicely couched in ecological term8 by noting that a craft's 
resource levels essentially determine the craft's capability 
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for action. That is, the different actions that a craft is 
capable of executing at a particular ti80 vi11 b. partially 
determined by the craft's re80urce levels. lor example, 
vhether or not a craft is capable of loading a cargo or 
attacking an enemy is affected by its veight capacity and 
nU8hK Of 8i88i1OS0 The resource information, then, 
co8prhes the craft's capability for action, the environ- 
mental structure determlne8 the degree to vhich each of 
these actions is provided by the environment, and tho 
affordance for a given action is a function o f  the inter- 
action botveen the8e  tvo factors.  High affordance levo18 
arise vhan the craft is capable of performing an action made 
available by the environment, and lov affordance levels are 
characteristic of a mismatch betveen a craft's Capabilities 
and the environ8ental structure. 
Thus, a sensitivity to the affordances in the 8i8UhtOd 
vorld is the unitary, context-specific Mchanism by vhich 
the model performs the tasks of decision-making, coordln- 
atlon, and planning. Pev of the formal features that vould 
typically bo exploited by operations research or artlflcial 
intelligence mthods to differentiate these tnformation 
prOCO88ing prOblO88 are reflected in the 8odOl. On the 
other hand, the action selection components of the model can 
be interpreted vithin the framevork of 8ultl-attribute 
utility theory OIAUT) descriptive models of human decision- 
8aking (Ralffa, 1970) .  The sirilarity is due to the fact 
c 
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that the proceases used here to integrate the affordance 
10VOlS of sub-actions into a resultant affordance level for 
the total action can be interpreted as corbining multiple 
utilities for the individual attribute8 of the action. The 
modeling approach adopted here fo r  action selection, then, 
need not be considered at odds with niW rode1ing. Rather 
it can be viewed as a way of suppleaenting the HAW approach 
by aiding in the identification of the relevant proble8 
attributes via viewing tho problem in affordanco oriented 
t o m s ,  and by indicating hov the problem o f  choice, 
planning and coordination can be approached within a single 
frawvork and in a manner consistent vith the character; 
ization of the information processing underlying skilled 
performance that vas discussed in the previous chapter. 
Structural Descri~tioq 
The 8 o d O l  structure can be decorpo8ed into three major 
corponentu: tho perceptual MChani8l8, the selection Mch- 
anisma, and the action mechanis~8. The perceptual mech- 
anisms, defined qualitatively in the previous section, 
process the displayed information and produce affordance 
orionted infornation concerning the attractiveness of each 
of the action8 available to the scout and each of the 
friendly craft. The selection mechanisa accepts the 
affordance information for each of the craft and deteraines 
required present and future action8. The actton mechani888 
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accept the required craft actions and are responsible for 
simulating the physical and visual operator activities at 
the interface that are required to implement these actions. 
Figure 9 on the folloving page schematically depicts 
the model decomposition into perceptual, selection, and 
action processors. Pot the perceptual and salection 
processors, the diagram also indicates the individual 
mechanisms that make up each type. The action mechanism8 
are not decomposed in this diagram. A detailed description 
of the entire set of action 8OChani8m8 vi11 be provided 
separately in a later section of thi8 chapter. While each 
o f  the mechanisms in the diagram vi11 be described in more 
detail in the folloving section, it is necessary to first 
describe them at a gross functional level to indicate the 
global organization o f  the model. 
The tvo top perceptual MChani888, the scout search 
affordance and scout locomotion affordance mchanisms 
provide the information upon vhich the scout search path 
selection ~ c h a n i s m  d O t m D i n O 8  search paths for the scout 
craft through the simulated vorld. The search affordance 
mechanism operates by creating a spatially distributed 
affordance mapping of the vorld, vhere the affordance of a 
vorld location is determined by the effectiveness of scout 
radar centered at that location for 8ighting pO88ibl43 cargo 
and enemy craft. The locomotion affordance mechanism 
creates a spatial mapping of the vorld, vhere the affordance 
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of a vorld location is determined by the speed vlth vhich 
the scout can be flown through the trees at that location. 
The scout vaypoint selection ReChanlsm operates on the 
additive combination o f  these tvo affordance maps and 
selects a desired next vaypolnt for the scout craft. The 
primary output of this selection rechanisr is to the scout 
action ~echanism vhich imple~ents the scout 8eaich plan by 
performing the control actions necessary to actually move 
the scout to the desired vaypoint. Xn a complete model, 
this task vould be performed by a control theoretic model 
capable of accepting a desired vaypoint and producing the 
unual control activity necessary for reaching it. In this 
present model, though, this task is approximated by 8imply 
moving the scout in a series o f  very short steps (0.06 miles 
each). The method by vhich these steps are determined vi11 
be d h ~ ~ ~ ! ~ e d  in the description Of t k  scout motion action 
mchanism in a later section. 
The next four perceptual processors in ?igure 9 are 
re8pOn8lbh for providing the affordance information upon 
vhich search vaypolnts for the four friendly craft are 
selected . The friendly search af fordance processor produces 
a map similar to the scout search affordance map. The 
affordance level of a vorld location on the friendly search 
affordance 8ap indicates the desirability of searching the 
area that vould be covered by friendly craft radar along the 
linear path to the. vaypoint location. The affordance is a 
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func t ion  of t h e  linear p a t h  because t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of a 
waypoint is actual ly  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of t h e  l i n e a r  r o u t e  along 
vhlch t h e  f r iendly  craft should t r a v e l .  The f r i e n d l y  
coll181on affordance processor creates a spat ia l ly  d i s t -  
r i b u t e d  a f fordance  map that signals area8 of potent ia l  
C O l l h i O n  v i t h  o the r  friendly craft. The 8cout - f r iendly  
coord ina t ion  proces8or creates a s p a t i a l l y  d i s t r lbu ted  
affordmce 8ap that indicate8 reg ions  of high value due t o  
t h e  fact that they  are near t h e  c u r r e n t  OL pred ic t ed  s c o u t  
craft l o c a t i o n .  The f r i e n d l y  range a f fo rdance  processor 
produces a spat ia l  ~ a p  of t h e  vo r ld  t h a t  indicate8 the  area? 
i n  t h e  vorld t h a t  are i n  range of t h e  friendly craft; 1.0. 
those t o  vhich t h e  f r i e n d l y  craf t  m y  t r a v e l  and still  have 
enough f u e l  t o  e i t h e z  l a s t  till t h e  end of t h e  mission or 
r e t u r n  home t o  resupply. The f r i e n d l y  vaypoint  s e l e c t i o n  
processor accepts t h e  combination of these fou r  a f fo rdance  
lap8 and selects a search vaypoint for t h e  craft. 
The bottom 8 i x  perceptua l  8OChani888 produce a f fordance  
information upon vhich o b j e c t  (cargo, enemy craft, and home 
ba8e) s e l e c t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  are 8ade. The ca rgo  a f fo rdance  
indicates t h e  degree t o  vhich a cargo a t  a specified 
l o c a t i o n  a f f o r d s  being loaded by a friendly a t  a specified 
l o c a t i o n  v i t h  a specified anount of resources .  Consider- 
a t i o n s  i n  t h i s  a f fordance  c a l c u l a t i o n  include: 1. t h e  
distance betveen t h e  friendly and t h e  cargo; 2.  vhether  t h e  
f r i e n d l y  ha8 enough f u e l  t o  load t h e  cargo and take it t o  
, 
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home base; 3. vhether  t h e  f r i e n d l y  h a s  enough ve igh t  
c a r r y i n g  Capacity t o  success fu l1y  load t h e  cargo; 4 .  vhether  
t h e  f r i e n d l y  has  enough mission t i m e  t o  load and unload t h e  
cargo a t  how base; and 5. vhether  t he  cargo is already 
allocated t o  another  craft. 
The f i x e d  enemy af fordance  pe rcep tua l  mechanism 
indicates t h e  degree t o  vhich a fixed ground enemy a t  a 
specified l o c a t i o n  affords being attacked by a f t iendly 
craft a t  a specified l o c a t i o n  w i t h  specified resource  
1 0 V O l S .  The f a c t o r s  t h a t  are included i n  t h i s  c a l c u l a t i o n  
include: 1. vhether t h e  f r iendly  ha8 enough rissiles t o  
attack t h e  enemy; 2. vhether t he  friendly is ca rzy ing  cargo 
( t h a t  8hould no t  be jeopardized by 8UCh a n  attack); 3. 
vhether t h e  f r i e n d l y  has  enough fue l / t ime  t o  travel t o  t h e  
enemy and r e t u r n  home; and 4 .  vhether  t h e  enemy craft h a s  
already been allocated t o  another  f r i e n d l y  craft .  
The home base a f fo rdance  pe rcep tua l  mechanism indicates 
t h e  degree t o  vhich r e t u r n i n g  t o  home base is a desirable 
a c t i o n  for  a f r i e n d l y  craft. T h i s  c a l c u l a t i o n  is based on: 
1. t h e  number of cargo t h a t  need t o  be unloaded; 2. t h e  
number of rissiles carried by t h e  f r i e n d l y ;  and 3; t h e  
amount of f u e l  the  f r i e n d l y  c z a f t  has remaining. 
The c o l l i s i o n  a f fordance  pe rcep tua l  r e c h a n i s r  is 
charged v i t h  d e t e c t i n g  p o t e n t i a l  co11is ions  betveen f z i e n d l y  
craft, and therefore i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  degree t o  vhich evas ive  
a c t i o n  is r equ i r ed .  
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the mobile enemy affordance mchanism indicates the 
degree,to vhich an enemy tank or helicopter afford8 being 
attacked by a friendly craft. In the case of the friendly 
craft, this mechani8m is quite simple since attacking is 
~ x i ~ l l y  afforded when a friendly craft is locked-on by 
enemy radar, since escaping theme enemies is quite difficult 
to accomplish. In the case of the scout vhich can sight 
these enemies at an extended range (unlike the friendlies), 
the affordance calculation is slightly more' CORpliCated. 
The friendly-up affordance perceptual processor 
indicates vhen a command should be given to a friendly craft 
to rise above tree level, as craft speed is increased above 
tree level. this perceptual MChani8B operate8 by detecting 
when friendly craft are traveling very slowly through 
heavily forested regions. 
80~0 of these mechanisms vould appear to require the 
integration of information from memory with information from 
perceptual sources. Therefore, there would seem to be a 
problem with describing these BeChani8B8 a8 entirely 
perceptual, rather than perceptual-cognitive, in nature. 
One weakness o f  this vork is that the distinction between 
operations on perceptual and memorial information is not 
clearly maintained. Rather, it has been assumed that the 
same type of information integratlon operations can be used 
for describing the use of information from both perception 
and memory. A8 a result of this assumption, this research 
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MY not adequately treat po88lble infor8ation processing 
limitations related to constrained memory resources. 
Nevertheless, the assumption that identical operations are 
used to integrate information from both perceptual and 
memorial 8ources will bo 8aintained throughout thi8 vork. 
The outputs of all these perceptual 88Chanb88 are made 
available to the object selection meChani88. This 8eChanl88 
~erve8 to resolve potential conflicts between multiple 
friendly craft, and to plan futute craft activitie8. The 
output of this mechanism is a series of couands to the 
f r i end ly  craft action mechanisr vhich simulates the phy8iCa.l 
interface actions necessary to implement these desired 
friendly craft activities. Given this underatandlng of the 
global organization of the model, the vay in vhich each of 
these perceptual, selection, and action mechanism8 operate 
can nov be described with greater precision. 
SCriD tion of )lacha nisms 
The model employ8 perceptual, selection, and action 
8echrnism . In abstract terms, perceptual mechanisms 
provide a mapping from the rav, displayed information into 
affordance information that is presumably highly relevant 
for the task of action selection. One metric of the 
efficiency of these mechanisms is, then, the degree to vhich 
they allow for simple action selection mechanisw. A 
detailed characterization of the perceptual, selection, and 
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a c t i o n  wchanisms is r equ i r ed  t o  demonstrate exact ly  hov t h e  
s i r p l l c i t y  of s e l e c t i o n  ~ e c h a n i s m  can be achieved by t h e  
des ign  of ac t ion -o r i en ted  perceptual mchanisms. 
As 8uggested by Figure 9 ,  a n  apprO%iMt@ decomposition 
of the  model s t r u c t u r e  can be made along subta8k  lines: t h e  
s c o u t  vaypoint  gene ra t ion  8ubta8k, t h e  f r iendly vaypoint 
gene ra t ion  8ubta8k, and tha  object (cargo, enemy craft, and 
home ba8e) s e l e c t i o n  s u b t a s k .  The f o l l o v i n q  d e 8 c r i p t i o n  of 
t h e  process ing  MChanisDs f O l l O V 8  t h i s  decompo8ition and 
begins  v i t h  t h e  s c o u t  pa th  planning subtask .  
Scout Wamoint Generation Hechanisw 
t h e  t a s k  of  p a t h  planning f o r  t h e  scout craft involved 
s e l e c t i n g  a r o u t e  through t h e  world t h a t  M x i a i z e d  t h e  
number of cargo and eneay craft d iscovered  vith t h e  s c o u t  
r a d a r  . The fol lowing gene ra l  h e u r i s t i c s  describe t h e  
consensual  e x p e r t  behavior (obta ined  from po8t-hoc inter-  
vievs of s k i l l e d  c r e v s ) .  The r o u t e  plan should: 1. Cover ai, 
8uch of t h e  forested regions as possible v i t h  s c o u t  radar 
( o b j e c t  d e n s i t i e s  vera  higher  i n  f o r e s t e d  r e g i o n s ) ;  2. Avoid 
t r a v e l l n g  through t h e  f o r e s t 8  a8 8uch as possible (due t o  
s l o v e r  average 8peeds through t h e  f o r e 8 t  caused by t h e  tree 
avoidance task);  3. Re tu rn  t o  home base about t v o  t h i r d s  
through t h e  mission t o  r e f u e l ;  and 4. Avoid %ackt?ackingm 
as  much as pO88lble ( t o  eDpha8120 p rev ious ly  unsearched 
r eg ions  1 . 
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Figure 10 indicates t h e  search p a t h s  generated i n  t h e  
same vor ld  by t h e  tvo creva  vho used manual c o n t r o l  of t h e  
scou t  (Crews E and 2 ) .  The p a t h  generated by Crev 2 t h a t  
appears i n  F igure  10 vas chosen f o r  i l l u s t r a t i o n  because it 
included a minimum number of d e v i a t i o n s  t o  process cargo and 
enemy craft f o r  t h i s  c rev .  Buch dev ia t ion8  obscure t h e  
degree t o  vhich t h e  r o u t e  of t h e  s c o u t  is i n d i c a t i v e  of t h e  
Crev's deaired aea rch  path for t h e  scou t .  The pa th  included 
for Crev 1 vas  chosen because it vas  based on t h e  same vor ld  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n  used for Crev 2. 
N o t e  t h e  s i m i l a r i t y  betveen t he8e  path8 i n  t h a t  t h e  
same gene ra l  r o u t e s  ve re  fo l loved  by both creva, a l though 
t h e  direct ion of t r a v e l  a long  these r o u t e s  vas  somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t .  Both c r e v s  v i s i t e d  t h e  same g e n e r a l  vo r ld  
l o c a t i o n s  and tended t o  s t a y  close t o  t h e  forest boundaries 
d u r i n g  t r a v e l  betveen these loca t iona .  T h i s  "boundary 
hugginga behavior probably resulted from t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  of 
t h e  set of competing c o n s t r a i n t s  on pa th  gene ra t ion  d i s -  
cussed above i n  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of t h e  consensual  
search s t r a t e g y .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  both crev8  avoided backtrack- 
ing, and thoy bo th  managed t o  refuel about  t v o  t h i r d s  
through t h e  mission. There is evidence t o  sugges t  t h a t  t h e  
task of planning t h e s e  r o u t e s  was completed i n  no more t h a n  
tvo o r  three seconds, as c r e v s  o f t e n  ve rba l i zed  t h e  r e s u l t s  
of t h e i r  p a t h  planning processing w i t h i n  a few seconds after 
i n i t i a l l y  v i ev ing  t h e  map d i s p l a y  a t  t h e  start of a s e s s i o n .  
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search  path8 produced i n  World 3 
by Crew B ( top)  and C r e v  2 (bottom) 
Figure 10 
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A 8  va8 mentioned in the previous section, the model 
employ8 tvo perceptual affordance 843ChanisB8 to transform 
the displayed information into action oriented information. 
The scout search affordance mechanism provide8 a map of the 
100 square mile displayed vorld that indicates the degree to 
vhich each vorld location afforded sighting cargo and enemy 
craft vith radar. The scout locomotion affordance mechanism 
provides a map of the vorld that indicate8 the degree to 
vhich each vorld location afforded speedy locomotion. The 
r 
combination of the tvo maps va8 then used by the search path 
selection mechanism to provide path planning. 
Subjects a180 received briefing report information at 
the beginning of each session concerning the probable 
locations of cargo and enemy craft. It vas originally 
hypothesized that subjects vould be sensitive to this 
information in their selection of search paths. Subsequent 
analysis, though, did not yield any evidence that subjects 
used the briefing information, so this information vas not 
included in the model. 
The diagram on the following four page8 indicate the 
search, locomotion, and total affordance maps vhen applied 
to each of the four vorld configurations u8ed in the 
experiment. The picture in the lover left corner of each 
figure shovs the vorld as it va8 presented to 8ubject8 on 
the computer di8play. The vhite (non-forested) regions vere 
shown in brovn, the moderately dark (lightly fore8ted) 
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regions vere shovn in light green, and the dark (heavily 
forested) regions vere shown in dark green. The picture in 
the lover right corner of each figure depicts the locomotion 
affordance map based on this vorld configuration that vas 
produced by the scout locomotion affordance 8echnism. 
Darker regions on this map indicate areas of higher loco- 
motion affordance. This is essentially an inverse mapping 
of the original display since open regions resulted in high 
search affordances vhile heavily forested regions resulted 
in low search affordanCe8. 
The picture in the upper left corner of each figure 
shovs the affordance m p  that vas produced by the scout 
search affordance 8eChani88. To construct this ~ p ,  a four 
dimensional vector vas associated vith each vorld location 
to indicate the percentage of area that vould bo covered by 
scout radar that vas open region, lightly forested region, 
heavily forested region, and beyond the boundary of the 
simulated vorld. ?or each point, the inner product o f  this 
vector and a search affordance vector is taken to determine 
the total search affordance of the vorld location. The 
search affordance vector vas the same for each vorld 
location and indicated the perceived density of object8 
within each of the four regions. Dazker points on this map 
indicate a higher coverage of forested regions vith scout 
radar centered at the point. 
The result of combining (and rescaling for clarity) 
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these tvo affordance maps is shovn in the picture in the 
upper right corner of each figure. This map indicates the 
degree to vhich each world location affords both actions of 
locomotin9 and sighting objects collectively. This map vas 
produced by adding the affordance values of the tvo previous 
u p s  under a constant weighting scheme. This process of map 
superposition as a method of value integration is similar to 
one discussed by HcHarg (1971) for ecological planning of 
highvay routes . 
lriqure 13 shovs the ~ a p s  produced vhen applied to the 
same vorld shown In ?igute 10. Notice that the peak  (dark- 
est) areas in the total affordance in rigure 13 roughly 
correspond to the regions covered by the tvo crevs' paths. 
This total affordance map is the information upon vhich the 
scout vaypoint selection mechanism operates. The scout 
waypoint selection mechanism operate8 by considering only 
the peak area8 in the total affordance ~ a p  as candidate 
search waypoints for the scout. A t  the beginning of the 
mission, a search and evaluation mechanism cycles through 
these peak8 to select a search plan for the mission that 
satisfies two path planning criteria in addition to the 
84~arCh and locomotion criteria provided by the perceptual 
meChani8.8. These two additional planning constraints 
ensure that the selected path rinimfzes backtracking through 
previously searched regions and passes through home base in 
the middle third of the mission 'for refueling. The path 
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plan that visits all the peak8 and maximize8 searched area 
subject to the backtracking and refueling constraints is 
chosen. although the need for generation and evaluation of 
action alternatlves has not been eliminated, the perceptual 
affordance mchanimms radically decrease the s i ze  of the 
space o f  action alternatives that must be considered by the 
evaluation process by providing a small set of peak8 
(typically about ten) as vaypointm. Route8 among these 
vaypoint8 are much aore quickly .valuated than would be 
routes among a set o f  candidate vaypoints provided by a 
dircretizrrtion of the world vithout regard to search and 
locomotion affordance infor~ation. 
Briendlv Craft WaYDoint Generation WChanisR8 
The ~8Chani8.8 for friendly craft vaypoint generation 
operate in a similar fashion by constructing independent 
affordance .4p8 and then combining them to produce a total 
affordance rap. Friendly craft are given search c o ~ ~ a n d 8  by
the specification of a vaypoint on the .ap display via the 
manipulation o f  the m p  cursor and typing a search command 
on the text editor. The four perceptual affordance uchan- 
1888 that provide the infor8ation on which this ta8k 18 
performed include the friendly search affordance, friendly 
collision affordance, friendly-scout cooperation affordance, 
and friendly range affordance processor's. Recall that the 
scout 8earch affordance prOCO88Or determined the search 
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affordance of a vorld location by suuing the search 
affordances of all the vorld points that vero vithin scout 
radar radius of the location. The kiendly search afford- 
ance processor also operates by suuing search affordances, 
although the dimnslon along vhich the 8 U 8 ~ t i O n  is per= 
formed is different. 
Since assigning a friendly ctaft vaypoint determines a 
linear path of travel from the initial craft position to the 
vaypoint, it is clear that vaypoint selection is actually 
the selection of a linear route of travel, vhere the search 
vidth of this route i 8  the radar radiurr o f  the friendly 
craft (0.4 miles). The individual affordance values that 
are 8U88ed to determine the search affordance o f  a given 
vorld location are the affordance values of the vorld points 
contained vithin the 0.4 mile vide rectangular region traced 
out by the craft's path to the vaypoint. Therefore, unlike 
the map produced for the ~ C O U ~ ,  the affordance map used for 
friendly craft vaypoint selection is a function of the 
initial craft position, and therefore must be created each 
time the vaypoint selection task is initiated. 
A second affordance map is produced by the friendly 
collision affordance perceptual mechanism. This mechanism 
produce8 an affordance map that is binary valued. Area8 of 
potential of collision vlth other craft (determined by the 
planned trajectories of the other craft) receive zero 
affordance value, and all other areas receive unit value. 
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In the map co8bination prOCe88, a 8ultiplicative rule is 
used to integrate this map with the others, so regions of 
possible collision ate excluded from consideration. 
A third affordance .ap for the task of friendly craft 
waypoint selection is produced by the friendly-scout 
cooperation affordance 8OChani88. To de8Crlba crevs who 
appear to spatially coordinate the scout and friendly craft, 
this 8OChani88 can be used to provide an identification of 
those vorld locations that, given the planned scout path, 
afford siaultaneous searching by the scout and friendly 
craft. The specified area is the locus of vorld points that 
can be sirultaneously covered by both friendly craft a d  
scout radar. L i k e  the collision affordance map, this map is 
also binary valued, although the affordance values on this 
map are suued with the other 8ap8, rather than maltiplied, 
so that points vhere no coordination is achieved receive no 
additional value but are not excluded fro8 consideration. 
The final perceptual ~echanisr u8ed for friendly craft 
waypoint selection is the friendly range affordance mech- 
anlsr. This 8echanis~ also produces a binary valued 
affordanco map, where unit value is assigned to those points 
that are within range of the friendly craft, and zero value 
is assigned to those polnts that are outside of the craft's 
range. In the condition where a craft ha8 enough fuel to 
last until the end o f  the thirty .inUte 8ission, all world 
points are considered to be in range. When thi8 condition 
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is not met, a world location is determined to be in range if 
the craft can reach the vorld location and a180 travel from 
the location to home base to refuel. The locus of all such 
points defines an el1ipse vith foci at the friendly craft 
and at home base. The eccentricity of the ellipse is 
determined by the relationship betveen the craft's fuel 
level and its distance from home base. The affordance 
values from this map are multiplied vith tho values from the 
other three maps so that vorld locations that are outside of 
the craft's range are excluded from consideration. 
The friendly vaypoint selection processor operates on 
the combination of these maps under the additive or mult- 
iplicative rules described above. A 8  was the case with the 
scout search path selection mechanism, the waypoint sel- 
ection DeChanlsD ls quite simple. The mechanism operate8 by 
selecting as a vaypoint the world location from the total 
affordance map with maximum affordance value. One result of 
the vay that the affordance maps are Con8tructed is that, 
given that world border locations are within range and not 
potential col1ision points, friendly waypoints selected 
under the method described above will alvays be world border 
locations. Thicl result arises due to the fact that the 
search affordance function is alvays non-decreasing as the 
distance from the friendly craft increases, due to the 
summation of affordances along the linear routes. 
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Aa vi11 be described i n  t h e  f O l l O V i n g  chapter, t h e  
vaypoints  generated by crevs do no t  f o l l o v  t h i s  p a t t e r n ,  as 
subjects were r e l u c t a n t ,  for sone as y e t  u n i d e n t i f i e d  
reason, t o  send f r i e n d l y  craft  C l 0 8 0  t o  t h e  borders of t h e  
simulated vor ld .  Therefore,  a n  ad-hoc c o n s t r a i n t  placed on 
t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of f r i e n d l y  craft vaypoin ts  vas  that vor ld  
l o c a t i o n s  t h a t  ve re  Close t o  t h e  world borders ve re  excluded 
from con8idozat ion.  I f  t h e  reason for t h i s  behavior could 
be i d e n t i f i e d ,  or even 8oundly hyp0the8iz.d~ a pe rcep tua l  
a f fo rdance  mechanisr could bo easily cOn8trUCted t h a t  voald 
produce a b i n a r y  valued m p  that could be 8 u l t i p l i e d  v i th  
t h e  a f fo rdance  va lues  of t h e  other fou r  raps t o  oxcludb 
these extreme l o c a t i o n s .  
World Object P1  annincr He c h a n i 8 ~ 8  
The tvo search o r i e n t e d  components of t h e  modeling 
s t r u c t u r e  have nov been described. The remaining component 
is the set  of percep tua l  and s e l e c t i o n  Dechanisrs  that 
describe t h e  method by which goal objects (cargo, enemy 
ciaf t ,  and home b a n e )  are ass igned  t o  f r i e n d l y  craft, and 
t h o  a c t i o n  H C h a n i 8 8 8  t h a t  allow theme a c t i o n s  t o  be i 8 p l O -  
mented by s i ~ u l a t i n q  t h e  crevs' physical i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  interface. 
Tho pe rcep tua l  a f fo rdance  mechanisas devoted t o  t h e  
object s e l e c t i o n  t a 8 k  inc lude  t h e  cargo af fordance ,  f i x e d  
enemy. a f fordance ,  home affordance,  c o l l i s i o n  a f fordance ,  
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mobile enemy affordance, and friendly-up affordance per- 
ceptual processors. These mechanism determine the degree 
to vhich particular objects afford actions of various types 
to friendly craft depending upon the particular friendly 
craft resources. With the exception of home base, each type 
o f  object defines one type of affordance, since only one 
typa of action 1 8  associated vith each object type (1.e. 
cargo afford loading, enemies afford attacking, potential 
collisions afford evasive action, and friendlies aovinq 
slovly to avoid trees afford being sent above tree l e v e l ) .  
H o m e  base, on the other hand, afford8 three types of 
act ions : refueling, resupplying m i s s  ilea, and unloading 
cargo. A high affordance for any one of these actions can 
be sufficient reason to be sent to home base. 
A 8  vas the case vith the perceptual mechanisms de- 
scribed earlier, one role of the object perceptual afford- 
ance ~eCht4ni888 is to simplify the problem of the object 
action selection mechanism. The task of determining an 
efficient allocation of craft to vorld objects can be vieved 
as a complex optimization problem. One vay that a sen- 
sitivity to affordance8 can reduce the complexity of an 
optimization problem vas discussed above in reference to 
scout waypoint selection, vhere use of affordance infot- 
mation resulted in a drastic reduction in the size of the 
problem space to be searched. A sensitivity to affordances 
can also reduce the complexity of an optimization problem by 
. .  
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decomposing that problem into a large number of relatively 
simple, independent sub-problem. Zach of the sub-problem 
is the assessmnt of an action-environment relation, and 
will reflect both the desirability o f  a particular action as 
vel1 as the degree to which it can effectively be performed 
given the specifics of the environmental situation. 
Problem of optimization almost invariably involve a 
minimization of resources to achieve a fixed objective, or a 
maximization of an objective function given fixed re~ources. 
That is, they require an integration o f  cost8 and benefits 
at some point in the computation using a common scale of 
measuze~ent. Affordances serve a similar function. Since 
they are masures of the desirability of taking a specified 
action in a specified environment, they provide implicit 
tradeof f evaluation8 that result in a one-dimn8ional 
mea8ure of both the benefits and the costs of the action. 
They do this by reflectlng both the desirability of the 
action (the benefits) and the degree to which the environ- 
ment allOV8 for effective performance of the action (the 
costs 1 . To suggest that the perceptual mechanisas are 
attuned to affordancas, then, is to imply that the necessity 
for explicit trade-off comparison8 is reduced, due to the 
fact that the perceptual 80ChanisB8 perform an implicit 
cost-benefit evaluation. Phis is one explanation of hov 
attunement to affordances can reduce t h e  burden8 on an 
information processing s y s t e ~  that is charged with a task 
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t h a t  r e q u i r e s  t h e  comparison of costs and b e n e f i t s  i n  t h e  
s e l e c t i o n  of a c t i o n .  
The object a f fordance  perceptua l  mechanism are 
conc re t e  examples of t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  i n  opera t ion .  The cargo 
af fordance  mechanism provides a scalar V a l U e  t h a t  it5 
indicativo o f  both t h o  d o s i r a b i l i t y  of loading  a p a r t i c u l a r  
cargo and t h e  ease v i t h  vhich t h i 8  t a s k  can  be performed. 
The a f fordance  is actually a scalar w a s u r e  t h a t  reflects a 
combination of both these d i ~ e n s i o n s .  These d i ~ e n s i o n s  are 
reflected i n  t h e  cargo af fordance  mechanism by t h e  fact t h a t  
the cargo affordance i8  increacred v i t h  decrea8ed distance 
betveen t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft and t h e  cargo. One o f  t h e  costa 
involved i n  loading  a cargo is the t i m e  s p e n t  by t he  
friendly t o  perform t h i s  t a s k ,  and t h i s  time decreases v i t h  
decreased d i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  cargo. Another p o t e n t i a l  cost  is 
l o s i n g  t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft by running o u t  of f u e l  on t h e  way 
t o  load or unload a cargo, SO t h e  cargo af fordance  mechani8m 
provides  a zero value  i n  t h i s  cond i t ion .  On t h e  b e n e f i t  
aide, t h e  payoff for t h e  cargo can  on ly  be achieved i f  t h e  
craft has  enough time t o  r e t u r n  t h e  cargo home, and enough 
missiles t o  defend t h e  cargo (and f r i e n d l y  craf t )  from being 
destroyed, therefore t h e  a f fordance  WChanlS8 is also 
8On8itiVO t o  the88 cons ide ra t ions .  Of C O U r 8 0 ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
as t o  vhich dimensions of a n  a c t i o n  are t o  be consldered 
cos ts  and vhich factors are b e n e f i t s  does no t  seem t o  be a n  
objective property of t h e  a c t i o n ;  rather it appears t o  
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depend upon t h e  goal s t r u c t u r e  that t h e  a c t i o n  s e r v e s  and 
other con tex tua l  factors. 
The fixed enemy af fordance  ~ e c h a n l s m  operate8 i n  a 
similar fashion.  Considerat ions t o  which t h i s  Mchanism is 
s e n s i t i v e  are t h e  d i s t a n c e  betveen t h e  friendly craft and 
th. f i x e d  eneny, t h e  number of mi8sile8 po8sessed by t h e  
friendly ctaft, t h e  number of cargo carried by t h e  friendly 
craft t h a t  might  be sacrificed due t o  a n  unsuccessful  attack 
a c t i o n ,  t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft'. f u e l  l eve l  t h 8 t  determines 
whether t h e  enemy is in range, and t h e  mi88ion time remhin- 
i n g  in t h e  case t h a t  t h e  friendly craft vi11 have t o  r e t u r n  
home before t h e  end of t h e  mi88ion. The a f fo rdance  mch: 
anism produces a scalar m a s u r e  o f  t h e  combination of t h i 8  
e n t i r e  set  of factors. The detailed ope ra t ion  of t h i 8  and 
each of t h e  mechani8.s d l s C U 8 8 e d  below vi11 be described i n  
greater detai l  in t h e  folloving chapter. 
The mobile enemy af fordance  wchanism is much more 
simple due t o  t h e  fact t h a t ,  a t  t h e  po in t  when a t t a c k i n g  
mobile enemies is a featsiblo a c t i o n  for  a f r iendly craft, 
t h e  mobile enemy is endangering t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of t h e  
friendly craft. Thu8, u n l e s s  t h e  attack a c t i o n  is taken, 
t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft v i11  typicaAly be destroyed. Therefore, 
a maximum af fordance  va lue  is a 8 8 O C i a t O d  v i t h  lock-on8 v i t h  
nobile enemy craft, otherwise a zero va lue  is a88ignOd t o  
t h i s  a f fordance .  
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The home base affotdance mechanism is mote complicated 
due to<the fact that home base affords three types of 
action. The craft m y  return home to refuel, to resupply 
vith mi88ile8, to unload cargo, or any combination of these 
three activities. Therefore, separate affordance cal- 
culations are made for each of the three p088iblO actiona, 
and the resultant affordance values are then combined into a 
single ~easure by the use of a rule that contains both 
additive and maximization components. The additive com- 
ponent is due to the fact that the three affotdances can 
combin. in a way that, although none o f  the affordance 
values on its ovn is high enough to suggest that the craft 
should be sent hone, going home still might be desired due 
to a combination of needs. The maximization operation 
arises because any one of the three affordance di.ension8, 
though, is sufficient for requiring a home action, regard- 
1088 Of the Value8 along the other two di8On8iOn8. 
It vould appear at least theoretically possible to 
eliminate the maximization component of this Wchani8m vith 
an appropriately designed additive operation. An additive 
rule can be used to allow for a high input value on one 
information dimension to be sufficient, on its ovn, for the 
generation of a high output value. The maximization 
opwation vas used, though, because it provide8 an i8pliCit 
thresholding function that cannot be performed by an 
additive operation alone. The reason that thresholdlng vas 
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desired was to allow a very high value on one di~ension to 
null the values on the other dimen8iOn8 in the output 
calculation. Consider, for example, the situation where 
it was ab8OlUtely necessary that a craft return home to 
refuel, resulting in a M X ~ R U ~  home affordance value. The 
use of a maximization operation in this situation would 
yield the same (maximum) affordance value regardless of the 
value8 on the other input diMn8iOn8. Since the lack of 
fuel sade it absolutely necessary that the craft return 
home, an additional need to unload a piece o f  cargo, for 
example, could make it no 'morea necessary that tha crafg 
return home. 
The final two perceptual affordance mechanisms help 
determine when tvo additional friendly actions should occur, 
although these actions do not have an associated world 
object a8 do the actions discussed above. One of these is 
the collision avoidance affordance mechanism, which is 
sensitive to potential collisions between friendly craft. A 
high affordance value indicates that a potential COlli8ion 
is imminent, and suggests that a collision avoidance action 
should be implemented. This mechanism operate8 by perform- 
ing an extrapolation of each craft'a position to identify 
potential collisions. The final affordance mechanism is 
sensitive to situations where the friendly craft is travel- 
ing slowly due to the fact that it is below tree level and 
within a forested region. In this situation, the friendly 
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craft should be given a couand to raise its altitude to 
above tree level. This situation 18 not highly salient per- 
ceptually, as it requires repeated observations of the 
craft's motion on the rap display (to generate a speed 
estimate) to be identified. Similarly, the affordance 
mechanism that is sensitive t o  this situation is pro- 
gressive: the affordance value is slovly increa8ed by small 
amounts during the time interval in which the situation 
exists. This feature is 18plemnted by adding a mall 
number to this affordance value each time the affordance 
values are updated vhen the model alooksa at the vorlb 
display. 
These five perceptual affordance mechanism8 supply the 
information that is used by the object selection mechanism. 
This mechanism operates upon the entire set of affordances 
betveen all craft-action pairs that are made available by 
the current, and predicted, vorld state and deter8ines the 
desired current and planned craft actions. For the scout 
and each of the four friendly craft, the affordance values 
for each action the vorld currently makes  available are 
calculated barred on current vorld state, the vorld state 
that is predicted to exist at the end of the craft's current 
activity, and the vorld state that is predicted to exist at 
the end of the craft's currently planned activity. A given 
cargo that is discovered, for example, can be allocated to 
any one of the friendly craft at any one of three time 
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point8 (currently, immediately folloving the current action, 
or iu@iately folloving the planned action). 
The allocation mechanism operate8 in the folloving vay. 
Let 1, (i=l,S) range over the five craft, vhere 1 4  desig- 
nates the scout craft. The planning horizon for determining 
craft activity is 888U8ed to be three actlonrr. (Result8 of 
a sensitivity analysis that suggested that the assumption of 
8 three action planning horizon vas required to mimic ctev 
behavior are discussed i n  the next chapter). Let j, (j=1,3) 
range over the three time slots i n  the planning horizon for 
each craft: j-1 is the current action; j=2 is the firsf 
planned 8CtiOn; and j-3 18 the second planned action. Lek 
k, ( k - l , N )  de8ignate the actions that are made available to 
a craft at a given ti8438 where N is determined by the 
current and predicted vorld state. Bach k indicates a 
particular action available to a friendly craft, vhere k-1 
might indicate loading cargo #3 ,  k-2 might indicate loading 
cargo 412, k-3 right indlcate attacking fixed enemy 47, and 
k = 4  might indicate going home. 
NOV, let A(i8j8k) b8 the affordance (provided by the 
perceptual processors) for assigning friendly(1) at tima 
slottj) to object(k). When j=l, the A(i,j,k) are calculated 
directly from the current vorld state and the current 
resource levels for each of the craft. If a craft is 
currently performing an action for vhlch a termination time 
can be estimated (all actions except search actions vhich 
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continue indefinitely), the A ( 1 , 2 , k )  are calculated based on 
the vorld state and the craft resource levels that are 
predicted to exist at this time. The predictions are made 
vith a set of simp10 difference equations that de8cribe 
8 p t O m  dm.ic8 . The equations dO8Crlbe hov craft the 
position and resource lev018 change over time. In the case 
vhere a given friendly ha8 been scheduled to perform an 
action after the current action, and the scheduled action 
also has a predictable termination time, the A(1,3,k) are 
calculated based on the vorld state and craft redource 
levels that are predicted to exist at the initiation o f  thq 
third time slot in the planning horizon. 
h c h  craft is treated individually vhen #king these 
predictions. That is, the mechanism serially cycles through 
each of the craft independently vhen advancing craft to 
future time points. Thus, a comprehensive prediction 
involving all five craft is not used for planning future 
craft actions. Thus, the mechanism is not able to plan 
future, coordinated activity among the multiple craft. 
Rather, the mechanism can only plan future actions that do 
not involve coordination. The ability to generate co- 
ordinated actions is restricted to action8 taken in the 
current vorld state. That is, the perceptual mechanisms 
that are used to detect coordination affordances are not 
used fo r  planning future actions, since the estimates of 
future vorld states are made for the craft individually. 
& 
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since the pO88ibllity exists that optimal performance 
requires planning coordinated actions, this mchanism should 
be considered as a heuristic, rather than an algorithm. 
A8 mentioned previously, the function perfornod by this 
planning mechanism is as8uwd to be perforaed by visual 
iaagery. The reason that the aechanism vas not designed to 
be able to generate planned, coordinated actions concerns an 
assumption about hov imagery might be limited in its ability 
to provide veridical simulations of future Vorld states. 
Although no empirical evidence has been cited to support 
this claia, it 18 a88UMd that the huran's ability to 
advance the vorld state via visual iaagery is restricted to 
individual craft. When imaging the future trajectory o f  an 
individual craft, it i8 a88UDed t h a t  crev8 cannot image the 
trajectories of  the other craft that appear peripheral to 
the craft vhich is the focus of attention. 8ince the 
perceptual 8echanisrs sensitive to coordination affordances 
require information pertaining to the simultaneous location 
of multiple craft, the operation of the80 aechanisms is 
a88Ured to be ze8tricted to processing the currently 
displayed vorld state only. While it may be the case that 
huaan8 are capable of siaultaneously iaaqing the future 
states of multiple object8 (e.g., highly skilled chess 
players inaging the future location o f  multiple che88 
pieces), this capability is not assumed to be operative in 
this- exper imntal task . 
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After these p r e d i c t i o n s  have been made, t h e  three 
d iaens iona l  array A ( i , j , k )  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  a f fordance  v8lues  
f o r  each of t h e  f i v e  craft a t  each of t h e  three time s l o t s  
f o r  each of t h e  a c t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  vo r ld  mkes available. A 
comparison of these va lues  is r equ i r ed  due t o  t h e  fact  t h a t  
o b j e c t s  suppor t ing  world a c t i o n s  (cargo and enemy craft)  are 
a ~ ~ n 8 ~ n a b h a  and cannot  be allocated t o  more t h a n  one 
friendly time s lo t .  The a c t i o n  s e l e c t i o n  wchanism operates 
by assigning t h e  most a p p r o p r i a t e  a c t i o n  t o  each f r i e n d l y  
time s l o t  undez t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  mu l t ip l e  a c t i o n s  
requlrlng the saae vorld object are not alloved. That is, 
cargo #3, for example, cannot  be allocated t o  both friendli 
#I and friendly #2, nor can it be a l l o c a t e d  t o  both f r i e n d l y  
81's c u r r e n t  time s l o t  and f r i e n d l y  #l's second time s l o t .  
l o r  t h e  object a c t i o n  selection r e c h a n i s r ,  alternative8 
need t o  be compared so t h a t  t h e  same o b j e c t  is no t  a l l o c a t e d  
t o  m u l t i p l e  craft. These  comparisons are necessary due t o  
the  fact  t h a t  t h e  problem decomposition used t o  create t h e  
perceptual affordance mechanisms did n o t  result  i n  complete- 
l y  Independent sub-problems. The s e l e c t i o n  mechanism is 
requi red ,  then,  t o  deal v i t h  t h e  interact ions between t h e  
s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  sub-problem8 cau8ed by the  fact  t h a t  t h e  
problem decomposition vas  not  e n t i r e l y  clean. 
To s a t i s f y  t h e  e x c l u s i v i t y  c o n s t r a i n t ,  t h e  f o l l o v i n g  
h e u r i s t i c  1s used t o  determine t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of consumable 
objects based on t h e  a f fo rdance  va lues  i n  array A ( i , j , k ) .  
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limply said, the heuti8tiC trles to assign the wbe8tw 
friendly (as determined by its locatlon and resource levels) 
to each con8umable object. For example, let k-1 be a 
consumable object that should be a88igned to a craft. given 
the current world state and the current and planned activ- 
ities for the five craft, affordance values for this cargo, 
A(i,j,l), are determined for each craft(1) and tima 810t(j). 
determine to vhlch craft ti- 8iot each ConsuMble object 
should be a88igned. The heuristic 1s defined below. 
That is, action(.) is the best action for friendly(1) 
-h t i M  slot()). 
2. Let FHAX(k1 be the ordered pair (f,t) if: 
That is, the best craft tine s lo t  for action(k1 i8 for 
friendly(f) at time slot(t1. 
3. Allocate action(k) to friendly(i1 at time 8lot(j) if 
That 18, allocate action(k) to friendly craft(1) at time 
slot(j) i f  action(k) Is the most highly afforded action 
for friendly(1) at time 810t(j), vhen considered across 
all av8ilable actions; llnp friendly(1) at tire slot(j) 
1s the highest affordance for action(j) considering 
all friendlies and time slots. 
Allocation of COnsU~able objects to craft is quite s i ~ p l e  
under this heuristic. The heuristic is motivated by 
considering how a h u a n  supervisor might allocated tasks to 
. 
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a staff of peoph ( t h e  f ive  craf t )  vho vary  i n  t h e i r  
abi l i t ies  t o  perform those t a s k s  (craft l o c a t i o n s  and 
resource l e v e l s ) .  The goal 1s t o  " f ind  t h e  best person for 
t h e  job", and t o  s imul taneous ly  "f ind t h e  best job for  each 
persona . NOV, vhen t h e  a l l o c a t i o n s  made under these t v o  
p r i n c i p l e s  agree, t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  t a s k  is easy. ?or example, 
consider vhen a nev task is added t o  t h e  job queue and t h e  
hypothetical huaan supe rv i so r  must a s s i g n  it one m e m b e r  of 
t h e  suppor t  s t a f f .  The p 8 O p h  CODptlSfnq t h e  S t a f f  M y  
d i f f e r  i n  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  perform t h e  t a s k  so t h e  super-  
visor vould l i k e  t o  find t h e  person who can perform the  t a 8 k  
most e f f i c i e n t l y .  On t h e  other hand, t h e  supe rv i so r  doeir 
no t  vant  t o  a s s i g n  t h e  t a s k  t o  a person vho is better used 
t o  perform a d i f f e r e n t  tarrk.  Sally, for exa rp le ,  might be 
t h e  most h i g h l y  sk i l l ed  computer programmer on t h e  s t a f f .  
Assuming t h a t  she  is not  already p e r f o r r i n g  o the r  proqrar- 
Ding t a s k 8  of more importance than  t h e  nev t a s k ,  t h e  nev 
t a s k  vould most l i k e l y  be allocated t o  her .  
Problems can arise, of C O U L ~ ~ ,  vhen t h e  most h i g h l y  
s k i l l e d  person f o r  t h e  t a s k  is unavai lab le .  I n  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  h e u r i s t i c  described above leaves t h i s  t a s k  
una l loca ted .  To deal v i t h  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  human 
supe rv i so r  might  t r y  t o  f i n d  t h e  next  r o s t  competent s taff  
member T h i s  ope ra t ion  is accomplished by adding t h e  
f o l l o v i n g  f e a t u r e  t o  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  h e u r h t i c :  vhen a craft 
has a more h i g h l y  afforded a c t i o n  i n  a g iven  time s l o t  t h a n  
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t h e  nev object t h a t  needs t o  be a l l o c a t e d ,  t h e  affordance 
for  t h e  object is nu l l ed  because t h e  craft has  a more h igh ly  
afforded a c t i o n .  R e t u r n i n g  t o  t h e  example of t h e  human 
bUmrvi8Or, t h i s  r u l e  Say8 t h a t  when a t a 8 k  is bO8t per- 
formed by Sally,  b u t  Sa l ly  is bu8y v i t h  more important 
t a s k s ,  t h e  a f fordance  t h a t  S a l l y  fee18 for  t h e  nev t a s k ,  
even though s h e  is t h e  most competent performer of t h e  t a s k ,  
I8 e s s e n t i a l l y  zero.  I n  t h i s  vay, Sal ly  no longer  competes 
f o r  t h e  nev t a s k ,  and another  staff member can assume t h e  
role of t h e  most competent performer due t o  Sally's unavai l -  
a b i l i t y .  The f r iendly  craft are a l l o c a t e d  t o  consurablo 
vo r ld  objects ( t a sk81  us ing  t h e  same scheme. I t  should bi 
remembered, though,  t h a t  t h e  competi t ion for objects la  not  
on ly  between craft b u t  a180 k t v e e n  the t i re  81ots for each 
craft . 
For example, cons ider  a s i t u a t i o n  where craft 1 is on 
it8 vay t o  home base t o  refuel and resupply v i t h  mlssiles. 
Assure a cargo is t hen  discovered and t h e  a f fo rdances  for  
t h i s  cargo f o r  each of t h e  craf t  are ident i f ied .  C r a f t  1 
might have t h e  h ighes t  cargo  af fordance  va lue  among t h e  f i v e  
craft, yet it might have a n  even h i g h e r  home affordance 
va lue  due t o  its need f o r  missiles. I n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  
h e u r i s t i c  described above would n u l l  craft 1'8 c u r r e n t  
a f fo rdance  va lue  f o r  t h e  cargo so t h a t  other craft and o t h e r  
craft 1 time s l o t s  can compete for the cargo. For example, 
craft  2 might nov have t h e  h ighes t  cargo  a f fo rdance  va lue  so 
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the cargo vould be allocated to Craft 2.  On the other hand, 
it might bo the case that the highest cargo affordance value 
vould be possessed by craft 1's second time slot, indicating 
that craft 1 should load the cargo after it is refueled and 
resupplied vith missiles at home base. 
In a different scenario, craft 1 right be locked-on by 
an enemy helicopter during its trip home to refuel. Even 
though it has a high home affordance value, the affordance 
value for attacking the enemy helicopter vould be higher. 
In this c a m ,  the home action for craft 1 would be inter- 
rupted and the home action vould bo reacheduled to the 
second time slot (after attacking tbe helicopter). 
The frequency vith vhich the planning heuristic 
described above results in nulling affordance values and 
interrupting ongoing activity is determlned by the complex- 
ity of the vorld situation to vhich the perceptual mech- 
anisms are applied. Barly in the mission vhen no cargo or 
enemy craft have been sighted and all craft have high 
reaource levels, the affordance matrix A(i,j,k) vould simply 
indicate 8 high current affordance for searching for each o f  
the craft. A 8  a result, the entries in the matrix cor- 
responding to planned actions vould be zeros, since 8earch 
actions continue indefinitely. In the middle of the 
mission, on the other hand, many cargo and eneries MY have 
been sighted and some of the friendly craft m y  need to 
return home for resourcea. In this situation, the afford- 
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ance matrix A(i,j,k) may be nearly full o f  non-zero values, 
reflecting the complexity of the task environment. Although 
it may be possible to hypothesize a relationship betveen the 
situationdependent complexity of the manipulations on the 
affordance matrix and dynamic ~easures of mental vorkload, 
thi8 issue va8 not addressed in this rc8aarch. 
To illustrate how the affordance values in the matrix 
A(l,j,k) depend upon the current vorld situation, refer to 
1igure 1s on the folloving page. This figure indicates a 
pos8ibh vorld situation and the corresponding approximate 
affordance values that vould be generated by the parceptual 
mechanism8. The array of di8tribution8 at the top o f  the 
flgure is a graphical representation of the affotdance 
matrix A(i,Y,k). Each rov (1) represents a craft, vith the 
friendly craft in the top four rovs and the scout in the 
bottoa rov. Rach column ( j )  represents a time slot in the 
planning horizon for each craft. Prom left to right, the 
colurns lndlcate the first, second, and third actions in the 
planning horizon. Each vertical bar (k) vithin each 
distribution indicates the affordance value for candidate 
craft action. From left to right vithin each distribution, 
the candidate action8 are going home (€41, searching (81, 
loading a particular cargo (Cl,C2,C3), attacking a red enemy 
craft helicopter (R), attacking an orange enemy tank (01, 
and attacking a yellov fixed enemy emplacement ( Y ) .  lor 
clarity, the vertical bars a88OCiated vith any additional 
F1 
H S C l  C Z C 3 R O Y  
F2 H S C l  C Z C 3 R O Y  
F4 H S C l  C Z C 3 R O Y  
Scout 
H S C l C Z C 3 R O Y  
First Action 
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L H S C l C Z C 3 R O Y  
I H S C l  M C 3 R O Y  
H S C l C Z C 3 R O Y  
H S C l  C Z C 3 R O Y  H S C l C Z C 3 R O Y  
Second Action Third Action 
Figure 15. A t  top, the affordance distri bution3 for each craft  
indicative of the world rituation shown below. F=Friendly craft, 
S=Scout, C=Cargo, R=Enemy helicopter, O=Enemy tank, Y=Fixed 
enemy emplacement. Large circle indicate3 3cout radar range. 
1 3 1  
cargo and enemy craft  do not  appear i n  t h e  diagram. Recall 
t h a t  there vera  a c t u a l l y  t v e l v e  pieces of cargo, and n i x  
enemy targets of each type. A computer generated dynamic 
display of t h e  type 8hOVn i n  Figure 1 5  vas  used du r ing  t h e  
modeling process t o  observe t h e  model's i n t e r n a l  processing 
ope ra t ions .  
I n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  8hOVn i n  t h e  bottom of t h e  f igu re ,  t h e  
scout is i n  t h e  no r thves t  reg ion  a8 ind ica t ed  by t h e  small 
circle labeled "8".  A88U.e t h a t  t h e  s c o u t  has j U 8 t  been 
f lovn  above tree l e v e l ,  thereby s i g h t i n g  cargo Cl and C2 
vhich are v i t h i n  t h e  1 .5  mile radar radiu8 of t h e  scou t ,  
Por clarity,  area covered by s c o u t  radar is indicated by t h e  
large circle centered  a t  the  s c o u t  l o c a t i o n .  A circle 
i n d i c a t i n g  s c o u t  radar coverage vas  no t  included on t h e  
vo r ld  display used by human c revs .  Another p rev ious ly  
sighted cargo,  cargo C3, is shown i n  tho southeast reg ion  of 
t h e  vor ld .  The four  friendly craft  are indicated by mall 
circles labeled Fl-F4. The circles labeled "RW, "Ow, and 
indicate a red enemy h e l i c o p t e r ,  an  orange enemy tank,  
and a y e l l o v  fixed enemy emplacement, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The 
8 l i g h t l y  larger, empty circle i n  t h e  8 O U t h W 8 8 t  r eg ion  o f  t h e  
vo r ld  i n d i c a t e s  home base. 
The affordance va lues  represented  by t h e  he igh t s  of t h e  
v e r t i c a l  bars i n  t h e  array of d i s t r i b u t i o n s  are specific t o  
a given craft and a given s l o t  i n  t h e  craft 's planning 
horizon.  For example, t h e  a f fordance  va lues  i n  t h e  d is t r i -  
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bution at the upper left of the figure indicate the ap- 
propriateness of assigning each of the candidate actions to 
friendly #lms first time slot. As the affordance values 
indicate, the most appropriate current action for friendly 
#1 is to load cargo Cl. Assume, also, that this affordance 
value is the highest affordance value for loading cargo c1. 
vhen compared to all other craft-time slot pairs. This 
cargo vould then be allocated to friendly 111'8 first time 
slot and the affordance values for all other craft-time slot 
pairs for loading this cargo would be set  to zero. 
To shov, though, hov different craft might have differ? 
ent affordance values for the same action, the C1 affordance 
values for each of the other four craft are shovn in the 
remaining rows in the first column of distributions. These 
lover cargo affordance values are only meant to be indica- 
tive of the greater distance8 between these craft and cargo 
C1, since in this simplified example it is assumed that a11 
craft have enough fuel and veight carrying capacity to load 
any of the cargo in the vorld. The affordance values shovn 
for lo8ding cargo C1 in the figure, then,' are those that 
vould occur just prior to friendly #l vinninq the competi- 
tion for cargo C1. Jus$ after this time, the affordance 
values for loading cargo C1 for each of the other four craft 
vould be set to zero. 
The distribution in the second column for friendly #l 
indicates the affordance valws for each of the candidate 
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action8 t h a t  are predicted t o  exist  a t  t h e  te rmina t ion  of 
t h e  craft'm cuz ren t  a c t i o n .  Since the  c u r r e n t  a c t i o n  is t o  
load cargo Cl, t h e s e  a f fordance  va lues  indicate the  attract-  
iveness  of each of t h e  candida te  actions g iven  t h e  world 
state t h a t  is expected t o  ex is t  j u s t  after f r i e n d l y  #I loads 
cargo C1. The af fordance  va lue  for t h e  home a c t i o n  i n  t h i s  
d i s t r ibu t ion  is 8 l l g h t l y  h i g h e r ,  reflecting t h e  fact that 
friendly #1 will t hen  h8ve a cargo (C1) that need8 t o  be 
unloaded a t  home base. Of even higher  value,  though, is t h e  
affordance value for  loading  cargo C2, r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  mall 
distance betveen friendly craft #l and cargo C2 t h a t  is 
predicted t o  e x i s t  vhen t h e  craft f in i8he8  loading  cargo C1. 
I t  i8 a 8 8 U - d  t h a t  friendly #1 ha8 von t h e  competi t ion for  
cargo C2 as v e l l ,  therefore t h e  a f fordance  values .  for t h e  
o t h e r  craft  for  loading t h i s  cargo  have a l r e a d y  been set t o  
zero.  
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  t h e  t h i r d  column f o r  f r i e n d l y  #1 
indicates t h e  affordance va lues  for each of t h e  candida te  
a c t i o n s  t h a t  are predicted t o  e x i s t  a t  t h e  t e rmina t ion  of 
t h e  craft's second a c t i o n .  Since f r iendly  #l's second 
a c t i o n  v i 1 1  be t o  load ca rgo  C2, t h e  craft v i 1 1  nov then  
have t v o  cargo t h a t  need t o  b. unloaded a t  home base* The 
high af fordance  va lue  for t h e  home a c t i o n  i n  t h i s  d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n  reflects t h i s  fact. F r i e n d l y  tl's t h i r d  a c t i o n  would 
therefore be t o  go t o  home base t o  unload t h e  cargo and 
resupply v i t h  f u e l  and missiles. 
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The distributions for each of the other craft should be 
interpreted in the s a w  fashion. Friendly I2 is locked-on 
by a red enemy helicopter, and the di8trlbUtiOn8 indicate 
that this craft should attack the helicopter and then 
proceed to home base. This situation might result if 
friendly # Z ' s  attack va8 expected to deplete ita missile 
supply to a dangerously lov level. After going home, the 
third di8tribution indicates that friendly #2 8hould be 
given a search action. 
hiendly #3 is scheduled to attack a yellow fixed 
ground enemy emplacement, load cargo C3, and then travel to 
h o w  base, pre8urably to unload the cargo and resupply vith 
missiles and fuel. Friendly # 4  is attacking an orange enemy 
tank nearby home base, and is then scheduled to search. 
Perhap8 friendly # 4  has just resupplied vith missiles at 
home base and the encounter with the tank is not expected to 
decrease It8 8l88ih 8Upply to dangerously 10W level. The 
scout is currently searching and no future scout actions 
have been planned. 
Once the determination of desired scout and friendly 
craft actions is made with this planning procedure operatlng 
upon information provided by the perceptual affordance mech- 
anisms, control actions need to be taken at the interface to 
iaplement these actions. The ~echanisrs respon8ible for 
organizing and producing these actions are described in the 
folloving section. 
135 
action Mechanisms 
The model's action mChanisD8 responsible for s i m -  
ulating the crevs' physical interaction vith the interface 
are shorn in Figure 16 on the folloving page. The action 
component o f  the model is a roughly hierarchical arrangement 
of mechanisms. Although the mechanisms at the top of the 
diagram are more abstract in the sense that they are distant 
from the bottom level mChani888 th8t actually simulate 
physical activity, they exist in thelr ovn right, and do not 
simply represent higher-level de8CriptiOn8 of the organ- 
ization of the activities of the lov-level ~chani8ms:. 
Rather, they are responsible for managing the flov of 
information to the physical action wchanirms and for 
coordinating physical activities that require multiple 
physical action 8eChanlsms. 
Hierarchically arranged control mechanisms have been 
used by many behavioral scientists to dercribe skilled human 
action (Jagacln8k1, Plarondon, and Hiller, 1987; Pev, 1984; 
Nackay, 1984; Harvey and Greer, 1980; and Norman, 1981). 
One M j o r  assumption of this VieV 1s that action control 1s 
distributed in the form of a s ~ h e ~ s a  (Norman), 'rotor pro- 
grams' (Rosenbaum and Saltzman, 19841, or aactivity modulesa 
(Jagacinski et. al.). While each o f  these constructs is 
slightly different, they all share the property that they 
possess a degree of autonomou8 control of action which does 
not have to be directly controlled at higher levels. Bach 
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of the action 8echanisms in the present 8odel can be vieved 
as a si8ilar type of construct. 
The link8 betveen the mechanism8 denote 1nfOrMtlon 
flov. In the diagram, the direction of inforration flov is 
alvays dovnvard, ?or example, the most global action 
8echanism (at the top of the diagram) 18 activated each time 
any interface activity is required. ft then determines 
vhether the need for action concerns the friendly craft or 
scout action MChani88S, and sends information dovnvard to 
the appropriate mechanism. Although information always 
flovs dovnvard in this component of the model, an implicit 
UpVaZd flov of information does exist through the external 
environment. That is, the results of the actions performed 
by the lover level mechanisms can become knovn to the upper 
level mChani888 through the perception of the environmental 
changes caused by those action8. 
The most general action 8echanism at the top of the 
diagram i 8  re8pOn8lble f o r  8chebulinq the po88ibly COqp49thq 
d e ~ n d s  for scout-related and friendly-related interface 
control activity. To perform this function, the action 
mechanism operates upon the output of the action selection 
mechanisms. This output is a matrix indicating the desired 
activity for the scout and each of the friendly craft. The 
action BeChani88 is sensitive to changes in this matrix. A 
change in the currently desired activity for the scout or a 
friendly craft indicate8 that interface activity is requized 
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to bring that craft's activity into conformity vith its 
desired activity. Each iteration, all such changes are 
noted along vith their criticality. In the present model, 
the criticality of a potential change of activity directly 
corresponds to the affordance level of the desired action. 
It might, though, be more realistic to assume that the 
criticality of a potential change of activity should be a 
function of the difference betveen the affordance levels of 
the current and desired actions, although the model has not 
been constructed according to this assumption. This 
assumption vould probably better capture the notion that tha 
most important actions are those that resolve the greatest 
difference betveen the current and desired vorld state. In 
the present model, though, the most important actions are 
defined to be those that are associated vith the greatest 
affordance level. 
After the most critical change in activity is ident- 
ified, either the friendly craft action or scout action 
mechanism is activated to perform the interface activities 
required to implement the change. The friendly craft action 
mechanisms appear on the left s i d e  of the diagram and the 
scout action mechanisms appear on the right side. The 
highest level mechanisms on each of the tvo sides are 
responsible for selecting the lover level mechanisms that 
are appropriate for performing the interface activity. ?or 
the friendly craft, these are the mobile enemy action, cargo 
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action, fixed enemy action, search action, and home action 
mchanism8. For the scout, these are the load/unload 
action, enemy action, and search action MChmi888. 
These action 8eChaniSB8 are directly responsible for 
coordinating activity that require8 interaction with 
multiple interface controls. The interface controls are: 
the friendly craft text editor, used to enter action 
coucrnds for the friendly craft; the world display cursor 
used to enter search waypoints; the set of pushbuttons used 
to activate the editor, to provide real-time modification of 
friendly action commands, and to control the scout auto- 
pilot; and the scout control joystick, u8ed for nanual 
control of scout motion. 
As di8cussed in Chapter 111, the crev8 differed In the 
way in which they interacted with the interface controls, so 
some of the action mechanisms had to be individually 
tailored to describe each crew. Crew 1, a one-person crew, 
used the autopilot for control o f  the ~ C O U ~ ,  pre8umably in 
order to cope with the extensive task demands associated 
with  having to control both the scout and friendly craft. 
Crev E, the expert one-person crev, u8ed manual control of 
the scout that was intermittently interrupted by editing 
sessions for friendly craft control. For the two-person 
crew, Crev 2, the pilot vaa dedicated to the task of scout 
mnual control, while the navigator was dedicated to t h e  
’ task of friendly craft control. Since some of the action 
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8eChanis88 in the model are dependent on the crew being 
described, a detailed description of these rechanisrs vi11 
be given in the follovlng chapter vhich describes hov the 
model vas parareterized in an atterpt to dric  the behavior 
of each of the hu8an ctevs. 
CHAPTPR V I  
FITTINO THE W08t TO HUMAN CRB18 
lntroductlon 
This Chapter describes how the model vas parameterized 
to mimic the behavior of the three human crevs. First, the 
method used to select model parameters 18 discussed. This 
method is guided by both theoretical and empirical consider- 
ations. The theoretical conslUerations refer to identifying 
those manipulations of the model that have meaningful psych- 
ological interpretations. The empirical considerations 
refer to the need to demonstrate the model's sufflciency 
through adequately matching crev behavior. Next, a set of 
crev-specific parameter values are described that vere used 
to generate model behavior similar to the behavior exhibited 
by each of the crevs. In some cases the parameters are 
numerical values, but in other cases the value of a para- 
meter indicates a particular policy, such as the use of the 
autopilot for scout rotion control. Naturally, the minimal 
set of model parameters vere sought that could be adjusted 
to match emplrical data. Finally, the method used to assess 
the model's empirical adequacy is described. The results of 
the crev modeling are discussed in the folloving chapter. 
1 4 1  * 
1 4 2  
parameter i zation ADD roach 
Due to the complexity of the model, some rationale is 
needed to quide the identification of the parameters that 
can be manipulated to 8atch crew performance. Any division 
of the model into constants, parameters, and Variables must 
be based on implicit (at hast) assumptions about the 
properties of the p8ychologiCal mechanisms to vhich the 
rodel's constructs refer. One desire is to account for the 
behavioral differences between the threa crews in the most 
parsironious fashion. At a minimum, the characterization of 
crew differences in terms of the model*s constructs should 
be simpler than the characterization of crew differences in 
terms of the empirical data. Consider, for example, the 
differences in the sets of condition-action rules required 
to differentiate tvo human subjects in a production system 
model of problem solvinq. If these differences cannot be 
demonstrated to be a simpler descrlptlon of inter-subject 
difference8 than a description of lnter-~subject differences 
in purely empirlcal terms, there are serious questions as to 
the theoretical contribution of the production system model, 
Thus, one test of the present model ls the degree to 
which it can economically account for crev behavioral 
differences In vays that are readily interpretable in terms 
of the model's constructs. At the most general level, the 
model can be decomposed into perceptual, selection, and 
action components. Each of these components can be further 
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decomposed into a set of Specific mechanisms, as described 
in the-previou8 chapter. The primary goal of thi8 chapter 
is to explain hov and vhy particular ~echanisms vere chosen 
to describe each of the three hu8an crevs. 
Host of the emphasis has been placed on the development 
of the perceptual components in the model. This is due to 
the fact that the modeling approach is based on viewing 
skilled human performance as relying heavily on poverful, 
task-dependent, context-specific perceptual mechanisrrr. The 
identification and development of the selection, or central, 
corponents of the mod81 vas secondary. This task va8 guided 
by considering what information-processing tasks could not 
be easily accounted for by the perceptual sechanisms. In 
this way, the role of the selection mechanism8 c a n ~ b e  seen 
to be implicitly defined by the specification of the 
perceptual mechanisms. Finally, consideration vas given to 
the action mechanisms that vere respon8ible for simulating 
the observable crev activltles. Little theoretical con8id- 
eration has been given to the design of the action mechan- 
ism other than the deslre to employ a hierarchical struc- 
ture vith enough flexibility to account for the crevs' 
different physical interface control behaviors.* 
Given this overviev of the modeling emphasis, the 
folloving approach for parameterizing the model vas utsed. 
First, action mechanisms for each cfev vere developud in 
accordance vith the observab'le intezface control policies 
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used by the three crevs. Mean editing times and policies 
for scout and friendly craft control vere identified from 
the empirical data. In the case of the scout, the relevant 
data concerned vhether manual or autopilot control vas used, 
For the friendly craft, the action comrands entered via the 
text editor that vere u8ed to control the friendly craft 
vere identified. Videotapes of crev sessions vere consulted 
to measure average times to press button8 and manipulate the 
joystick controlling the cursor on the vorld display. 
Given these easily measured differences betveen crtvs, 
perhaps the simplest hypothesis to be considered is that the 
array of performance difference8 identified in the crev 
profiles could be due entirely to these parameters. This 
vould be an attractive hypothesis from a methodological 
perspective since it vould confine the parameterization 
search to the action component of the model, alloving the 
perceptual and selection components to remain invariant over 
different crevs. An analysis of the empirical data, 
though, proves this hypothesis untenable. While different 
action MChanisD8 might account for certain performance 
differences, such as craft idle time for example, an exam- 
ination of the entire crev profiles indicates that the crevs 
4180 differed in terms of hov vel1 they made use of the five 
craft in vays that vere independent of the efficiency by 
vhich the crevs lnteracted with the physical interface. 
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ror example, Crew 1, the one-person crew who used 
autopilot control of the scout, appeared to have used a 
inefficient policy to determine scout activities. i d  
described in the czew performance profiles in Chapter 111, 
this crew's inability to rearch the vorld vith the scout did 
not seem to be entirely due to the scout's decreased speed 
and higher fuel usage under autopilot control. Rather, 
searching inefficiency also re8ulted from the fact that Crew 
1 used the scout to load more cargo than the other one- 
person crev, thereby keeping the scout from 8earchlnq the 
vorld for other cargo and enemy craft. 
Another example of crew differences that do not appeaz 
to be the result of differences in interface aanipulation 
skills concerns Crews 2 and E. Although Crev E was less 
able to keep the scout in motion than the two-person crev, 
this subject was able to cover more unsearched area vith the 
scout than Crew 2. this fact suggests that Crew E ' s  scout 
search path8 vera sorehov more efficient, although Crev 2 
wad able to search the same total area as Crew E due to 
searching performed by the friendly craft. Another sub- 
stantive difference betveen there two crevs vas that Crew B 
was able to unload a higher percentage of loaded cargo than 
Crew 2. This appears to reflect a difference in the degree 
to which the friendly craft could be effectively managed, 
and seems difficult to explain in terms o f  difference8 in 
interface manipulation skills. 
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These crev differences have been dlscussed because they 
appear-to provide evidence that the crevs differed in vays 
in addition to any differences that vere observed in terms 
of interface manipulation skills. The data cited above seem 
to indicate the presence of crev differences at a strategic 
level, rather than as variations in the efficiency with 
vhich crevs could Interact vlth the physical interface. It 
could be the case, though, that wlow-levela differences in 
interface manipulation skills MY be ~nifested, albeit in 
rather conplex ways, in terms of *high-levelw strategic 
differences. That is, it right be the case that high-1eve:l 
strategic differences are erergent upon differences in terms 
of low-level interface manipulation skills. 
For exarple, the strategic differences exhibited 
betveen tvo football tears (e.g., a run-oriented versus a 
pass-oriented offense) might be due in large part to 
differences betveen the tvo teams in terms of the physical 
attributes and execution skills possessed by the tears' 
players. The two different strategies might be t h e  result 
of the sane type of strategy selection process simply 
operating upon different sets of information. One such 
process night attempt to determine an optimal offensive 
strategy as a function of the execution skills of the team's 
players. Given teams corposed of players vith different 
seta of skills, different optimal offensive strategies might 
be produced by this process. 
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I t  may be the case that this phenonenon could help 
explain the strategic differences observed in the laboratory 
task. If this is the case, it would appear pos8ibh to 
construct a model capable o f  determining an appropriate 
strategy based upon infornation pertaining to interface 
manipulation skill8. The different strategies produced by 
8uch a nodel nlqht be capable, then, of accounting for the 
observed strategic difference8 between the crews in terms o f  
difference8 solely at the level of interface manipulation 
skills. If this approach veze to be taken in the current 
vork, the parameters of the perceptual and cognitiv4 
mechanisms right not need to be altered to generate differ- 
ent behaviors at the  strategic level. 
As a natter of fact, this appzoach has been u8ed to 
describe strategic differences betveen crevs in terms of 
autopilot usage ( K i r l i k ,  1987). A model vas constructed to 
demonstrate that different strategies for autopilot usage 
(e.g., dedicated autopilot usage, dedicated manual control, 
svitchinq betveen the autopilot and manual control based 
upon editing demands) could be shovn to be the result of an 
optimization process operating upon data concerning a crev's 
ability to perform manual control. That is, it vas shovn 
that some of the different autopilot usage strategies 
observed in the experiments vere consistent vith the 
assumption that crevs vere attempting to optimize average 
scout 8paed glven their differing ability to perform manual 
148 
control . Crevs highly skilled at manual control, for 
example, could be shovn to be acting optimally by not using 
the autopilot. Crevs vith low manual control skills could 
be similarly shovn to be acting optimally by using dedicated 
autopilot control. In addition, it vas shovn that the 
strategy of engaging autopilot control before editing and 
returning to manual control after editing vas never optimal 
regardless of the crev's manual control proficlency. This 
etrategy vas alvays 8ub-optiral due to the large amount of 
time required to set-up and engage the autopilot. Thus, the 
model provided one explanation of the fact that no crev8 
vere observed to use this strategy. In this model, then; 
strategic differences vere shovn to be emergent upon 
differences in terms of manipulation skills. 
It might, then, be possible to construct a similar 
model for shoving how the strategic differences between the 
crevs could bo the result of differences in terms of lov- 
level interface manipulation skills. Such a model, though, 
vould not be consistent vith the assumptions discussed in 
Chapter IV concerning the nature of the real-time operation 
of the mechanisms underlying skilled perfor8ance. It vas 
argued that the operation of these mechanism is ahistorical 
and non-teleological. In other vords, it vas suggested that 
a description of the real-time operation of these DeChani8DS 
is independent o f  the previous shaping forces that are 
sensitive to task goals and result in expert or possibly 
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optimal performance. Thus, an appropriate description of 
the operation of these mechanisms need not refer to the past 
events that vere responsible for their existence or the 
goals to vhich their operation contributes. It is assumed 
that optimization operations are not a component of the 
real-time operation of the MChani8R8 underlying skilled 
performance, although optimization (or learning) operations 
right be re8ponsibh for the %lesign@@ o f  the mechanisms at 
any point in time. 
It is therefore suggested that a mdel vhich demon- 
strates hov high-level strategic differences vould be the 
(perhaps optiral) emergent results of low-level, skill- 
related differences 1s not appropriate for describing the 
real-time operation of the mechanisms underlying skilled 
perf ormnce . While the autopilot usage model dlscussad 
above, for example, might be useful for predicting vhich 
mechanirrw vi11 be evolved as a result of the strategy 
selection process t l . e . ,  those that implement the selected 
strategy), it vould not be useful for describing the real- 
time operation of these mechanisms. To use the model for 
this purpose would amount to making the dubious claim that 
optimization operations vere performed each time the crev 
took an action related to the use of the autopilot or the 
manual control joystick. In direct contrast to this claim, 
the present modeling approach assumes that the strategy 
selection operations that might contribute to highly skilled 
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performance are performed off-line, or incrementally, and 
should, be considered distinct from the mechanisms that 
actually implement the selected strategy. To return to the 
football case, for example, the process which operates upon 
information concerning the players' execution skills to 
determine an offensive strategy would probably be performed 
by the coach prior to the game, or in an incremental fashion 
while watching the game from the sidelines. A real-time 
description of the behavior of the players while implement- 
ing this strategy need not be concerned with the coach's 
strategy selection process. 
While it might be possible to describe crew strategic 
differences as emergent upon differences in interface 
manipulation skills, then, this description would exist at a 
different level than a description of strategic differences 
in terms of differences within the real-time mechanisms 
underlying performance. The first description would provide 
an account of why the mechanisms were ttdesigned" in a 
certain way, and would probably make reference to task goals 
and the task feedback that would be relevant to obtaining 
these goals. This level of description might, then, be 
defined as teleoloqical in nature. The second description, 
on the other hand, would provide an account of the operation 
of the mechanisms and would not be concerned with task goals 
or learning. This description might therefore be defined as 
non-teleological or mechanistic. Since this research is 
1 5 1  
devoted to describlng the real-tine operation of the 
meChanhm8 underlying skilled perforrcrnce, only the second 
type of description will be used here, although pursuing the 
adesigna issues would surely provide a more comprehenslve 
account of the nature of skilled performance. 
A direct implication of the decision to ignore the 
teleological level of description is that tho process of 
fitting the model to crew behavior might app8.r Shallov or 
descriptive in nature. This issue Will b8 dircu88ed in 
greater detail in the next sections where the pzocess of 
model parameterization is described. At this point, though:, 
it should be clear that the adoption of a mechanistic level 
of description entails that a de8cription of the strategic 
differences between crews will only concern hypothesized 
differences in the real-time mechanisms that implement these 
strategic differences. Based on the arguments presented 
above, it does not appear possible to completely account for 
strategic difference8 in t e r m  of action mechanism8 alone, 
since these nechanisns are only responsible for implenent- 
lnq, rather than determining, a particular strategy. 
Given that it does not appear pO88ibh to corpletely 
account for crew differences in terms of action mechanisms 
alone, the next si~plest hypothesis to be examined is that 
crew differences were also due to the existence of different 
perceptual mechantins, but crevu did not differ in terms of 
the selection, or central, mechanisms. The hypothe818 that 
, 
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the crevs' perceptual mechani8.s differed vould appear to be 
consistent vith the theoretical ideas on vhich the modeling 
approach vas based. This hypothesis suggests that crevs 
differed in terms of the degree to vhich their perceptual 
mechanisms became attuned to the affordances in the s i m -  
ulated vorld that vould allov for rapid and effective action 
selection. 
No justification, on the other hand, is given in the 
theoretical arguments for the assumption that the selection 
DeChanisR8 vere invariant over the three crevs. Rather, 
this hypothe8is is adopted primarily for methodoloqicaJ 
reamons. If the model can be rade to mimic the different 
behaviors of the huaan crevs vithout manipulating the 
central selection 8eChanisBS, little empirical justification 
can be provided for the hypothesis that the crevs' selection 
mechanisms differed. On the other hand, if the model can be 
rade to m i m i c  crev differences vhile holding the perceptual 
DeChanismS fixed and varying the selection mechanisms, 
little emplrical justification could be provided for the 
hypothesis that the crevsg perceptual mechanisms differed. 
If neither the perceptual nor selection manipulations alone 
is capable of mi8icking crev differences, then the hypoth- 
esis that both the8e mechanisms differed betveen crevs vould 
appear to be required. 
The current approach for describing crew differences is 
based on the requirement that simpler descriptions should be 
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explored before more complex descriptions are considered. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that a description of crcv 
differences can be localized to either the perceptual or 
selection mechanisms, but not both, vi11 be explored before 
considering the hypothesis that crevs differed in regard to 
both of th88e 8eChani888. Pot reasons dimcussed belov, it 
vas decided that the selection WChaniS88 should be held 
constant and the perceptual nechanism8 should be ranipulattd 
in the attempt to describe crev differences. 
One rea8on that the selection 88Chanl8.8 vere held 
con8tant to de8cribe crev differences is due to the lirited 
ability to vary these mechanism8 in theoretically meaningful 
and empirically relevant vays. The operation of the three 
selection mechanisms in the model, the scout waypoint 
selection Mchanism, the friendly vaypoint selection 
mechanism, and the object selection mechanisr can be 
characterized in the s a w  simple vay. Each of these 
88Chani8m8 selects the action vith the maximum affordance 
value subject to a 8-11 set of constraints. The object 
selection mechanism is more complex since it is capable o f  
predicting future world states to enable planning. The 
constraints used in each of the mOChani888 are specific to 
the action selection task. For example, the scout vaypoint 
selection 88Chani88 uses a constraint to reduce backtrack- 
ing, and the object selection ReChanhm uses a constraint to 
eliminate competition between the five craft. 
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Oiven this characterization of the selection mechan- 
isms, there vould appear to be a very small Set of possible 
manipulations that could be used to fit the behavior of the 
different crews. The three most obvious ~anipulations would 
be the following: a) altering the assumption that crovs 
were choosing the actions vith maximum affordance value; b) 
altering the assumed set of constraints used by the selec- 
tion BeChani8R8; and c) altering the assumptions concerning 
the planning horizon used to select future craft actions. 
Unfortunately, manipulation (a) seems to be o f  little 
theoretical utility and mnipulations (b) and (c) do nok 
seem to be empirically relevant. 
Abandoning the assumption that c r e w  were selecting 
actions vith M X ~ B U B  affordance value (manipulation (a)) 
vould appear to cause tvo theoretical difficulties. The 
first would be concerned with the probler of identifying a 
coherent set alternative assumptions that could be used for 
manipulating the operation of the selection DeChanisB8. Do 
crevs choose the actions with the second highest affordance 
value, or perhaps actions vith affordance values in a 
specif led range? These assumptlons would appear to be 
arbitrary and of little theoretical value. The second 
problem vith this approach is that the objection could 
always be Bade that crevs vere indeed choo8ing the maximally 
afforded actions, but the reason that a more complex 
selection o&ration vas required to ~ i ~ i c  behavior was that 
1ss 
the affordance values vere simply generated in the vronq 
fashion. That is, it vould appear at least theoretically 
possible to mimic the operation o f  a more complex selection 
DOChanim vith a si8ple maximization-based DOChani88 by 
changing the vay in vhich the affordance values are cal- 
culated. This objection vould essentially claim that crevs 
vere indeed maximizing but they vere maxhizinq vith respect 
to a different set of criteria than used by the more 
complex, non-maximizing, mechanism. In the terminoloqy o f  
the present model, then, the argument could alvays be made 
that the creva' actually differed vith respect to their 
perceptual mechanisw (vhich generate affordance values) 
rather than vith respect to their selection wchanis88. 
Therefore, the use o f  manipulation (a) for varying the 
selection mechanisms appears to be of limited theoretical 
utility. 
Si8ilarly, it does not appear theoretically rewarding 
to vary the constraints used by the selection 80Chani888 in 
an attempt to describe crev differences. The role played by 
these constraints is to eliminate certaln highly afforded 
actions from con8ideration for zea80ns rrpecific to the 
action selection task. For example, the OXClU8iVity 
constraint used by the object selection mechanism eliminates 
candidate craft actions that compete vith actions to be 
taken by another craft. In the scout vaypoint selection 
~ c h a n i s m ,  constralnts are used to eliminate candidate 
* 
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vaypoints that vould cause the scout to run out of fuel or 
perfor- extensive backtracking. The observed behavior of 
each of the three crevs appeared to be consistent vith these 
constraints. 
The reason it does not appear useful to vary these 
constralnts to describe crev differences is quite 8lmllar to 
the reason that manipulations o f  the maximization assu~ption 
vere rejected. A 8  vas the cab0 vith varying the maximiz- 
ation assumption, it appears to be the case that the need to 
adju8t the constraints used by the selection M C h a n h m s  
could be eliminated by suitably chosen manipulations of the 
perceptual af fordance mechanisms The af fordances provided 
by the perceptual mechanisms generate a candidate set of 
actions vhich are then pruned by rejecting tho8e actions 
that do not satisfy the constraints. Since the constraints 
operate upon the affordances in th$s vay, it vould appear 
p088ibh that the effects of introducing a nev constraint 
could be mimicked by a suitable readjustment of the afford- 
ance value calculations. Once again, then, the argument 
could alvays be -de that the selection m c h a n i s ~ s  vere 
indeed invariant over crevs and that crev beh8vioral 
differences vere due solely to differences in their per- 
ceptual mechanisms. 
These arguments concerning the po8sibility of behavior- 
ally indistinguishable tradeoffs between the operation of 
the perceptual and selection mechanisms raise the pos- 
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sibility that the design of the model is underspecified by 
observable behavior. For example, it has been suggested 
above that a desired change in the behavior of the model 
could be accomplished by manipulations of either the 
constraints used in the selection mechanisms or the para- 
meters used in the perceptual affordance value calculations. 
In model construction, then, choices had to be made to 
determine vhich operations vould be located in the percept- 
ual mechanisms and which would be located in the 8election 
mechanisms The assignment vas not arbitrary. Rather, 
constraints were included in the selection mchanisrs for 
only those operations for which a perceptually-oriontea 
processing mechanism could not be identified. A similar 
type of tradeoff was noted betveen the maximization oper- 
ation and the operation of the perceptual affordance 
BeChanlsm8. The existence of these potential tradeoffs 
would cause a serious problem if the model was being used in 
an attempt to prove whether certain operations were being 
performed perceptually or centrally. These tradeoffs are 
not a prOb1eD in this work, though, since the goal is merely 
to demonstrate that the behavior of a strongly perceptually- 
oriented model is consistent vith observable behavior. 
Since it does not appear to be theoretically rewarding 
to vary the maximization operation or the constraints used 
by the selection mechanisms, manipulation ( c )  seems to be 
the only remaining candidate for describing how crews' 
1S8 
selection mechanisms may have differed. Unlike mnipula- 
tions (a) and (b), manipulation (c) appears to be theoretic- 
ally interesting since it vould claim that crevs differed in 
terms of the planning horlzon they used to select future 
craft actions. This manipulation, though, does not seem to 
be able to produce variations in model behavior that vere 
consistent vith the observed variations in crev behavior. 
As de8cribed in the previous chapter, the design of the 
object selection 8eChani8D vas based on the assumption that 
crevs could plan three actions into the future for each 
craft. This assumption vas based on an informal sensitivity 
analysis of the rodel's behavior as a function o f  planning 
horizon. This informal analysis vas performed before the 
model vas fully parareterized t o  ~ i ~ i c  the behavior of each 
of the crevs. To achieve reasonable model behavior, this 
analyais indicated that it vas critical to assume a planning 
horizon of at least two actions, it vas less critical but 
still necessary to assume a planning horizon of three 
actions, but increasing the planning horizon beyond three 
actions vas of limited additional benefit. Since it vas not 
desirable to asnuma a planning process of greater complexity 
than vas necessazy, a planning horizon of three actions vas 
a88UBed 
To provide a more formal justification for the need to 
assum even thls level o f  model complexity, a similar 
sensitivity analysis vas performed after. the model vas 
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fitted to crew behavior. After model parameters vera chosen 
to provide the best fit to Crev E's behavior (see the 
following 88ction8)p the model's planning horizon vas then 
reduced to one action. The behavior of the model with the 
one-action planning horizon (the short-tern model) vas then 
compared vith the behavior of the node1 vith the thrre- 
action planning horizon (the long-term model) to identify 
hov the reduction in planning horizon affected the behavior 
of the model. A 8  described belov, the nature of the sub- 
optimal behaviors generated by the short-term model did not 
appear to be consistent vith the behavior o f  any o f  the 
three crews. This result provides post-hoc evidence for t k  
necessity of assuming the more conp1ex8 three-action 
planning horizon. 
When compared vith the long-term model used to mimic 
the behavior of Crev E, the performance of the short-term 
model vas inferior in terms o f  the average number of points 
scored per Di88iOn. (See the last section of thi8 chapter 
for a description of the model comparison process). The 
average point8 scored by the short-term .ode1 did not differ 
significantly from the average points scored by Crev 1. 
This finding suggests that it might be possible to account 
for Crev 1's inferior performance in terms o f  the assumption 
of a reduced planning horizon. A detailed analysis of the 
behavior of the short-term model, though, indicates that the 
sub-optinal behaviors that contributed to its inferior 
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performance ve re  not  c o n s i s t e n t  v i t h  Crev 1's behavior.  AS 
W i l l  be d i s C U 8 S O d  b e l O W ,  t h e  a88UmptfOn O f  a short-term 
planning horizon produces sub-optimal behaviors  t h a t  d id  not  
appear t o  be c o n s i s t e n t  v i t h  t h e  behavior of any of t h e  
three c revs .  
I n  t o r r s  of t h e  se t  of performance measures used t o  
describe c r e v  behavior,  t h e  major factor that contributed t o  
t h e  short-term model's poor performance vas  a n  i n a b i l i t y  t o  
s c o r e  p o i n t s  by unloading d iscovered  cargo a t  how base. 
The rrhort-term model and Crew 1 vere  n o t  8 i g n i f i c a n t l y  
d i f f e r e n t  i n  terms of the number of cargo unloaded per 
ses s ion ,  (and both unloaded less cargo than  did Crew B), but  
t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  their s i m i l a r l y  poor 
performance on t h i s  measure vere found t o  be q u i t e  d i f f e r -  
e n t  . A 8  d i s C U 8 8 e d  i n  Chapter 111, Crew8 1 and 1 vere  
similar i n  terms of t h e  percentage of d iscovered  cargo t h a t  
vere  e v e n t u a l l y  unloaded a t  home base, b u t  Crev 1 discovered  
and re tu rned  less cargo than  did Crev E. That  is, these t v o  
c r e v s  ve re  s i m i l a r l y  eff ic ient  i n  unloading t h e  cargo t h a t  
had been di8covOrOd, but  Crev B discovered  more cargo than  
Crov 1 and vas  t h u s  able t o  unload more cargo  t o  s c o r e  
p o i n t s  . 
I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h i s  characterization of t h e  differences 
between Crews 1 and E i n  terms of cargo processing,  t h e  
difference between t h e  8hOrt- teZ8 .ode1 and Crev 1 concerned 
t h e  percentage of d iscovered  cargo t h a t  ve re  unloaded a t  
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home h i e ,  rather than the number of cargo that vere 
discovered. The short-term .ode1 and Crev 1 did not differ 
significantly in teras of the number of cargo that vere 
dl8covered, (and they both discovezed more than Creu l ) ,  but 
the short-term model va8 able to unload a smaller percentage 
o f  the8e cargo at home ba8e. In fact, the short-term aodel 
vas significantly votse on this measure than any of the 
three crevs, as it vas only able to unload an average of  61% 
of discovered cargo at home base.. (No crev unloaded leas 
than 80% of the discovered cargo, on average, per mission). 
Therefore, a major factor that contributed to the short- 
term model's sub-optimal performance vas an inability to 
unload the cargo that had been discovered, vherea8 a major 
factor that contributed to Crev 1's sub-optimal performance 
vas an inability to discover cargo. 
The short-term aodel, then, exhibited a pronounced 
inability to efficiently process discovered cargo. This 
sub-optiral behavior vas not exhibited by any o f  the three 
crevs. The short term model's sub-optimal behavior in this 
regard can be explained by examining the role o f  the 
planning horizon in generating model behavior. It should be 
pointed out that, in this vork, the term "planning hotizon" 
has a technical meaning that is specific to the structure 
and behavior of the model. The planning mechanism used in 
the model is event-based, rather than time-based, and 
therefore tha length of the planning horizon indicate8 only 
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the number of actions into the future that the model is able 
to consider. Since these actions have variable duration, 
the length of the planning horizon does not have a tight 
correspondence vith the amount of time into the future that 
the model can plan ahead. 
The assumption of a one-action planning horizon 
constrains the action selection meChanl88 of the model to 
the  task of determining only the most appropriate current 
action for each craft. Therefore, the competition betveen 
craft for COnsuMble objects, such as catqo, is concerned 
only vith each craft's current affordance value for the 
object, and does not consider the affordance value that a 
craft vould have for the object at the termination of its 
current action. This restriction, on its ovn, can be seen 
to be sufficient for producing the short-term model's sub- 
optimal cargo processing behavior. 
To see hov the inability to efficiently unload dis- 
covered cargo can arise from restricting the planning 
horizon to a single action, consider the case vhere a craft 
is currently traveling to load a piece of cargo or to return 
to home base. After the craft has been committed to this 
action, assume that a piece of cargo is discovered nearby 
the destination of the craft. A88Ult, also, that the 
affordance value for loading this nev cargo is not great 
enough to exceed the craft's affordance value for the 
current action so that the craft's current action is not 
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interrupted. In this case, the craft is not conrridered as a 
candidate for loading the new piece o f  cargo since it has a 
more highly afforded current action. Bven though, for 
example, the craft vould have a very high affordance for 
loading the new piece of cargo at the termination of its 
current action, this fact is not relevant in determining 
vhich craft will be allocated to the cargo. The cargo vi11 
then be allocated to a 8econd craft, possibly many miles 
avay, that ha8 the highest current affordance value for the 
nev piece of cargo. This craft MY not even be able to 
reach the cargo until vel1 after the original craft could 
have loaded the cargo by proceeding to its location after 
the termination of its current action. 
Therefore, the most appropriate action of having the 
original craft load the cargo after completing its current 
action has been neglected in favor of using a craft that may 
take a much longer time to acco8plish the task. aiven the 
vay in vhich the action selectlon mechanism operates, the 
original craft does not compete for the nev cargo even after 
the termination of its current action since the cargo ha8 
already been allocated to a different craft. Therefore, the 
original craft ray be given a search action at the com- 
pletion of its current action even though it still may be 
closer to the cargo than the second craft to which the cargo 
ha8 been assigned. Perhapcr, though, the selection BeChani8. 
could be improved by allovinq the original craft to compete 
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for the cargo at the termination its current activity, 
thereby possibly interrupting the activity of the second 
craft. Even with this adjustment, though, the resulting 
behavior would still be inefficient due to the amount of 
wasted time spent by the second craft traveling to a cargo 
that it will never eventually load. 
Although the conditions that give rise to this cargo 
processing inefficiency might appear too complex and un- 
likely, in actuality this phenomenon was observed to occur 
with reasonable frequency. These conditions occurred with 
at least enouqh frequency to cause the short-term model to 
unload a significantly lower percentage of discovered cargo 
than any of the three crews. For example, there were many 
cases in which a friendly craft discovered a cargo on its 
way to home base in urgent need of fuel or missiles. In the 
cases where this cargo vas itself nearby home base and the 
other friendly craft were distant from home base, the most 
appropriate plan of action vould be to have the craft that 
discovered the cargo return to load it after completing its 
trip home. Due to the operation of the craft allocation 
policy described above, a craft currently searching at a 
large distance from home base would be assigned to load this 
cargo. A s  a result of this type of inefficiency, the 
missions performed by the short-term model typically ended 
with a large number of discovered cargo not returned to home 
base. 
i 
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Hone of the crev8 vere observed to produce sub-optimal 
behavior that vas con8istent vith the a88UBptiOn of a 
restricted planning horizon. For this reason, it vas 
decided that the planning horizon vould not be manipulated 
in an attempt to mimic crev behavior. In summry, then, 
each of the three possible selection mechanism manipulations 
have been examined and found lacking for either theoretical 
OX empirical reasons. Therefore, the selection mechanisms 
vere as8Uaed invariant over each of the three crevs. 
Recall that the model contains three selection mechan- 
isms: the scout vaypoint selection, friendly vaypoine 
selection, and craft object selection BeChani8B8. It should 
be emphasized that the invariance assumption for these 
mechanism does not imply that the same scout paths, 
friendly vaypoints, and craft object allocations were 
assumed to be generated by the different cmvs. Rather, the 
setection MChanisB8 have a relatively minor role in action 
generation. Their function is to select in a simple way 
from the candidate set of action alternatives provided by 
the perceptual BeChani8B8. In the case of friendly craft 
vaypoint selection, the action selection mechanism operate8 
by finding the action alternative (a search vaypoint) vith 
the greatest affordance level. The scout vaypolnt and craft 
object selection ~echanisms also operate by selecting action 
alternatives vith the greatest affordance level, subject to 
appropriate constraints concerning backtracking avoidance in 
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the case of the scout, and mutual exclusivity in the case of 
the friendly craft. 
given this functional characterization of these 
selection mechanisrs, it is easy to see that the major 
factor determining which actions get selected is the 
perceptual component of the model that dafines the action 
alternatives and generates the dynamic, context sensitive, 
affordance level for each of the alternative8. Therefore, 
once the action DeChani8D8 were constructed for each crew 
and a single set of selection DeChani8D8 were created, the 
model parameterization exercise focused on de8igning 
perceptual DeChani8D8 that vould provide the affordance 
structures that were consistent vith the behavior of each of 
the three human crews. 
Detailed descriptions of each of the action and per- 
ceptual mechanisms used to mimic the behavior of each of the 
crevs are given in the following sections. The action 
MChanisDS vere designed to be consistent with the empirical 
data, and vere left unchanged during the model fitting 
prOCO88 Initial estimates for the parameters of the 
perceptual DeChani8r8 vera generated based on the crev 
performance profiles. These parameters were subsequently 
tuned to gain better matches vith the empirical profiles in 
an iterative analysis of model behavior as a function of the 
parametera of the perceptual mechanism. 
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The action 843Chanisms shovn in Figure 16 in the 
previous chapter vere parameterized for each crev by 
referring to empirical data concerning crev physical 
activities. Videotapes were consulted to measuze the timing 
parameters used in the lovest level DeChani8.8 that sim- 
ulated observable editing, button-pushing, and joystick 
manipulation behavior. The88 parameters indicated the total 
time spent in both the preparation and execution of these 
actions so that the model vould be diverted from engaging in 
other ta8k8 for the same duration as vere the human crevs. 
Table 2 on the folloving page delscribe8 the threb 
highest level 8eChaniSm8: the Action Mechanism, the Friendly 
Action Hechanism, and the Scout Action Hechanism. As 
indicated in the table, the only difference between the 
three crev models with respect to these three mechanisms 
concerns vhether or not friendly- and scout-related inter- 
face control activity could be performed serially or in 
parallel. The tvo model8 for describing one-person crews, 
Crevs 1 and E, are constrained to perform friendly and scout 
activities serially. The model used to mimic the behavior 
of the tvo-person crev, Crev 2, can perform friendly and 
scout activities in parallel. For example, the Crev IE model 
interleaves scout manual control with entering friendly 
craft commands in the t e x t  editor, vhile the Crev 2 model 
performs these tvo tasks simultaneously. 
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TABLB 2 
HIGHEST LEVEL ACTION nECHANISn8 
Mechan ism Name : Action Mechanism 
Description : Identifies requests for interface activity 
from affordance distribution8 and activates 
either the scout or friendly craft action 
mechanism . 
Parare ter a : Serial vs. parallel interface control for 
scout and friendly craft activities 
Parame tar : Crew 1 Model - Serial 
Va 1 ues : Crew B Model - Serial 
: Crew 2 Modal - Parallel 
Mechanism Name: Friendly Action Mechanism 
Description : Identifies whether friendly activity 
request pertains to mobile enemy craft, 
fixed enemy craft, cargo, search, or 
home activity, and activates the 
appropriate mechanism. 
Parameters : None 
Mechanim Name: Scout Action Mechanism 
Description : Identifies vhether scout activity 
request pertains to enemy craft, 
loading/unloadinq, or scout motion, 
and activates the appropriate mechanism. 
Parameters : None 
, 
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Table 3 on t h e  fo l lov inq  pages de8cribes t h e  seven 
f r i e n d l y  craft  a c t i o n  mechanisB8 t h a t  coord ina te  t h e  
s imulated phys ica l  I n t e r f a c e  a c t i v i t i e s  associated v i t h  
f r i e n d l y  craft c o n t r o l .  The parameter va lues  U s e d  i n  t h e  
f i r s t  f i v e  of t h e s e  a c t i o n  mechanisms indicate t h e  a c t i o n  
cor rands  u8ed t o  aa8ign a c t i v i t i e s  t o  the  f r i e n d l y  craft .  
These a c t i o n  comands  vere  i d e n t i f i e d  d i r e c t l y  from t h e  
eapirical data. 
The nobile Enemy Action HeChani88 and Cargo Action 
Mechanism d i d  not d i f fe r  i n  t h e  three crev models s i n c e  a l l  
three crevs used t h e  same a c t i o n  command t o  attack mobile 
enemy c r a f t  and t o  command f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  t o  load cargo'. 
Similarly, Crev8 2 and B used t h e  same a c t i o n  command t o  
attack fixed enemy emplacements, so t h e  Fixed Enemy Action 
Mechanisms d i d  not  d i f f e r  betveen t h e s e  tvo crev models. 
Crev 1 never attacked f lxed enemy emplacements v i t h  t h e  
f r i e n d l y  craft ,  so t h i s  mechanism vas  never a c t i v a t e d  i n  t h e  
m o d e l  used  t o  describe t h i s  c r ev .  
I n  t h e  Search Action Mechanism, t h e  behavior of Crews 1 
and 2 vas  approximated by us ing  t h e  f r i e n d l y  craf t  search 
command m8:^,Gm, vh i l e  the  behavior of Crev E vas  approx- 
h a t e d  v i t h  t h e  search command wS:A,O,Pa. Each c r e v  
a c t u a l l y  used a range of d i f f e r e n t  search COR8and8. For 
example, a l l  three crews occas iona l ly  used a search command 
v i t h  n u l t i p l e  qoto vaypoints  (e.g., S:A,G,G), al though such 
comrands v e r e  very rare for  Crews 2 and E. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a l l  
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TABLB 3 
FRIENDLY ACTION MECHANISMS 
Mechanism Name: Mobile Enemy Action Mechanis8 
Description : When activated by the Friendly Action 
Mechanism, activates the itditing Mechani8m, 
inputs the attack action command, then 
activates the Attack Monitoring Action 
Mechani88. 
Parameters : Attack action command. 
Values : A11 crew models - E:A,A,A 
Mechanism Mame: Cargo Action Mechanism 
Description : When activated by the Friendly Action 
Mechanism, activates the Cursor - Bclitor 
Mechanism to move the vozld di8play map 
cursor to the cargo location and to enter 
the text editor, inputs the cargo action 
command 
Parameters : Cargo action command 
A Values : All crev models - C:^ ,O,v,L, 
Mechanism Name: Fixed Enemy Action tlechanis8 
De8cription : When activated by the Friendly Action 
Mechanism, activates the Cursor - Editor 
Mechanism to move the world display map 
cursor to the enemy location and to enter 
the text editor, inputs the fixed enemy 
attack action command 
Parameters : Fixed Enemy action command 
Va 1 ues : Crev 1 Model - None 
: Crev E Model - E:",G,A,A,A 
: Crev 2 Model - E:A,G,A,A,A 
1 7 1  
TABLB 3 
(continued) 
FRIENDLY ACTION MECHANISMS 
Mechanism Name: Search Action Mechanism 
Description : When activated by the Friendly Action 
tfechanism, activates the Cursor - Editor 
nechanism to move the world display ~p 
cursor to the search vaypolnt location 
and to enter the text editor, inputs the 
search action command. 
Parameters : Search action command 
Va 1 ues : Crev 1 Model - S:^ ,G 
: Crew B Model - S:^,O,P 
: Crew 2 nodel - S:^,O 
Mechanism Name: Home Action nechanism 
Description : When activated by'the Friendly Action 
Mechanism, activates either the Cursor - 
Editor Mechanlsm or the Editing Mechanism 
to move the world display map cursor to 
home base (if necessary) and to enter the 
text editor, inputs the home action 
command. 
Parameters : Home action command 
Values : Crev 1 nodel - X:U (no cursor required) 
: Crev E nodel - X:U (no cursor required) 
: Crew 2 nodel - S:^ ,G,v,U (requires cursor) 
llechanism Namq: Attack Monitoring Mechanism 
Description : When activated by either the Mobile Enemy 
Action HeChani88 or Fixed Bnery Action 
nechanfsm, activates the Button Pressing 
Mechanism to enable the firing of missiles 
until either the enemy or friendly craft 
is destroyed. 
Parameters : None 
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TABLB 3 
( cont i nued 1 
FRIENDLY ACTION MBCHANISMS 
Hechanisr N ame: Cursor - Editing Mechanism 
D88CriptiOn : When activated by any ReChani8R8 that 
require cursor manipulatlon folloved by 
editing, activates the Cur802 Mechanism 
and Bditing Mechanism in sequence. 
Parameters : None 
173 
three crevs occasionally dispen8ed vith the up t n )  action, 
although Crev E did this very rarely. Unfortunately, no 
consistent policies for search command selection could be 
identified. For example, it vas hypothesized that, for 
Crevs 1 and 2, vhether or not the up ( - 1  action vas used vas 
a function of the current craft altitude. This hypothesi8 
could be rejected due to the fact that up actions vere used 
inconsistently at the beginning o f  the mis8ion vhen all 
craft vere at the same altitude. The hypothesis that the 
selection of the up action vas due to planned travel through 
forerrted locations received some support, at least for Crev 
1, although this policy vas not consistently applied. 
Due to this inability to identify consistent policies 
for search command selection, the simple search commands 
described above vere used. The only difference betveen the 
search commands for the three crew pertains to the use of 
the patrol action. Crevs 1 and 2 never used the patrol (PI 
action, vhile Crev B nearly alvays terrinated search action 
commands vith patrol actions. The patrol action keeps the 
friendly craft searching in a circular pattern after the 
termination of the goto action. The search commands used to 
describe the behavior of Crevs 1 and 2 did not include 
patrol actions, resulting in the friendly craft sitting idle 
at the termination of search comrands. 
The Hole Action Mechanism also had to be individually 
tailored to describe the behavior of the three crevs. Crev 
174 
E consistently used the aX:Ua command, whereas Crew 2 
consistently used the aS:A,G,v,Ua coamand. Both commands 
send the friendly craft home to unload, although the second 
command allov8 the operator to specify the exact location 
(vithin 0.4 miles of home base) at which the craft should 
stop and unload, vhereas the first couand alvay8 send8 the 
friendly craft to the exact center of home base. The second 
command vas presumably adopted to lessen the potential for 
collisions betveen friendly craft that would be caused by 
cormanding multiple craft to home base sirultaneously. The 
first command, though, has the benefit that the cursor doe? 
not have to be manipulated to enter a home command. 
For describing Crew 2, then, the home command requiring 
cuzsor manipulation vas used in order to ensure that the 
model and human crew performed interface manipulation 
activity of the same duration when commanding a friendly 
craft to go to home base. this model does not, though, 
attempt to scatter the destination points of multiple 
friendly craft around home base to avoid collisions. (The 
reason that the model does not perform this function is 
discussed at the end of this chapter). For describing Crews 
1 and B, the model uses the home command that does not 
require cursor manipulation. As was the case with search 
commands, the use of a single home command for describing 
Crew 1 is a simplification, since this crev occasionally 
used the command employed by Crev 2. 
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The action mechanisms used for organizing the simulated 
physical activity associated vith control of the scout are 
described in Table 4 on the folloving pages. The only 
mechanism vith parameter values that differ betveen the 
three crev models is the notion Action nechanism. The 
models used to describe Crevs 2 and 1 simulate the activity 
associated vith manual control of the scout, vhereas the 
model used to describe Crew 1 simulates the scout autopilot 
management physical activity. The approximation of dedi-' 
cated autopilot control vas used, although Crew 1 did engage 
manual control briefly and intermittently. 
The Manual Control Mechanism, used in the models of 
Crews 2 and E, is activated by the Scout Action llechanism to 
generate a path to a desired scout vaypoint. The desired 
vaypoint, provided by either the Scout Waypoint Selection 
Mechanism or the Object Selection Mechanism, is either a 
search waypoint or the location of a cargo, a fixed enemy 
emplacement, or home ba8e. Search vaypoints are generated 
from the search affordance map of the vorld, which indicates 
the degree to which each vorld location affords locomotion 
and search for objects via scout radar. The peaks in this 
affordance map constitute candidate search vaypoints. The 
ielection mechanism operates by finding an appropriate peak 
to serve as the current scout vaypoint by combining the 
affordance related information vith fuel maintenance and 
backtracking avoidance constraints. 
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TABLB 4 
SCOUT ACTION MBCHANISHS 
)Iechanism Name: Load/Unload Action Mechanism 
De8CZiptiOn : Activated by the lcout Action Mechanism 
to either load cargo or unload cargo and 
replenish resources at home bas80 
Activates the Button Pressing Mechanism 
to perform the desired function. 
Parameters : None 
Me cha n i 81 Ware: Enery Action Mechanism 
Description : When activated by the 8cout Action 
Mechanism to attack an enemy craft, 
activates the Attack Monitoring 
Mechanism to guide the attack. 
Parameters : None 
Mechani8m Narc: Motion Action Mechanism 
Description : For ranual control crev  model^, activates 
the Manual Control Mechanism to move scout 
in a series of small movements to a desired 
vaypoint (either a search vaypoint, a 
cargo, a fixed enemy craft, or home base). 
For autopilot control model, activates the 
Autopilot Management Mechanism to command 
to autopilot to move the scout to the 
waypoint. 
Parameters : Manual vs. Autopilot Scout Control 
Values : Crew 1 Model : Autopilot Control 
: Crev E Model : Manual Control 
: Crev 2 Model : Manual Control 
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TABLE 4 
(continued) 
SCOUT ACTION HECHAMISMS 
H-: Attack Monitoring Mechanism 
Description : Activate8 Button Pressing Mechanism 
to fire missiles at an enemy until either 
the scout or the enemy is destroyed 
Parameters : None 
Mechan ism Name: Autopilot Management Mechanism 
De8CZiptiOn : For autopilot control model, activates 
the Cursor Mechanism to move the world 
display curbor to the specified waypoint 
(either a cargo, fixed enemy craft, a 
search waypoint, or home base), and 
then activates the Button Pressing 
Mechanism to initiate the autopilot. 
’ 
Parameters : None 
Hechanisr Name: Manual Control Mechanhr 
Description : For manual control czew mOd018, accepts a 
a specified waypoint (either a cargo, 
a fixed enemy craft, a search waypoint, 
or home base) and generates a series 
of sub-waypoints to the waypoint. (See 
follovinq pages for a description of this 
mechanism. Activates the Joystick Control 
Mechanism to simulate the physical joystick 
activities to fly to each sub-waypoint. 
Parameters : DL = Value of destination affordance as 
a percent of local affordances which 
determine path direction. (See text) 
Values : Crew 1 Model - Not used 
: Crev B Model - DL - 1008 
: Crew 2 Model - DL = 1008 
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The Scout Manual Control Mechanism a h 0  uses the search 
affordance vorld map to generate a path to the desired peak. 
Unlike the planning mechanism, though, vhich operates upon 
an global, high-level representation of this map in terms of 
peaks and ridges, the Scout Hanual Control Mechanism uses 
the rap in full detail in order to generate a path to the 
desired vaypolnt that is sen8itive to local search afford- 
ance gradations. This mechanism operates by treating each 
vorld location as if it exerts an attractive force on the 
scout that 1s proportional to its search affordance, and 
inversely proportional to the cube of its distance from tht 
scout. This inverse-cubed 8caling factor is u8ed to ensure 
that nearby locations have a larger attractive force than 
distant locations. In addition, the desired vaypoint is 
considered to exert an attractive force. To guarantee that 
the vaypolnt vi11 be reached, this force is independent of 
the distance betveen the vaypoint and the scout. 
Paths are generated by using vector addition to find 
the net attractive force acting upon the scout. The next 
step in the path is in the direction of this net force. The 
resulting direction of motion is thus determined by a 
combination of affordances from both the scout destination 
and the local environmental structure. In such a model, a 
much larger veighting on local affordances than on the 
affordance provided by the destination vould result in 
somewhat aimless meandering though the vorld that is 
, 
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primarily determined by the local environmental affordance 
structure. If, on the other hand, a much larger veiqhting 
is used for the destination affordance than for the local 
affordances, nearly linear travel to the destination vith 
insensitivity to the local environment vould result. 
In the model for describing Crevs 2 and E, the value of 
the attractive force exerted by the destination vas set 
equal to the net attractive force exerted by the local 
environment. Thus, for example, if the local affordance 
structure exerts a northward force on the scout, and the 
destination is to the east of tho scout, the resulting 
direction of motion vould be to the northeast. This equal 
veiqhting scheme has the possibility of stalling the scout 
due to force vectors that exactly cancel, but this phe- 
nomenon vas never observed. 
The final $et of action mechanisms are tho8e respons- 
ible for simulating the physical activity that is required 
to control the scout and friendly craft. All of the action 
mechanisms described above only organize interface activity, 
vhile the Physical Action HeChanisD8 appearing in Table 5 on 
the folloving page are actually responsible for simulating 
the execution of control actions. These action mechanism8 
are all quite simple, and the performance parameters for 
each crev model are 8UDmariZed in the table. These par- 
ameters are approximate values measured from videotapes of 
the behavior of each crew. 
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TABLE 5 
PHYSICAL ACTION MECHANISMS 
Mechanisn Nane: Button Pressing Mechanism 
De8CriptiOn : Sinulates the physical activity of 
pressing a button on the control panel. 
Paraneters : TB - Button pressing tine 
Values : Crev 1 Xodel - TB 1.50 seconds 
: Crev E Model - TB - 0.75 8eCOnd8 
: Crev 2 Model - TB = 0.75 seconds 
Mechanism Nane': Cursor Moving Mechanl8n 
D 4 5 8 C Y i p t i O n  : Simulates the  physical activity of 
noving the vorld display nap cursor 
to a specified location. uses ~itts' Law 1 
to estinate time required to Rove ~ a p  
cursor a distance D fro. previous positlon 
to a target of vidth W. D and W neasured 
in display pixels (display vidth = 512 
pixels - 30 CB). Width of cargo and enemy 
targets - 5 pixels, vidth of search 
vaypoint target = 10 pixels. Movenent tine - A + B x Loq(ZD/W) 
Values : Crev 1 Model - A - 2 ; B - .33 
: Crew B Model - A - 1 ; B - .1S 
: Crev 2 Model - A - 1 ; B = .1S 
Mechanism Name: Editing Hechanisn 
Description : Simulates the physical activity of 
typing a friendly craft action connand 
on the text editor. 
Parameters : TB - Tine to enter a mobile eneny attack 
cornand 
TO - Time to enter all other couands 
Values : Crev 1 Model - TB - 4.0 ; TO - 9.0 
Crev E Model - TE - 3 . 0  ; TO = 4.0 
Crev 2 Hodel - TB = 3.0 ; TO - 5.0 
161 
TABLE 5 
(cont inued 
PHYSICAL ACTION MECHANISMS 
Hechanlsm Naae : Joystick Control Mechanism 
Description : Simulates the physical activity of 
moving the scout manual control joystick 
to fly the scout along a path. Operates 
by moving the scout in a sequence of 
small steps. Step s ize  is determined by 
the speed vith vhich the scout 1s flovn. 
Parameters : 88 = Scout speed (mph) 
Values : Crev 1 Model - Mechanism not used 
: Crev B Model - 88 = 60.0 
: Crev 2 Model - 88 = 65 .0  
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As mentioned previous ly ,  t h e  t i m i n g  parameters used i n  
t h e  phys ica l  a c t i o n  mchanisms represent t h e  t o t a l  time 
assoc ia t ed  v i t h  both t h e  p repa ra t ion  and execut ion of 
phys ica l  a c t i o n s .  For example, t h e  mean but ton  press ing  
time f o r  Crev 1 vas observed t o  be approximately 1 . S O  
seconds, t v i c e  t h a t  of t h e  mean times f o r  Crevs 2 and It. 
The reason f o r  t h l s  large difference vas not  due t o  d i f fe r -  
ences l n  t h e  a c t u a l  motion times a8sociated v i t h  pressing 
but tons .  Rather, t h i s  large t i m i n g  d i f f e r e n c e  results from 
t h e  observa t ion  t h a t  Crev 1 took a longer  t i m e  t o  i d e n t i f y  
appropr ia te  b u t t o n s  t h a n  d i d  t h e  o t h e r  c r e v s .  
A similar d i f f e r e n c e  between Crew 1 and t h e  o t h e r  two 
c r e v s  concerned t h e  time requlred f o r  preparing c u r s o r  
manipulation a c t i o n s .  The larger A ( o r  intercept) parameter 
value i n  t h e  F i t t s  Lav c a l c u l a t i o n  used fo r  describing Crev 
1 's  behavior indicates t h a t  he took a longer  f ixed  time t o  
make c u r s o r  movements i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h a t  time corresponding 
t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of t h e  movement t a s k .  The larger B (or  
slope) parameter used f o r  Crev 1 indicates t h a t  he vas  a l s o  
more sensi t ive than  t h e  o t h e r  t v o  c r e v s  t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of 
t h e  rovement t a s k .  Approximate A and B parameters vere  
de r ived  by using a simple l i n e a r  r e g r e s s i o n  t o  f i t  two 
s e s s i o n s  of c u r s o r  moverent time data. To represent t h e  
fact  t h a t  movements t o  search targets vera  less cons t r a ined  
t h a n  movements t o  d isp layed  o b j e c t s ,  t h e  w i d t h  of search 
t a r g e t s  vas  se t  equal  t o  t v i c e  t h e  v i d t h  of o b j e c t  t a r g e t s .  
PerceDtual tl echanism Parameters 
The perceptual mechanisms, shovn in Figure 9 in the 
previous chapter, vera pata8eteriZed by hypothesizing 
affordance structures that seemed to be consistent vith the 
behavior of each of the three crevs. The perceptual 
mechanisms dedicated to the tasks of search vaypoint 
selection for the scout and friendly craft are described in 
Table 6 on the folloving pages. The first two DOChdnidm8, 
the Scout Search Affordance and Scout Locomotion Affordance 
Mechanisms, vere used in the Bod818 of Crews 2 and B to 
describe the manual control search activity of the8e two 
crevs The final four DeChani8B8, the Friendly Search 
Affordance, Friendly Collision Affordance, Crlendly-Scout 
Coordination, and Friendly Range Affordance Mechanisms, were 
u8ed in the models of all three crevs to describe the 
selection of friendly craft search vaypoints. 
It vas hypothesized that Crev 1's selection o f  search 
waypoints for the scout could also be described with the 
DeChanisDs for friendly craft vaypoint selection. Two 
factors suggest this hypothesis. First, Crev 1's scout 
control behavior did not appear sensitive to the superior 
ability of the scout to discover objects vith its large 
radar range. Crev 1 did not appear to differentiate between 
the scout and friendly craft for the purposes of loading 
cargo, thereby keeping the scout from its most important 
task of searching. Second, Crev 1's use of the autopilot 
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T A B L l  6 
SBARCH PBRCEPTUAL HBCHANISUB 
Hechanisr Name: 
Description : 
Par are t e r s . 
Scout Search Affordance Hechanim 
Oenerates a search affordance vorld rap 
used by Scout Waypoint Selection HeChani8r 
to generate search waypoints and by Scout 
Manual Control Hechanisr to generate paths 
between vaypoints. 
SO = Search affordance value of open 
SL = Search affordance value of lightly 
8H = Search affordance value of heavily 
SB = Search affordance value of regions 
BT = Search affordance value of 
regions 
forested regions 
forested regions 
beyond vor ld boundar lea 
previously searched regions 
The search affordance of a vorld point is calculated as 
follovs. Let, 
BO = fraction of vorld points vithin 1.5 rile radar range 
of the given point that are in open region8 
FL = fraction of world points vfthin 1.5 rile radar range 
of the given point that are in light forest 
FH = fraction of vorld points within 1.S mile radar range 
. of the given point that are in heavy forest 
FB = fraction of vorld points vithin 1.5 rile radar range 
of the given point that are beyond world boundaries 
Then for unsearched points, 
Search affordance = FOxSO + FLxSL + FHxSH + P B x S B  
For previously searched points, Search affordance = BT 
(See text for a discussion of the parameter values) 
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TABLE 6 
(cont inued 1 
SBARCH PERCEPTUAL MECHANISMS 
Mechanism Narq : Scout Locomotion Affordance Mechanism 
Description : Generates a locomotion affordance vorld map 
used by Scout Waypolnt Selection Mechanism 
to generate search vaypoints and by Scout 
Hanual control Mechanism to generate paths 
betveen vaypoints. 
Parameters : LO = locomotion affordance value of open 
regions 
forested region8 
forested regions 
beyond vor Id boundaries 
LL = locomotion affordance value o f  lightly 
LH = locomotion affordance value of heavily 
LE = locomotion affordance value of region8 
Values : Parameter Crev 1 Crev 2 Crew E 
LO Not used 0.0 0.0 
LL w -1.5 -1.5 
LH w -2.0 -2.0 , 
LB w -3.0 -3.0 
Hechanism Nam : Friendly Search Affordance Mechanism 
Description : Generates a search affordance vorld map 
used by the Friendly Waypoint Selection 
Mechanism to generate search vaypoints 
for the friendly craft in all three crev 
models, and for the scout in the Crev 1 
model. 
Parameters : FSO = search affordance value for open 
regions 
forested regions 
forested regions 
beyond vor Id boundaries 
PSL = search affordance value for lightly 
PSH = search affordance value for heavily 
FSB = search affordance value for regions 
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TABLB 6 
(cont h u e d  ) 
SEARCH PERCEPTUAL MECHANISMS 
Mechanism Name: 
Values 0 
Mechanism Name: 
Description : 
Parameters 
Values 
. 0 
Mechanism Name: 
Description : 
Parameters . 
Friendly Search Affordance Mechanism 
( cont inusd 1 
Parameter Crev 1 Crev B Crev 2 Crev 1s 
FSO 2 2 2 2 
FSL 2 2 2 0 
FSH 2 2 2 0 
PSB 0 0 0 0 
.......................................... 
Friendly Collision Affordance Mechanism 
Generates a collision affordance vorld map 
u8ed by the Friendly Waypoint Selection . 
Hechanism to generate search vaypoints 
for the friendly craft in all three crev 
models, and for the scout in the Czev 1 
modal. 
COLL - collision affordance of a vorld 
FREE - Collision affordance of a vorld point resulting in a collision 
point not resulting in collision 
Friendly-Scout Coordination Affordance 
Mechanism 
Generates a coordination affordance vorld 
8ap used by the Friendly Waypoint Selection 
Mechanisr to generate search vaypoints for 
the friendly craft in all three crev models 
COOR = Coordination affordance of a vorld 
point simultaneously coverable by 
scout radar and the radar of the 
friendly craft vhose vaypoint is 
being generated 
other vorld points 
NCOR = Coordination affordance of all 
TABLB 6 
(cont inued)  
Mechanisr N a m e :  
Values I 
)techanism NaDQ: 
Descr ip t ion  : 
Parameters 
Values  e 
SEARCH PERCEPTUAL HBCHANISMS 
?riendly-Scout Coordinat ion Affordance 
Mechanism (cont inued)  
F r i end ly  Range Affordance Mechanism 
Generates a fuel-range a f fo rdance  vo r ld  
~ a p  used by t h e  F r i end ly  Uaypoint S e l e c t i o n  
Mechanis8 t o  generate search waypoint8 for  
t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft  in a l l  three c r e v  models 
and t o  genera te  scou t  search vaypoints  in 
t h e  Crev 1 model 
?OK = Range af fordance  o f  a vorld p o i n t  t o  
which t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft can t r a v e l  
and still  have enough f u e l  t o  
return home, i f  t h e  craf t  does not  
have enough f u e l  t o  l as t  u n t i l  t h e  
end of the mission. 
p o i n t s  
FNO = Range af fordance  of a l l  o t h e r  vo r ld  
FOK 1 1 1 1 
FNO 0 0 0 0 
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for scout control required this crev to enter scout vay- 
point8,vith the vorld display rap cursor, in the same way 
that search vaypoints are entered for the friendly craft. 
This requirement may have encouraged this crev to develop 
similar policies for scout and friendly craft vaypoint 
selection. In general terms, the hypothesi8 is that Crev 
1's use of a supervisory mode of control over all five craft 
resulted in a lessened sensitivity to the primary functional 
difference betveen the scout and friendly craft in terms of 
8earch capability. It should be made clear, though, that 
t h i s  causally stated hypothesis is not being evaluated here, 
What is specifically being examined is the hypothesis that 
Crew 1's processes for selection of scout and friendly craft 
activities vera more similar than the processes used by 
Crews 2 and B. The parameters used for scout vaypolnt 
selection for Crev 1 appear under the heading Crev 18. 
The first tvo perceptual mechanism8 described in Table 
6 indicate that the same search affordance and locomotion 
affordance parameters vere used to describe scout search 
activities for both Creva 2 and E. The parameters listed in 
the table 'are the same values that vere used to produce the 
affordance maps appearing in Figures 11-14 in the previous 
chapter. Recall that the final affordance map that is used 
by the Scout Waypoint Selection and Scout Manual Control 
Mechanisms is created by superimposing (adding the values 
of) the locorotion and search affordance maps. 
, 
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The paramters used in the Scout Search Affordance 
Mechanlsm and Scout LOCO8Otion Affordance Mechanism for 
Crevs 2 and 1 vere determined by an extensive (but not 
exhaustive) 8earch of the parameter space. The behavior of 
the Scout Manual Control Mechanlsm, vhich use8 locomotion 
8nd search affordances to generate scout 8otion, vas varied 
by changing these parareter values. the parameter values 
given in Table 6 provided the best f i t  to czew behavior. In 
addition, the resulting values seem to be in reasonable 
alignment with task goals and constraints. 
It is critical to keep measurement 8calinq issues i n  
m i n d  vhen interpreting these parameter values. Due to the 
vay in vhich these values are additively corbined and then 
used to generate scout motion, the choice of both zero point 
and reasurerent unit for the affotdance value scales are 
arbitrary. The zero and unit are arbitrary because the 
motion generating mechanism 1s only sensitive to the 
relative affordance values, or the gradations, in the total 
affordance MP. A change in zero vould simply raise or 
lower the affordance value of every vorld point by the same 
amount, resulting in no overall change in the relative 
affordance structure. A change of unit vould alter the 
severity of the affordance gradation8, but vould once again 
leave the relative affordance structure unaltered. In the 
terminology used to describe the Scout Manual Control 
Mechani88, a change of unit vould change the norm (or 
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length) of the resultant force vector acting upon the scout 
but it would not change the direction of this vector. Since 
the direction of scout motion is determined by the direction 
of the resultant force vector, but left unaffected by the 
norm of this vector, a change in the affordance measurement 
unit does not affect the behavior of the Scout Manual 
Control Hechanism. Therefore, the only meaningful inter- 
pretations of the search and locomotion affordance mechanism 
parameters concern their relative values. 
Purely as a matter of convention, then, search afford- 
ances vere assigned positive value8 and locomotion afford- 
ances vere assigned negative value8. This arrangement vas 
chosen to be consistent with a descriptlon of searching as 
behavior directed toward the (positively valued) goal of 
finding objects constrained by the (negatively valued) 
difficulty of locomoting through forested regions. The 
affordances for both searching and loconoting in open 
regions vere assigned a value of zero, because open regions 
seemed to provide a neutral reference value to which the 
value of searching and locomoting in the forested regions 
could be compared. Assigning zero affordance values to open 
regions is not meant, for course, to indicate that locomot- 
ing through open regions was of zero difficulty or that 
searching open regions was of zero benefit in discovering 
objects. Rather, this zero point for the affordance scales 
was chosen purely a8 a matter of convenience. 
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The search affordances of both lightly and heavily 
forest regions vere assigned equal and positive values to 
generate search behavior consistent with the forest boundary 
hugging behavior of Crevs 2 and 1 (see Chapter VI. The 
search affordance for previously searched points vas given a 
negative value to lessen the amount of backtracking produced 
when traveling between search vaypoints. This negative 
value also helped wsmooth outa the scout paths by maintain- 
ing a large negative force directly behind the scout. The 
locomotion values for forested regions that vere found to 
provide a good fit to crew bhavior were indicative of the 
relative densities of the lightly and heavily forested 
regions. A large negative value for locoroting beyond the 
world boundary vas used to keep scout paths within the 
displayed vorld. 
The crevs vera hypothesized to be quite sirilar i n  
terms of the affordances used to select friendly craft 
search vaypoints, as indicated by the parameter values for 
the final four perceptual mechanisms i n  Table 6. These four 
Bechanisms produce the affordance ~ a p s  that are combined and 
used by the Friendly Waypoint Selection Mechanism. Whereas 
the final affordance rap for the scout is produced by simple 
addition of affordances, the final affordance map for the 
friendly craft is produced by addition and multiplication. 
Note that the Friendly Collision and Friendly Range hchan- 
isms both produce zero-one binary valued maps. The afford- 
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ance values of these tvo naps are each rultiplied vith the 
SUD of- the other tvo raps, the Friendly Search Affordance 
and Friendly-Scout coordination Affordance naps. This 
process is used to exclude a search vaypoint fro. consider- 
ation if its assignrent to a craft vould result in a 
~011isi0n or a craft running out of fuel. 
The calculations used to generate the affordance maps 
indicating collision points and the lOCU8 of points vithin 
fuel range produce exact and correct values for the8e 
reasures. It is almost surely the case that crews did not 
rake exact and veridical astinates of fuel ranges and 
collision points, even though no crev ever had tvo craft 
collide or a craft run out of fuel in the sessions used for 
analysis. Since exact calculations vere not parforred, good 
perforaance vas probably the result of processing mechanisrs 
that vera conservatively biased. That is, friendlies vere 
probably not sent to the edges of their fuel ranges, and any 
pair of friendlies vere probably kept separated by rore than 
the distance necessary to avoid colllsion. Unfortunately, 
no mechanisrs could be developed to operate in a fashion 
consistent vith these behaviors, other than by slrply adding 
a conservative tolerance to the equations used in the exact 
calculations. This increase in complexity vould not 
increase the p8ychological plausibility of these BeChani8D8, 
though, since the mechanisrs vould still based on exact 
(albeit conservative) calculations. Therefore, it vas 
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decided to use the simpler, exact calculations in order to 
produce behavior in high-level agreement vith crev behavior. 
The issue of identifying psychologlcally plau8ible mech- 
anisms to perform fuel range estimtion and collision 
avoidance was not addressed further. 
Unllke the scout searching affordances, the parameter 
values in the Friendly Search Affordance Mechanism are not 
related to forest density. This is due to the fact that the 
speed o f  friendly craft motion is not affected by forest 
density vhen the craft fly above tree level. Although crews 
differed with respect to their ability to keep the friendly 
craft above tree level, the friendly craft vere kept above 
the trees for the majority of time by each of the three 
crcvs. Therefore, the affordance values were based on the 
assumption that the friendly craft would fly above tree 
level and thus be unaffected by forest density. 
The only difference betveen the three crevs in terms of 
friendly 8earch perceptual mChanf8D parameters concerns the 
friendly-scout coordination affordances. Since Crew 1 vas 
hypothesized to not differentiate between the scout and 
friendly craft, the model for this crev vas not designed to 
give any extra veighting to friendly craft search waypoints 
that vould enable coordination vith the scout. 
The parameters for describing scout vaypoint selection 
in the Crew 1 rodel differ from the friendly vaypoint 
selection parameters in tvo respects. First, since Crew 1 
, 
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confined scout activities to open regions (presumbly due to 
slov autopilot travel through forests), the search afford- 
ance value of forested regions vas set equal to zero. In 
addition, since the scout cannot coordinate its activities 
with itself, the coordination affordance vas not used to 
determine scout vaypoint affordances. 
The final set of perceptual 8eChani888 to be discussed 
concern sensitivity to affordances pertaining to loading 
cargo, attacking enemy craft, traveling to home base, 
avoiding collisions, and maintaining craft altitude. Since 
the parameter values in these meChanh88 vere hypothesized 
to vary greatly betveen the crevs, the method that vas used 
to select the parameter values should be described. As 
discussed previously in this chapter, the modeling approach 
is based on the assumption that the role of the perceptual 
mechanisms is to provide information that is used to 
irolement, but not getermin~, a particular strategy. This 
assumption is based on the framevork developed for describ- 
ing highly skilled performance. In the suggested framevork, 
strategic issues are properly discussed at ‘the teleological 
level vhere task goal8 are considered to determine hov a 
particular strategy could be developed off-line, or incre- 
rentally, by a process of learning or reasoning. It vas 
argued that, for.modeling purposes, these issues can be kept 
distinct from the issues concerning how a given strategy is 
i8ph8entOd in real-time. 
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Since the current modeling addresses only the im- 
plementational issues, it may seem as if the process of 
parameterizing these perceptual 8echanisms is shallov or 
descriptive. That is, the parameterization approach is 
based on considering vhat different sets of affordance 
values might be sufficient to generate the high-level, stra- 
teqic differences that vere observed in the experiments. 
The selected parameter values are thus re8ponsible for 
implementing a given strategy, but they do not indicate hov 
a particular strategy might have evolved through learning. 
The final set of perceptual mechanisms are described i n  
Table 7 on the folloving pages. Different parameter value8 
in the cargo affordance rechanism vere used to adjust for 
the degree to which the three crevs differentially used the 
scout to load cargo. The parameter value used for Crev 1 
results in identical cargo affordance calculations for both 
the scout and friendly craft. The parameter values for the 
other tvo crevs result in lover cargo affordance values for 
the scout relative to the friendly craft. Given a scout and 
friendly craft with identical distance8 to a given cargo, 
fuel levels, numbers of missiles, and veiqht carrying 
capacities, the scout vould have a lover affordance for 
loading the cargo than vould the friendly craft. 
In both the Cargo Affordance !4echanism, the distance 
betveen the craft and the cargo (DC) enters the affordance 
calculation in the folloving way (see Table 7). The factor 
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TABLB 7 
OBJECT PERCEPTUAL MBCHANISMS 
flechanism NaDq: Cargo Affordance Mechanism 
Description : Osnerates the cargo-loading affordance used 
by the Object Selection Mechanis. to select 
scout and friendly craft activities. 
Farameters : SC = The ratio of scout to friendly craft 
cargo affordances. A low value of 8c 
results in a lov affordance for scout 
cargo loading relative to the friendly 
craft affordance. A unit value for 8C 
results in no difference betveen the 
scout and friendly craft affordance 
calculations. 
The affordance for a cargo-craft pair is calculated as . 
f OllOWS : 
Let, 
DC = the distance betveen the cargo and the craft 
UN = 1 if cargo can be loaded and unloaded at home 
base vithout the craft running out of fuel or 
the mission terminating, 
= 0 othervise 
= 0 otherwise 
= 0 othervise 
= 0 othervise 
MS = 1 if the craft has at least 2 missiles, 
UC = 1 if the craft has enough veight carrying 
capacity remaining to load the cargo, 
FB = 1 i f  the cargo is not vithin 0.4 miles of a 
fixed enemy craft, 
Then, if the craft is a friendly, the affordance is: 
MAX I 0, ((1 - DC/7) x UN x M8 x WC x FBI I 
And, if the craft is the scout, the affordance is: 
MAX I 0, ((1 - DC/7) X UN X MS X UC X FE X SC) I 
Thu8, the affordance is greatest vhen the DC is smll, 
and is equal to zero vhen DC is at least 7 miles. 
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TABLE 7 
(continued) 
OBJBCT PERCBPTUAL MBCHANISMS 
Mechani am Name: Pixed Enemy Affordance Mechanism 
De8CrlptiOn : Generates the fixed-enemy affordance used 
by the Object Selection Mechanism to select 
scout and friendly craft activitie8. 
Parameters : FF - A number in the interval [0,11 that 
determines friendly craft affordance 
from the wnominalw fixed enemy 
affordance. 
8F = A number in the interval [0,11 that 
determines scout affordance from the 
anorlnalw fixed enemy affordance. 
The nominal affordance for a enemy-craft pair is 
calculated as follows: 
Let, 
DI - the distance between the enemy and the craft 
UN - 1 if enemy can be attacked vithout the craft 
MS - 1 if the craft has at least 3 missiles, running out of fuel or the mission terminating, = 0 otherwise 
= 0 othervise 
Then, the nominal affordance (NOH) is: 
NOM * MAX [ 0 ,  ( ( - 8 5  - .8SxDB/7) X UN X MS) 1 
Thus, the nominal affordance is greatest when DE is small, 
and is equal to zero vhen DE is at least 7 miles* 
For the friendly craft, the affordance is: NOM x FF 
For the scout, the affordance is: NOH x SF 
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TABLE 7 
(continued) 
OBJBCT AFFORDANCB HECHANISHS 
Mechanism Name: Home Affordance Mechanism 
Description : Generates the home affordance used by the 
Object Selection Hechani~m to 8elect scout 
and friendly craft activities 
Parameters : CH = Gain on nominal home affordance due 
to need to unload cargo 
The hore affordance is the ~rclmur of three nominal home 
affordances: the affordances for unloading cargo (NOHC), 
for refueling ( N O W ) ,  and for resupplying missiles ( N O M ) .  
The three nominal affordance8 are calculated as follows: 
Let, 
XSF = The percent of current fuel that is in excess of 
the amount of fuel needed to safely return home, 
given that the current fuel level is not 8ufficient 
to last until the end of the rission. 
WCR = The velght carrying capacity remaining in pounds 
r o  < WCR < i o o o ~  
HIS = the number of missiles carried ( 0  < HIS < 6 J 
Then, the nominal home affordance for refueling is: 
NOHF = 1.0 - XSP/lOO 
The nominal home affordance for cargo unloading is: 
NOHC = (1000 - WCR/lOOO)/lOOO 
And the nominal hone affordance for resupplying missiles 
is: 
N O M  = 1 if HIS is 0 or 1; 0 otherwise 
The home affordance is: 
HAX 1, HAX(NOHF,NOHH,(CH X NOHC)) J 
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TABLE 7 
(continued 1 
OBJECT AFFORDANCE MECHANISMS 
Mechanism Name: Mobile Bnemy Affordance Mechanism 
Description : Generates affordance for attacking mobile 
enemies used by Object Selection Mechanism 
to select scout and friendly craft 
activities . 
Parameters : None 
The affordance value for the friendly craft equals 1.01 
vhen the craft is locked-on by mobile enemy craft radar. 
The affordance value for the scout equals 1.01 vhen the 
scout is belov tree level and locked-on by mobile enemy 
craft radar. These are the situations in vhich the craft 
cannot typically escape from the attacking enemy craft. : 
Mechanism Name: Collision Affordance Mechanism 
Description : Generates affordance for. taking a collision 
avoidance action for a friendly craft. Used 
by the Object Selection Mechanism to select 
scout and friendly craft activities. 
Parameters : None 
The affordance value equals 1.00 when a craft is expected 
to collide with another friendly craft. Taking an 
avoidance action with the first of the two relevant craft 
zeros the collision affordance for both craft. 
MeChani8m Name: Friendly Up Affordance 
Description : Generates affordance for assigning an up 
action for a friendly craft. Used by the 
Object Selection Mechanism to select scout 
and friendly craft activities. 
Parameters : None 
The affordance is zero for all craft above tree level and 
for craft belov tree level in open regions. A value of 
0.1 is incrementally added to the affordance level each 
time the map display is vieved for craft dovn in forests, 
up to a maxiru~ of 1.0 
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(1 - DC/7) is used to make the affordance for loading a 
piece of cargo a function of the distance betveen the craft 
and the cargo locations. The distance is divided by seven 
to normalize distances betveen seven and zero miles to a 
zero-one range. Although the raximua pos8ible distance 
betveen a craft and a cargo is approximately 14 miles, the 
zero value on the scale is set to seven miles to increase 
the sensitivity of the affordance calculation to small 
difference8 in distances. The aaximization operation in the 
affordance calculation ensures that a negative affordance 
value is never produced. A similar di8tance calculation is 
used in the Fixed Enemy Affordance Mechanism. 
The Fixed Enemy Affordance Mechanism vas similarly 
tuned to the varying degrees to vhich the three crevs secaed 
to differentiate betveen the scout and friendly craft. 
Given a nominal affordance level as described in the table, 
the affordance values for each crev for both the scout and 
friendly craft were expressed as functions of this nominal 
value. The nominal affordance was defined to the (saae) 
affordance used for the scout in the Crev 1 model and for 
the friendly craft in the models of Crevs 2 and B. Since 
Crev 1 did not attack fixed enemy craft vith friendly craft, 
this nominal affordance vas nulled in this model for these 
craft. In addition, since Crevs 2 and E did not often use 
the scout to attack fixed enemy craft, this affordance value 
vas lessened for the scout in these two models. The maximum 
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possible fixed enemy affordance value produced by this 
mechanism is 0.85, vhereas the maXhUB possible cargo 
affordance value is 1.00. This difference vas required due 
to the fact that less points vere scored by destroying a 
fixed enemy than vere scored by unloading a piece o f  cargo 
at home base. Therefore, loading cargo vas pzeferred to 
attacking fixed enemy craft. 
The home affordance parameter values veze also tailored 
to individual crew.  The home affordance due to the need to 
unload cargo used in the Crev 1 model vas greater than in 
the other tvo crev models to produce behavior consistent 
vith Crev 1's policy of serially processing cargo vith the 
scout and friendly craft. As discussed previously in this 
chapter, the maximization operation in the Home Affordance 
Mechanism vas used to generate a thresholding of the 
affordance values. The final three perceptual mechanisms, 
the nobile Enemy, Collision, and Up Affordance Hechanlsms 
veze identical in the three crev models. 
The af fordances produced by these perceptual mechanisas 
provide the input to the selection mechanisrs described in 
the previous chapter. A 8  mentioned above, the same salec- 
tion mechanisms vera used to model all three crews. Thus, 
the parameter values given above for both the perceptual and 
action mechanisms vera, vith one exception, the only 
adjustrents made to fit the behavior of the human crcvs. 
The final parameter that vas manipulated vas the time 
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requi red  f o r  t h e  perceptua l  mechanisms t o  operate. Up t o  
t h i s  po in t ,  t he  only  mechanisms t h a t  have been assumed t o  
r e q u i r e  process ing  time have been t h e  a c t i o n  mechanisms t h a t  
s imula t e  observable  c o n t r o l  act ivi t ies  a t  t h e  i n t e r f a c e .  I t  
is obvioucr t h a t ,  i n  t h e  terminology of t h e  present model, 
t h e  ope ra t ion  of t h e  crev's pe rcep tua l  and s e l e c t i o n  
8eChanisBs cannot be instantaneous.  Un f or t u n a t e  1 y, there 
are no d i rec t ly  measurable data t h a t  could be used t o  
88tiMte t h i 8  time. 
Therefore, t h e  processing time due t o  t h e  ope ra t ion  of 
t h e  perceptual and s e l e c t i o n  mechanlsms vas estimated by 
examining t h e  behavior of t h e  model w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  t iming  
parameters . The need t o  cons ider  t h i s  time parameter 
sur faced  du r ing  t h e  Crew 1 model f i t t i n g  process .  For t h i s  
c r e v  e s p e c i a l l y ,  i t  was found t h a t  t h e  model produced far 
t o o  l i t t l e  i d l e  time f o r  t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft .  The amount of 
idle  time produced by t h e  Crev 1 model t h a t  vas  due s o l e l y  
a c t i o n  mechani8m delays vas roughly one h a l f  of t h e  craft 
i d l e  time observed f o r  Crev 1. Therefore, some perceptua l  
or c e n t r a l  d e l a y s  had t o  be assumed in order  t o  match t h e  
behavior of t h i s  crew. Perceptual o r  c e n t r a l  delays a l s o  
had t o  be assured  f o r  t h e  Crew 2 and Crev B models as well, 
a l t h o u g h  these vere  much smaller than  t h e  d e l a y  used f o r  
mimicking Crev 1. The pe rcep tua l  mechanism process ing  t i m e  
parameters t h a t  seemed t o  provide best f i t s  t o  t h e  data 
vere: Crev 1 model - 3 seconds; Crev 2 model - 1 second; 
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Crev IJ model - 0 . S  seconds. These times reflect t h e  amount 
of t i m e  required by t h e  model t o  update t h e  a r r a y  of a f fo rd -  
ances  each time t h e  rodel alookeda a t  t h e  vo r ld  d i s p l a y .  
These parameter va lues  vere  selected because t h e y  provided 
t h e  best f i t s  t o  c r e v  performance. 
Table 8 on t h e  fo l lov inq  pages provides a 8U88ary of 
t h e  parameter va lues  t h a t  were manipulated i n  t h e  a t t e m p t  t o  
m i m i c  t h e  performance d i f f e r e n c e s  betveen t h e  three c revs .  
Only those parameters t h a t  ve re  var ied  t o  f i t  t h e  c r e v s  are 
included i n  t h e  table. T h i s  concludes t h e  di8CUssiOn of t h e  
r o d e l  parameter iza t ion  process. 
, 
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TABLE 8 
SUMMARY OB PARAMETER VALUES 
1. Mechanisr: Scout Action Mechanisr 
Parameter: Serial vs. Parallel scout & friendly control 
Crev 1: Serial 
Crev B: Serial 
Crev 2: Parallel 
2. Mechanism: Fixed Enery Action Mechanisr 
Parareter: Fixed enemy action cormand 
Crev 1: Not used 
Crev E: E:^,G,A,A,A 
Crev 2: E:A,O,AIAIA 
. 3 .  Mechanisr: Search Action Mechanisr 
Parareter: Search action cormand 
Crev 1: S:^,G 
Crev E: S:^ ,G,P 
Crev 2: S:^,G 
4. Mechanism: Hone Action Mechanisr 
Parareter: H O B 8  action cormand 
Crev 1: X:U (no cursor required) 
Crev E: X:U (no cursor required) 
Crev 2: S:^,G,v,U (cursor required) 
5.  Mechanism: Motion Action Mechanism 
Parameter: Manual versus Autopilot scout control 
Crev 1: Autopilot Control 
Crev E: Manual Control 
Crev 2: Manual Control 
6. Mechanisr: Manual Control Mechanisr 
Parareter: Destination affordance as a percent of 
local affordances. 
Crev 1: Not used 
Crew E: 100% 
Crev 2: 100% 
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TABLE 8 
(cont inued)  
SUMMARY OF PARAMETER VALUBS 
7. Mechanism: Button P res s ing  Mechanism 
Parameter: Button Pressing time 
Crev 1: 1.50 second8 
Crev E: 0.75 seconds 
Crev 2: 0.75 seconds 
8. Mechanisn: Cursor Moving Mechanism 
Parameter: F i t t s  Lav i n t e r c e p t  
Crew 1: 2 seconds 
Crev E: 1 second 
Crev 2: 1 second 
Parameter: F i t t s  Law s lope 
Crev 1: 0.33 seconds/bit  
Crev E: 0.15 seconds/bi t  
Crev 2: 0.15 seconds/bit  
9. Mechanisn: 
Parameter: 
Crev 1: 
Crev E: 
Crew 2: 
Parane ter :  
C r e w  1: 
Crev E: 
C r e w  2: 
Edi t ing  Hechanism 
Time t o  enter a mobile attack command 
4.0 seconds 
3.0 seconds 
3.0 seconds 
Time t o  e n t e r  a l l  o the r  commands 
9.0 seconds 
4.0 seconds 
5.0 seconds 
10. Wchanisn:  J o y s t i c k  Cont ro l  Mechanism 
Parameter: Maxinun s c o u t  speed 
Crew 1: Not used 
Crev E: 80 m.p.h 
Crew 2: 65  m.p.h 
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TABLB 8 
(continued) 
SUHHARY OF PARAMETER VALUES 
Mechanism: Friendly 8earch Affordance Mechanism 
Paraaeter: Search affordance of light forests 
Crew 1: 2 
Crew E: 2 
Crew 2: 2 
Crew 1s: 0 
Parameter: Search affordance of heavy forests 
Crev 1: 2 
Crew E: 2 
Crev 2: 2 
Crev 18: 0 
Mechanism: Friendly-Scout Coordination Affordance 
Parameter: Affordance of regions simultaneously 
Mec ha n i sa 
coverable by scout and friendly craft 
Crew 1: 0 
Crew E: 3 
Crev 2: 3 
Crew 1s: Not used 
Mechanism: Cargo Affordance Mechanism 
Parameter: Ratio of scout to friendly craft affordance 
Crew 1: 1.00 
Crev E: 0.33 
Crew 2: 0.67 
Mechanism: Fixed Enemy Affordance Mechanisa 
Parameter: Ratio of friendly craft affordance to 
noainal affordance 
Crew 1: 0 
Crev E: 1 
Crew 2: 1 
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TABLE 8 
(continued) 
SUnnARY OF PARAHETER VALUES 
Mechanism: Fixed Enemy Affordance Mechanism 
Parameter: Ration of scout affordance to nominal 
affordance 
Crew 1: 1.00 
Crew 10: 0.33 
Crew 2: 0.33 
Mechanism: Home Affordance Hechanism 
Parameter: -in on home affordance due to need to 
unload cargo at hoae ba8e 
Crew 1: 3 
Crew E: 1 
Crev 2:  1 
Mechanism: All Perceptual Hechanism8 
Parameter: Updating time 
Crew 1: 3.0 seconds 
Crew E: 0.5 seconds 
Crev 2: 1.0 seconds 
208 
Model E valuatiorl 
The performance measures described in Chapter I11 that 
vere used to construct crev profiles vera a180 used to 
construct profiles from the behavior produced by the model 
vith each of the three parameter sets. The model vas run on 
each of the sane eight world-configuration/payoff-structure 
combinations used in the three crev experiments. Thus, the 
model vas run on each vorld configuration tvice, once vith 
the payoff favoring cargo processing and once with the 
payoff favoring enemy processing. Since the model is not 
sensitive to payoff structure information, the model should, 
theoretically, produce the same stream of behavior and vorld 
events in the two runs using the same vorld configuration. 
Here, unfortunately, implementation details serve to 
cloud the issue. Since the computer system on vhich the 
model ran vas not dedicated to this modeling task, there vas 
some chance that the execution of other users' tasks could 
slightly alter the time required for one of the mechanism8 
to process information. For example, in one run of the 
model a certain cargo vas discovered a fraction of a second 
before a different cargo vas discovered, but in the second 
model run, this sequence vas reversed. This vould, in turn, 
alter the friendly craft assignments to these cargo, 
completely changing the locus of the paths traced out by the 
two friendly craft in traveling to these cargo. This change 
vould then -result in differences in the times at vhich the 
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remaining cargo were discovered and enemy craft were 
encountered. Within a fev minutes after the minor diverq- 
ence between the two model runs, the two models would be 
operating on 
different streams of behavior . 
highly different worlds and producing entirely 
To reduce the severity of such effects, the model was 
run at hours vhen there were no or very fev other users. 
Even, though, when the model and simulation were the only 
tasks running on the computer system, there was typically 
some divergence in model behavior between successive runs, 
probably due to external or historical factors that altered 
the vay in vhich the many computer progrars comprising thb 
modal vere selected for processing by the cpu scheduler. 
This scheduler is responsible for determining the order in 
vhich the many programs awaiting cpu time were executed. 
Certain factors appeared to contribute to these scheduling 
operations that were not controllable by the computer user. 
For example, the scheduler vould sometimes perform system 
maintenance operations during the tlme in vhich the model 
vas running, thereby slightly altering the vay in vhlch the 
model'b programs were selected for execution. For analysis 
purposes, then, the actual stream of behavior produced by 
the model in any given run is perhaps viewed as a somewhat 
naccidentaln property of the model, whereas the relevant 
outputs of the model are the behavioral invariants that can 
be discovered in hlgher level performance assessments. 
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The same performance measure c a l c u l a t i o n s  were used t o  
ana lyze  t h e  data  produced by both t h e  model and t h e  human 
crews. The degree t o  w h i c h  t h e  model and crew p r o f i l e s  
agreed was used a s  a measure of t h e  empi r i ca l  adequacy of 
t h e  model f o r  each crew. As i n  t h e  crew p r o f i l e  compar- 
i sons ,  a t - t e s t  was used on each performance measure t o  
provide a measure of s i m i l a r i t y  between model and crew 
behavior .  Due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  model could produce 
ve ry  similar behavior i n  each p a i r  of s e s s i o n s  us ing  t h e  
same world conf igu ra t ion ,  a c o r r e l a t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  
d a t a  produced by t h e  model w a s  performed t o  determine  t h e  
appropr i a t e  degrees of freedom t h a t  should be used t o  
ana lyze  model performance. The on ly  measures on which t h e  
model's performance were found t o  be h igh ly  c o r r e l a t e d  
between t h e  two s e s s i o n s  on t h e  same world conf igu ra t ion  
were t h e  measures of area searched  by t h e  s cou t  and t h e  
t o t a l  area searched by t h e  models of C r e w s  E and 2 .  For t h e  
s t a t i s t i c a l  t e s t s  u s i n g  these  measures, t h e n ,  t h e  deg rees  of 
freedom were reduced t o  account  f o r  t h e  fact  t h a t  t h e  i n t r a -  
world v a r i a b i l i t y  produced by t h e  model was ve ry  low. 
Two types  of s i m i l a r i t y  t e s t s  were performed. The  
f irst  type  measured t o  s i m i l a r i t y  between each human crew 
and t h e  model used t o  m i m i c  t h a t  crew. For each of t h e  2 2  
performance measures i n  t h e  p r o f i l e s ,  t - t e s t s  were used t o  
i d e n t i f y  w h e t h e r  c r e v  and model performance d i f f e r e d ,  us ing  
t h e  same s i g n i f i c a n c e  l e v e l  as was used i n  t h e  comparisons 
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between the three human crevs. These tests will be referred 
to as qinilarity tests in the follovinq chapter where the 
modeling results are discussed. 
This method of maasurlng model adequacy 1s problematic, 
of course, due to the fact that high variability in model 
performance can serve to render all comparisons between crev 
and model performance statistically insignificant. To guard 
against this possibility, each of the three crev model8 vere 
a l so  compared against each other, in the hope of obtaining 
the same pattern of differences between the three models as 
vas observed bctveen the three c~evs. These tests cannot 
be artificially passed due to high variability in model 
performance, and will be referred to as configural tests in 
the following chapter. It should be pointed out, though, 
that the variability in performance on almost every one of 
the 22 measures vas lover for the model than for the human 
crevs . This finding strengthens the validity of the 
similarity testing procedure, and suggests that running 
additional model sessions to improve the pover of the 
statistical tests is of limited utility. 
The use of certain assumptions that are knovn to be 
fa188 pre8ents some problems for the model evaluation 
approach. The first such assumption concerns the simplified 
set of action commands used in the rodel to control the 
friendly craft. As mentioned above, crevs used a range of 
different action commands for essentially the sane purpose, 
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although the rationale behind command selection could not be 
hypothesized. The inability to determine policies for use 
of the "up" action is one important example. Crews 1 and 2 
usually prefaced search, cargo, and fixed enemy attack 
actions with "upa actions, but this was not always the case. 
Since consistent policies for aupu action usage could not be 
found, the behavior of these crews was approximated in the 
rodel by using the action couands that these crews used 
most frequently: those containing "up" actions. Therefore, 
the performance of the model might be expected to differ 
with the performance o f  Crews 1 and 2 vith r e s p e c t  to t h e  
measure of the percent of tire spent above trees for thC 
friendly craft. Note that it should be possible to achieve 
a better match with the data on this measure by including a 
pseudo-random component in the model that would selectively 
erploy "upw actions with the same relative frequency as used 
by the crevs, although this gain in empirical adequacy would 
not provide any additional insight into the reasons why 
crews differentially used the "up" actions in their friendly 
craft comand strings. 
Additional issues associated with the use of false 
assumptions will be discussed as they arise in the discus- 
sion of modeling results in the following chapter. The 
example discussed above has been presented in some detail to 
convey the coaplexity of the problems associated with 
atterpting to validate a generative model, which is known to 
0 
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be s i a p l i f i e d ,  by comparing its behavior v i t h  t h e  behavior 
of huaan s u b j e c t s .  
A siai lar  y e t  related problea is t r y i n g  t o  isolate j u s t  
those eapirical data t h a t  should be used t o  eva lua te  t h e  
aodel ,  s i n c e  t h e  a s suap t ions  of t h e  aode l ing  approach are 
only  intended t o  apply  t o  a restricted range of e a p i r i c a l  
phenoaena, namely, h i g h l y  s k i l l e d  perforaance.  I t  becaae 
clear t h a t ,  even v i t h  t h e  a o s t  h i g h l y  s k i l l e d  crew, sit- 
u a t i o n s  atised f o r  which t h e  crew would a t t empt  t o  genera te  
novel s o l u t i o n s  t o  familiar probleaa,  i n  a n  a t t empt  t o  
iaprove on s t e a d y - s t a t e  strategies.  Unfortunately,  t h e  
behavior a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e s e  %xper i aen t sm is eabeddeU 
wi th in  t h e  streaa of behavior produced by the  aechanisas  
t h a t  vere  hypothesized t o  produced h i g h l y  s k i l l e d  per-  
ceptual ly-based behavior. Unless these data  can be teased 
out ,  there is a danger of pena l i z ing  t h e  aodel for f a i l i n g  
t o  deal w i t h  phenoaena f o r  which i t  vas not  designed t o  
account .  
On t h e  o the r  hand, there is also a p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y  c red i t i ng  t h e  aodel f o r  producing eapirical- 
l y  adequate  behavior vhen t h a t  behavior is generated " for  
t h e  wrong reasons.a For example, t h e  model r a y  produce 
behav io ra l ly  val id  r e s u l t s  due t o  a f o r t u i t o u s  c a n c e l l a t i o n  
of t h e  e f f e c t s  of erroneous assuapt ions .  I t  is natural  
dur ing  t h e  aodel  f i t t i n g  process  for a t t e n t i o n  t o  be drawn 
t o  aisaatches betveen aodel  and huaan behavior,  o f t e n  
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allowing for model deficiencies that do not directly produce 
1napprQpriate activity to go unnoticed. 
AS a final note concerning the validity of comparing 
model and crev behavior, one adjustment made to the dynamics 
of the controlled system rust be discussed. As mentioned 
above, the model used for mimicking the behavior of Crev 2 
did not attempt to scatter the vaypoint destinations of 
friendly craft around home base. It was hypothesized that 
Crev 2 scattered these vaypoints to lessen the probability 
of two craft colliding while returning home. (None of the 
three crevs had tvo craft collide in the sessions used for 
analysis) The model contained two provisions for avoiding 
collisions. The first was to exclude search vaypoint 
assignments that would result in expected collisions. The 
second vas the use of a perceptual affordance 8eChaniS8 
specifically designed to identify potential collisions. The 
affordance value produced by this mechanism would signal the 
action mechanisms to implement an evasive action vith one of 
the friendly craft. 
Even though the model contained these provisions for 
collision avoidance, it was found that craft collisions 
occurred in the sessions performed by the model vith too 
high a frequency. The major reason for this problem seemed 
to concern the limited ability of the model to employ self- 
referential reasoning. When the model vas evaluating which 
potential friendly craft vaypoints could result in col- 
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lision, the model had to rely upon knowledge of the time at 
vhich the friendly craft would be expected to beqin its 
travel to the vaypoint. But this time depended upon the 
time at vhich the model "itself" vould be able to determine 
and implement a course of action. This time, of course, 
vas partially determined by whether the waypoint that vas 
currently under consideration would be free of collision, or 
whether addltional waypoints and other actions had to be 
explored, evaluated, and compared. And vhether or not the 
current waypoint under consideration would cause a collision 
vas determined by . . . #  and so on. This difficulty was 
compounded by the fact that the mechanisr computing the 
waypoint affordance did not have access to other contextual 
information that impacted the time at which the friendly 
craft vould initiate travel to the vaypoint. Since no 
oriqinal solution to this problem vas forthcoring in this 
research, the solution that vas adopted was to radically 
decrease the distance between two craft  that vould cause a 
collision. Therefore, the model did not attempt to scatter 
waypoints around home base in an attempt to avoid a col- 
lisions between friendly craft. This alteration in the 
collision distance calculation was the only change made to 
the dynarlcs of the syster to accommodate the model. 
CHAPTER VI1 
MODELING RESULTS 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the results of crew 8odeling will be 
discussed. As described in the previous chapter, two types 
of tests were performed to assess the empirical adequacy of 
the rode1 for each crew. Similarity tests were performed to 
identify hov well the parameterized models produced behavior 
in agreement with the crew performance profiles described ih 
Chapter 111. Statistical tests were used to identify any 
differences between c r e w  and their associated models on 
each performance measure. Since success on these tests can 
be inappropriately achieved due to high variability in model 
performance, configural tests were also performed to assess 
how well the performance differences between each pair of 
crews were a l s o  exhibited by each associated pair of crew 
8odels. These configural tests are more stringent measures 
of the empirical adequacy of the crev models. At the end of 
the chapter, general conclusions pertaining to inter-crew 
differences and model adequacy will be discussed. 
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summarv of Results 
This section is a general summary of the results of 
both the similarity and confiqural tests. After this 
overviev, the adequacy of the crev models vith respect to 
each of the 22 performance measures in the crev and model 
profiles will be discussed in more detail. 
A total of 66 similarity tests vere performed (3 crev- 
model pairs each using 22 measures). In 58 of the tests, 
model and crew performance could not be differentiated. All 
crev models satisfied tests associated vith points z~cored, 
discovering cargo and enemy craft, and successfully process- 
ing cargo and enemy craft. Also satisfled vera all testb 
associated vith the differential usage of the scout and 
friendly craft pertaining to these measures. On the other 
hand, the model failed to achieve consistency vith crev 
performance on eight of the 66 measures. (Only 3.3 failures 
vould be expected due to chance if the measures were 
independent: 66 tests x .OS alpha level .  More failures 
vould be expected if the measures vere not independent). Of 
these failures, one occurred for the model of Crev 1, three 
occurred for the model of Crev 2, and the model of Crev B 
failed on four performance measures. All three models 
failed on the measure of the time spent for friendly craft 
above tree level; in each of these cases the difference 
betveen model and crew performance vas approximately 13%. 
As vi11 be didcussed belov, tvo of the Crev E model failures 
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pertaining to searching performance appear to be attribut- 
able non-stationarity in Crew E behavior that was not 
captured by the model. 
For analysis of the results of the more demanding 
configural tests, four types of test results were defined. 
A "hit" was defined as an agreement between the comparison 
tests for each pair of crevs and the associated crew models 
on a specific performance measure. For example, if Crev 1 
sighted less cargo than Crew 2, and the Crew 1 model sighted 
less cargo then the Crew 2 model, this test vas scored a 
hit. Another type of hit is when neither the crews nor the 
associated crew models differed on a measure. A NmlssN wab 
defined as a difference exhibited between a pair of crews on 
a specific measure that was not exhibited by the associated 
pair of crew models on that measure. A "false alarm" vas 
defined as a difference that vas found between a pair of 
crev models that vas not exhibited by the associated pair of 
crews. Finally, a wre~ezsaln was defined as a case where 
crews differed in one direction, whereas the associated pair 
of crew models differed in the other direction. For 
example, if  Crew 1 loaded mora cargo than Crew 2, but the 
Crew 1 model loaded less cargo than the Crew 2 model, this 
result was termed a reversal. 
As with the similarity tests, a total of 66 configural 
tests were performed ( 3  pairs x 22 performance measures). 
Of these 66 tests, 54 were hits, five were misses, six were 
I 
219 
false alarms, and one t e s t  resulted i n  a r e v e r s a l .  Three  of 
t h e  misses occurred i n  t h e  comparisons of t h e  models of 
C r e w s  1 and E, and t h e  o the r  two misses concerned t h e  
comparisons of t h e  models of Crews 2 and E. With a l l  f i v e  
misses, t h e  model pairs and crew p a i r s  d i f f e red  i n  t h e  same 
d i r e c t i o n ,  a l though t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  model performance was 
not  great enough t o  achieve s i g n i f i c a n c e .  
O f  t h e  s i x  false alarms, three occurred i n  t h e  compar- 
hOn8 of t h e  models of Crews 1 and 2, and t h e  o the r  three 
misses occurred i n  t h e  comparisons of t h e  models of Crews  1 
and E. With a l l  six false alarms, t h e  model pairs and crew 
pairs d i f fe red  i n  t h e  same d i r e c t i o n ,  a l though t h e  differ :  
ence i n  model performance was great enough t o  achieve 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  vhereas  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  in crew performance was 
not .  The r e v e r s a l  concerned t h e  comparison of t h e  time 
s p e n t  above trees by t h e  f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  f o r  Crews 2 and E 
and t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  aodels .  
f iodelins Resu l t s  
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  t h e  resu l t s  of t h e  s imi la r i ty  and 
c o n f i g u r a l  tests w i l l  be discussed i n  greater detai l .  
F igure  17 on t h e  fol lowing page i n d i c a t e s  t h e  average number 
of p o i n t s  scored per s e s s i o n  and t h e  average number of enemy 
craf t  destroyed per s e s s i o n  f o r  each of t h e  three c r e v s  and 
each of t h e  three crew models. A t  t h e  t o p  of each graph, 
any s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  performance of each 
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pair of crews and each pair of crew models are noted. In 
later graphs where there are similarity test failures, any 
significant differences between each crew and its respective 
model will be noted as well. As can be seen in Figure 17, 
the three crew models satisfied all three similarity tests 
with respect to the measures of points scored and enemy 
craft destroyed. In addition, the configural differences 
between the three subjects all also replicated by the three 
models . 
Figure 18 on the following page shows crew and model 
performance concerning the number of enemy craft destroyed 
by the scout and friendly craft. Once again, no model 
differed from its respective crew on either of these 
measures. on the other hand, Figure 18 represents the first 
configural t e s t  failure, a miss i n  this instance. Crew 1 
destroyed significantly less enemy craft with the scout than 
did Crew E (3 versus 5.45 enemy craft). The model of Crew 
1, on the other hand, did not destroy significantly less 
enemy craft with the scout than did the model of Crew E, 
although a similar trend was exhibited (3.25 versus 4.02 
enery craft) 
Figure 19 on the next page indicates the total number 
of cargo unloaded at home base and the percent of discovered 
cargo that were eventually unloaded at home base. Once 
again, all similarity tests vert satisfied with respect to 
these tvo performance measures. On the other hand, the 
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difference between Crews 2 and E on the measure of the 
percent of discovered cargo returned to home base was not 
replicated by the models of Crews 2 and E. The reason that 
the similarity tests were satisfied but one configural test 
was failed on this measure seems to be that the two crew 
models performed at a level half-way between the performance 
of the two crews. Thus, the two models were similar enough 
to their respective crews on this measure, but not suf- 
ficiently different to replicate the small but significant 
difference between these two crews. 
The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  t v o  models d i d  n o t  d i f f e r  on t h i 8  
measure is due to the fact that no parameters were alterea 
between these two models in an attempt to generate different 
performance on this measure. This measure represented one 
of the few differences between Crews 2 and B. The major 
phenomena that was selected to be explained concerning,these 
two crews was how they were able to achieve such similar 
performance given their difference in crew s i z e .  The Crew E 
model was able to achieve the performance of the Crew 2 
model despite the fact that its action mechanisms were con- 
strained to perform consistently with assumptions concerning 
the peripheral limitations associated with the one-person 
crew condition. That this similarity in performance was 
% 
achieved vithout replicating the superior ability of Crew E 
to unload a higher percentage of discovered cargo suggests 
that this superiority was not a major factor contributing to 
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Crew E ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  perform a t  t h e  l e v e l  of a two-person 
crev. 
Figure 20 on t h e  fol lowing page i n d i c a t e s  t h e  average 
number of cargo  unloaded by t h e  s c o u t  and f r i e n d l y  craft f o r  
each of t h e  three crews and each of t h e  three crev models. 
A l l  s i x  s i m i l a r i t y  tes ts  and a l l  s i x  c o n f i g u r a l  tests were 
sat isf ied w i t h  respect t o  these t v o  performance measures. 
F igure  2 1  on t h e  next page indicates t h e  average number 
of f r i e n d l y  craft  des t royed  and t h e  average number of cargo  
discovered f o r  each of t h e  three crews and three crew 
Models. A l l  s i x  s imi l a r i t y  tes t s  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  these two 
measures were sa t i s f ied .  Only f i v e  of t h e  s i x  c o n f i g u r a l  
t e s t s  were sa t i s f i ed ,  though, a s  t h e  comparison between t h e  
models of Crew 1 and Crew E yie lded  a false alarm w i t h  
respect t o  t h e  average nuaber of craf t  destroyed.  No 
s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f fe rence  on t h i s  measure occurred between Crev 
1 and C r e w  E, al though C r e w  1 averaged 1 .29  craft  des t royed  
per  s e s s i o n  vhereas Crev E averaged 0 . 5 7  c ra f t  destroyed per 
s e s s i o n .  The model of Crev 1 averaged 1.38 craf t  destroyed, 
and t h e  model f o r  Crev E averaged 0 . 3 8  craft destroyed per 
ses s ion ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t v t t n  t h e  two being s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t .  
The f a i l u r e  of t h e  model t o  achieve t h e  appropriate  
c o n f i g u r a l  results on t h i s  measure is p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  interpret .  The a u t h o r ' s  ex tens ive  experience a t  t h i s  
t a s k  sugges t s  t h a t  t h e  number of f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  destroyed 
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has a very large effect on the number of points scored. In 
addition to the 600 points that are deducted, the craft is 
not available to be used to earn points for the rest of the 
mission. The fact that Crew 1 averaged more than twice as 
many craft destroyed as Crew E, while being statistically 
insignificant, almost surely contributed to the statistical- 
ly significant difference between the two crews in terms of 
total points scored. It would be almost impossible to 
average as many craft destroyed as did Crew 1 and still 
score as many points as did Crew E. 
Figure 22 on t h e  folloving page indicates the average 
number of cargo discovered by the friendly craft and the 
scout. All six similarity tests pertaining to these two 
performance measures were satisfied. With respect to the 
configural comparisons, one of the six tests resulted in a 
miss. Crew 1 sighted significantly less cargo with the 
scout than did Crew E (2.3 versus 5 . 1  cargo). The model for 
Crew 1 sighted less cargo with the scout than did the model 
for Crew 2 (3.2 versus 5.31, but this difference was not 
significant. 
Figure 23 on the next page indicates the average time 
duration between loading and unloading cargo, and the 
average number of times the craft returned to home base to 
unload and refuel. All six similarity tests pertaining to 
these two measures were satisfied. On the other hand, four 
false alarms were evidenced in the configural tests due to 
Cargo Discovered by 
Friendlies Per Session 
229 
Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew E 
Cargo Discovered by 
Scout Per Session 
Cargo 
8 
lo i 
Ctew 
Modal 
sig @ .05 
c1 ( c2 
6 C1 ( CE 
M1 ( M 2  
2 
0 - 
Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew E 
Figure 22 
Crew and model comparison of cargo 
discovered by scout and friendly craft 
Time Between Cargo 
Loaded and Unloaded 
Seconds 
yo0 
300 
200 
loo 
0 
Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew E 
Number of  Unloads at 
Home Per Session 
8 Unloads 
lo 9 c 
Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew E 
Figure 23 
Crew and model comparisons of duration 
between loading and unloading cargo and 
the number of times craft sent home 
230 
Crew 
El -1 
s i  @ .os 
M l ( M 2  
M1 (ME 
, 
231 
these measures. With respect to the duration between cargo 
loading and unloading, the difference between the Crew 1 
model and Crew 2 model, and the difference between the Crew 
1 model and the Crew 3 model were significant, whereas the 
corresponding differences in Crew perforrance were not. An 
examination of the session by session data indicated that 
the Crew 1 model had a much lower variability on this 
measure than Crew 1. Although the mean durations were 
siailar enough so that the Crew 1 rodel did not differ 
significantly from Crew 1 on this measure, the much lower 
variance for the rodel resulted in significant difference? 
between the Crew 1 model and the other two aodel8. 
The fact that the Crew 1 model had a shorter average 
duration between the tines at which cargo were loaded and 
unloaded was caused primarily by the vay in which this model 
serially processed cargo. Crew 1 was observed to have this 
sub-optimal policy, therefore the home affordance parameter 
reflecting the need to go hone to unload cargo vas raised in 
this model to produce this behavior. This serial cargo 
loading-unloading policy probably also resulted in t h e  two 
false alarms pertaininq to the number of times craft were 
sent home to unload. The Crew 1 model sent friendlies home 
significantly more often than did the rodels of Crev 2 and 
Crew E, whereas there vas no such significant difference 
between the three crews. 
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What these four  false alarms seem t o  sugges t  is t h a t  
Crev 1 vas  less r i g i d  i n  h i s  use of t h e  se r ia l  cargo 
loading-unloading p o l i c y  than  vas  t h e  model of Crev 1. T h a t  
is, t h e  c o n s i s t e n t  employrent of t h e  serial  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  
model of Crev 1 vas  probably exaggerated w i t h  respect t o  t h e  
degree t o  vhich Crev 1 a c t u a l l y  fo l loved  t h i s  pol icy.  The 
Crev 1 model, cons t ra ined  t o  perform r i g i d l y  i n  adherence t o  
t h i s  pol icy,  produced more h i g h l y  stereotyped behavior 
regard ing  cargo  unloading t h a n  d i d  Crev 1, vho may have been 
a b i t  more f l e x i b l e  i n  h i s  adherence t o  t h i s  policy.  T h i s  
overly-stereotyped behavior from t h e  Crev 1 model r e s u l t e d  
i n  less v a r i a b i l i t y  w i t h  respect t o  t h e  performance measure& 
i n  Figure 23, thereby  r e s u l t i n g  i n  four  false alarms i n  t h e  
c o n f i g u r a l  tests. 
T h i s  o v e r l y  s t e reo typed  behavior vas caused i n  large 
p a r t  by t h e  h i g h  ve lqh t inq  on t h e  need t o  r e t u r n  loaded 
cargo t o  home base i n  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  of t h e  home a c t i o n  
a f fordance  i n  t h e  model of Crev 1. A large we igh t  vas  
required t o  match Crev 1's performance on t h e  measure of t h e  
average ( l o v )  number of cargo unloaded per t r i p  home by t h e  
f r i e n d l y  craf t  (see be lov) .  Lovering t h i s  ve iqh t  resulted 
i n  cargo process ing  behavior t h a t  was less s t e reo typed  and 
t h e r e f o r e  reso lved  t h e  mismatches on t h e  measures mentioned 
above, b u t  it caused t h e  r o d e l  of Crev 1 t o  unload too  many 
cargo per  t r i p  home by t h e  f r i e n d l y  craf t .  I t  t h e r e f o r e  
appears as i f  Crev 1's cargo 'p rocess ing  behavior could not  
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be adequately simulated by a mechanism that used a single 
pararetar to determine when the friendly craft should be 
sent home to unload cargo. 
Figure 24 on the folloving page indicates the average 
nuaber of cargo unloaded per trip home by the scout and 
friendly craft. The six similarity tests and six configural 
tests pertaining to these performance measures were all 
ratisf led . 
Figure 25 on the next page indicates the average time 
spent idle for the scout and friendly craft. For the scout, 
the similarity tests for Crevs 2 and B and the models of 
Crews 2 and E were not satisfied. These failures are due 
primarily to the difficulties that vtre encountered in 
trying to adequately interpret the craft idleness measure. 
For the crews, idleness was measured in the folloving vay. 
Data were available concerning the posltion of each of the 
craft, including the scout, every 10 seconds. To calculate 
craft i d l e n e s s ,  the number of 10-second i n t e r v a l s  vas 
counted in which a craft aoved less than a threshold 
distance (representing 20 m.p.h). This number was divided 
by the total number of such intervals In the session (179 
intervals). For the scout, the resulting number was used as 
an estimate of the percent of tine that the scout was not 
being actively controlled. This number is a poor estimate 
due to the grain size of the discetization used and the fact 
that scout dynamics alloved the scout to glide an ap- 
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prec iab le  distance even a f t e r  a c t i v e  c o n t r o l  v i a  t h e  
j oys t i ck  was stopped. 
The assumptions employed i n  t h e  s c o u t  manual c o n t r o l  
a c t i o n  mechanisms i n  t h e  models of Crdw 2 and B were 
s impl i f i ed  i n  t h e  fol lowing way. The model of Crew 2, who 
had one crew member dedicated t o  scou t  manual c o n t r o l ,  had 
no p rov i s ions  f o r  less than  active c o n t r o l  of t h e  scout .  
Tha t  is, no reasons were ever  hypothesized t o  assume t h a t  
t h e  Crew 2 p i l o t  was ever  doing anything by c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  
scou t .  Thus,  t h e  scout ,  under c o n t r o l  of t h e  Crew 2 nodel,  
was never a c t u a l l y  i d l e .  I n  order t o  compare Crew 2 and 
model performance on t h i s  measure, then,  t h e  s c o u t  i d l enesh  
measure had t o  be i n t e r p r e t e d  not  as  genuine l a c k  of c o n t r o l  
e f f o r t ,  but  rather a s  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  of t h e  C r e w  2 p i l o t  t o  
maintain acceptable scou t  speed. 
The f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  s c o u t  speed due t o  encounters  w i t h  
world o b j e c t s  (e.9. trees, home base) were not  produced by 
t h e  model due t o  t h e  u s e  of a s i m p l i f i e d  mechanism f o r  s cou t  
locomotion. Therefore,  t h e  scou t  c o n t r o l  behavior produced 
by t h e  model could not  be tested against  t h e  idleness 
measure used t o  analyze crew performance. On t h e  o the r  
hand, i t  was imperat ive t h a t  t h e  amount of s c o u t  motion 
produced by t h e  models of C r e w s  2 and E be c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
t h e  behavior of t h e s e  crews. Therefore,  t h e  average 
d i s t a n c e s  traveled by t h e  s c o u t  per  s e s s i o n  f o r  C r e w s  2 and 
E were measured. C r e w s  2 and E d i d  not  d i f f e r  on t h i s  . 
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measure. For the Crew 2 model, then, the average speed of 
travel.for the scout was calculated under the assumption 
that the pilot was always performing scout motion control. 
This average speed was used as a paraneter In the scout 
action mechanisms, as described in the previous chapter. 
Therefore, the average distance traveled by the scout while 
under control of the Crew 2 model was the same as when the 
scout was under control of Crew 2. 
The Crev B model could not be parameterized in the same 
way since Crew B was not assumed to be able to perform 
continuous scout control due to the need to enter action 
commands for the friendly craft via the text editor: 
Therefore, videotapes were consulted that indicated that, 
when Crew B was performing scout motion control, the 
joystick was typically deflected to the maximum degree 
possible ( 8 0  m.p.h.1. This speed was then used as a 
parameter in the scout action mechanisms. Note, though, 
that the scout in the Crew E model was only moved at this 
speed during the time intervals in which the model was not 
performing control activity related to the friendly craft. 
An analysis of the average distance traveled by the scout 
under control of the Crew E model yielded the same average 
distance as aeasured for Crev E. 
Thus, the actual amount of scout control activity 
exhibited by the models of Crews 2 and B seemed t o  have been 
consistent with control activity exhibited by these crews. 
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The measures of s c o u t  idleness t h a t  appear i n  t h e  previous 
f i g u r e  have been c a l c u l a t e d  w i t h  t h e  sanw measures used f o r  
t h e  crew, al though f o r  reasons  diacussed above, these 
measures are not  ve ry  meaningful. They have only  been 
included t o  m a i n t a i n  cons i s t ency  v i t h  t h e  measures used i n  
Chapter I11 f o r  t h e  analysis of crev performance. 
The i d l eness  measures f o r  t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft i n  Figure 
25, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, are meaningful s i n c e  f r i e n d l y  craft  
locomotion vas  produced i n  t h e  same vay f o r  both t h e  c r e v s  
and t h e  crew models. With respect t o  t h i s  measure, a l l  
tests were sa t i s f ied  except  for t h e  fact  t h a t  t h e  Crev 2 
model produced less i d l e n e s s  than  d id  Crev 2 (188 versuk 
2 5 9 ) .  When t h e  Crev 2 model vas  ad jus ted  t o  produce less 
f r i e n d l y  craf t  idleness by tun ing  t h e  time requi red  t o  
update t h e  perceptua l  mechanisms, t h e  model performed vorsc 
than  Crev 2 on measures d e a l i n g  w i t h  a l t e r c a t i o n s  w i t h  enemy 
craf t  ( t o o  many f r i e n d l y  craf t  vere  l o s t ) .  
T h i s  problem may reflect  a s e r i o u s  d e f i c i e n c y  of t h e  
model. Namely, a l l  perceptua l  mechanisms vere  assumed t o  
r e q u i r e  t h e  same t i n e  f o r  updating, and t h i s  assumption may 
be unreasonable.  A more rea l i s t ic  assumption would be t h a t  
those mechanisms p e r t a i n i n g  t o  lock-ons w i t h  enemy craf t  
migh t  be updated more qu ick ly  t h a n ,  f o r  example, t h e  
mechanisms r e spons ib l e  f o r  detect ing af fordances  a s s o c i a t e d  
v i t h  cargo.  T h i s  difference might  be due t o  t h e  time- 
c r i t i c a l i t y  of r e a c t i n g  t o  encounters  between f r i e n d l y  and 
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eneny craft, and t h e  presence of a n  audio  alarm t h a t  
s igna led  lock-ons. T h i s  problem d i d  not  ar ise  i n  t h e  
process of f i t t i n g  t h e  model t o  Crev 1, s i n c e  t h e  same 
( s l o v )  perceptua l  updating t i n e  vas  c o n s i s t e n t  v i t h  both 
h i g h  measures of craft  id leness  and h i g h  numbers of f r i e n d l y  
craft des t royed .  The problem d i d  no t  s u r f a c e  i n  modeling 
Crev E, since t h e  same ( f a s t )  perceptua l  updat ing time vas 
c o n s i s t e n t  v i t h  both low measure8 of craft  idlene88 and l o w  
numbers of f r i e n d l y  craft destroyed by enemies. 
F igures  26 and 27 on t h e  fol lowing pages i n d i c a t e  t h e  
percentage of mission time s p e n t  above trees by t h e  f r i e n d l y  
c r a f t  and t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  v i t h  vhich t h e  s imulated vo r lh  
vas  searched. The reason f o r  t h e  fa i lures  i n  t h e  a l t i t u d e  
tests vere discussed i n  t h e  previous chapter, where it vas  
noted t h a t  t h e  use of a s i m p l i f i e d  set of a c t i o n  conmands 
f o r  f r i e n d l y  craft  c o n t r o l  would r e q u i r e  t h e  average time 
spen t  above trees f o r  t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft  t o  be i n c o r r e c t .  
For tuna te ly ,  model performance d i d  not  seem t o  diverge from 
c r e v  performance on t h i s  measure t o  a great e x t e n t .  
A l l  t e s t s  vere  s a t i s f i ed  v i t h  respect t o  t h e  amount of 
vo r ld  searched in t o t a l  ( F i g u r e  2 6 ) .  For t h e  amount of 
vo r ld  searched v.i th t h e  s c o u t  and f r i e n d l y  craft  (F igure  
271, t h e  tes t  fa i lures  concern t h e  rode1 f o r  Crev E. Crev B 
searched more of t h e  vor ld  v i t h  t h e  s c o u t  than  d i d  t h e  Crev 
B model ( 6 5 9  versus  5 4 % ) .  Crev E also searched less of t h e  
vo r ld  e x c l u s i v e l y  w i t h  t h e  f r i end ly  c ra f t  than  d i d  t h e  Crev 
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E -8idei . (12% versus  19%) Fina l ly ,  t h e  c o n f i g u r a l  test  
betveen-<he r o d e l s  of Crevs 2 and E r e s u l t e d  i n  a false 
alarm v i t h  respect t o  t h e  measure of t h e  amount of t h e  vorld 
searched v i t h  t h e  f r i e n d l y  c r a f t .  These three t e s t  fa i lures  
appear t o  be symptoms of one d e f i c i e n c y  of t h e  Crev B model. 
The prhary reason f o r  these tes t  r e s u l t s  is t h a t  t h e  
Crev B model searched less of t h e  vor ld  v i t h  t h e  scout  t h a n  
d id  Crev E. T h i s  r e s u l t e d  i n  a greater amount of area 
searched e x c l u s i v e l y  by t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft .  T h i s  r e s u l t  is 
due t o  t h e  fact  t h a t  vhen both t h e  s c o u t  and f r i e n d l y  craft  
have searched the saae reqfon, t h e  measures used above 
credit t h e  scou t ,  rather than  t h e  f r i e n d l y  craft. The 
f r i e n d l y  craf t  measures reflect  only  t h e  area t h a t  vas  
searched e x c l u s i v e l y  by t h e  f r i e n d l y  c ra f t .  Since Crev E 
searched more a r e a  v i t h  t h e  s c o u t  t h a n  d i d  t h e  model, less 
area remained f o r  Crev E t o  p o s s i b l y  search e x c l u s i v e l y  v i t h  
t h e  f r i e n d l y  craf t .  
The pa ths  generated by Crev E and t h e  model vere  
consul ted  t o  i d e n t i f y  why Crev E searched 11% lore  area v i t h  
t h e  scou t  than  d i d  t h e  model. I t  vas  found t h a t ,  i n  four  of 
Crev E ' s  seven s e s s i o n s ,  t h e  s cou t  vas  f lovn  in f o r e s t e d  
reqlon$"ln t h e  l a s t  few minutes of t h e  s e s s i o n .  The model 
provided a good f i t  t o  t h e  area covered by Crew E up t o  t h e  
po in t  a t  which t h e  crew f l e w  t h e  s cou t  d i r ec t ly  i n t o  t h e  
f o r e s t .  The s cou t  path planning model does not  generate 
path8  through f o r e s t e d  reg ions ,  a s  d iscussed  i n  Chap te r  V. 
, 
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One l i k e l y  hypothesis  t h a t  vould e x p l a i n  t h i s  diverg-  
ence betveen model and crev performance is t h a t  t h e  c r e v  vas 
able t o  r eeva lua te  t h e  r e l a t i v e  value of f o r e s t e d  and open 
reg ions  a t  t h e  end of t h e  mission vherea8 t h e  model vas  not  
able t o  perform t h i s  reeva lua t ion .  A t  t h e  po in t  vhere t h e  
model and crev diverged, n e a r l y  a l l  of t h e  peak areas i n  t h e  
search af fordance  Rap (see C h a p t e r  V I  vere  covered. Although 
t h e  r o d e l  inc ludes  a provis ion  t o  avoid backtracking through 
p rev ious ly  searched regions,  it st i l l  vas  not able t o  
* r e a l i z e w  t h a t ,  near t h e  end of the mis8ion, t h e  o n l y  
promising t e r r i t o r y  ye t  unsearched ve re  t h e  f o r e s t e d  
reg ions .  The lov af fordance  f o r  these reg ions  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  
d i f f i c u l t y  i n  locomotion vas able t o  keep t h e  model f r o r  
moving t h e  scou t  i n t o  t h e  f o r e s t s .  O n  t h e  o the r  hand, i t  is 
conceivable  t h a t  Crev E f l e w  t h e  s cou t  i n t o  t h e  f o r e s t s  a t  
t h e  end of t h e  mission because these vexe t h e  only  possible  
r eg ions  v i t h  any search value,  regardless of t h e  decreased 
speed of t r a v e l  t h a t  vould be incur red .  
~ 
I n  t h e  terms of t h e  model c o n s t r u c t s ,  Crev B vas 
po8s ib ly  able t o  r ede f ine  t h e  search va lue  vec to r  t h a t  
determined t h e  r e l a t i v e  vo r th  of t h e  d i f f e r e n t  vor ld  
r eg ions ;  T h i s  vec to r  d e t e r n i n e s  vhich p o i n t s  In  t h e  vor ld  
v i11  have t h e  h i g h e s t  affordance l e v e l s .  The r o d e l  d i d  not  
produce t h i s  behavior because t h e  search va lue  vas pro- 
gramed i n ,  and t h e  model d i d  not have t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  "step 
backw and re -eva lua te  t h e  degree t o  vhich t h i s  vec to r  vas  a n  
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adequate *representation of the search value of world 
regions:- -- Although the theoretical possibility remains that 
Crew E'S paths could be adequately matched by a suitably 
chosen fixed set of search affordance parameters, the 
attempt to find such parameters was unsuccessful. 
The model could be given the ability for re-evaluation 
but this enhancement would be extremely computationally 
intensive. For example, instead of relying upon the static 
affordance maps that were created at the onset of the world 
display, the model could iteratively recalculate this entire 
map each tire it "looked" at the rap display. This recal- 
culation would incorporate knovledge concerning areas that 
had been previously searched. At the end of the mission, 
the peak affordance areas In such a map vould most probably 
be centered in forested regions, and the scout would 
therefore be commanded to these peak areas. Unfortunately, 
about five minutes of computer tire are required to generate 
each map, so it would probably take tens of hours for such a 
model to perform one session given the current computer 
resources. 
.~ 
Conclusions 
Five substanti.- deficiencies f the model were 
identified. With respect to the parameters used to miric 
the behavior of Crew 1, it was found that the Crew 1 model 
may have been to rigid in its application of the serial 
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cargo processing policy. It appeared as if Crev 1 vas not 
as strict in the application of this policy. The serial 
processing policy is then best viewed only as a rough, but 
reasonable approximation of the behavior of Crev 1. This 
deficiency of the model resulted in the failure of four 
configural tests. 
with respect to the deficiencies of the Crev 2 model, 
it vas hypothesized that the assurption that all perceptual 
processors required equal tire to be updated 8ay not have 
been realistic. Rather, it seemed as if certain processors 
had to have been able to produce their affordances faster 
than could other processors. This model deficiency resulted 
in the failure of one similarity test and one configural 
test. 
The Crew E rodel vas hypothesized to be deficient with 
respect to its inability to dynamically reevaluate the 
search related vorld affordances. A potential enhancement 
t o  t h e  rodel t h a t  would overcome this problem was discussed, 
although its inpleaentation would be computationally 
intensive. This model deficiency resulted in the failure of 
tvo similarity tests and one configural test. 
.. 
Thb-uae of a simplified set of friendly craft action 
commands caused differences between the models and the crevs 
vith respect to the average time spent by friendly craft 
above tree level. Unfortunately, no consistent policies for 
cornrand selection could be identified that would allov a 
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mor-e realistic set of action Commands to be employed in the 
model. -- 'This model deficiency resulted in the failure of 
three similarity tests and tvo conflgural tests. 
- 
Finally, the model could not be fairly compared vith 
crew performance concerning idle time for the scout craft. 
The reason for this inabflity vas that the idle time 
calculation required behavioral data at a level lover than 
the level at which the model generated behavior. Thi8 model 
deficiency resulted in the failure of tvo similarity tests. 
In Summary, the model failed on a total of 20 of the 
132 tests. Sixteen of these 20 failures appear to be 
attributable to one of the major model deficiencie8 cited 
above. There is not quatantee, of course, that making the 
recommended enhancements to the model in an attempt to 
eliminate these failures would be S U C C ~ S S ~ U ~ ,  or that the 
enhanced models would not result in failures on a dlfferent 
set of performance measures. 
These statistical tests have only been able to provide 
a measure of the empirical adequacy of the three parameter- 
ized rodels. Thus, the appropriateness of the unparameter- 
ized model, i.e.8 the model as a parametric family of 
specific' models or as set of psychological assumptions, vas 
- .  
not directly assessed. It would seem quite difficult, 
impO8Sibh perhaps, to try to directly evaluate the status 
of these assumptions, since any failures of a fully para- 
meterized model based on them could possibly be due'to an 
247 
ina-ppropriate t r a n s l a t i o n  of t h e  assumptions i n t o  a testable 
model. -This defense,  of course,  vas not  used above i n  a n  
e f f o r t  t o  defend t h e  model, rather, t h e  model fa i lures  
provided some valuable  and d iagnos t ic  information concerning 
t h e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  of a few modeling assumptions. 
Credi t ,  though, might be given t o  t h e  gene ra l  Bodeling 
framevork due t o  t h e  fact  t h a t  it a l loved  f o r  a reasonably 
simple d e s c r i p t i o n  of inter-crev d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  term of t h e  
model parameters described i n  t h e  previous chapter .  The 
s impl ic i ty  t h a t  is being suggested is not  intended t o  be a 
r e f l e c t i o n  of t h e  number of parameters t h a t  were r equ i r ed .  
Rather, t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  of crev d i f f e r e n c e s  wa8 economical 
due t o  t h e  fact  t h a t  a set of independent, r e l a t i v e l y  slow- 
leve l" ,  parameters could be i d e n t i f i e d  f o r  each c rev  t h a t  
were capable, v i a  t h e  nodal aechanisms, t o  generate t h e  
complex, nhiqh-level",  behavioral  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  
crews . 
For example, i t  appears as i f  Crew E's a b i l i t y ,  as a 
one-person crew, t o  perform a t  t h e  l e v e l  of Crew 2, a two- 
person crew, can i n  large p a r t  be accounted f o r  by t h e  
s imple fact  t h a t  C r e w  E could f l y  t h e  s cou t ,  e n t e r  f r i e n d l y  
c r a f t  commands, and pe rcep tua l ly  i d e n t i f y  task af fordances  
s l i g h t l y  faster t h a n  c o u l d  Crev 2 .  These  r e s u l t s  may not  be 
t o o  s u r p r i s i n g  given t h e  assumptions of t h e  modeling 
approach d iscussed  i n  Chapter I V .  The o f f e r e d  v i s v  o f  
skilled performance vas  t h a t ,  once t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  per- 
248 
cegtual 'and action mechanisms are in place, skilled perform- 
ance even' in complex tasks can be characterized as primarily 
as perceptual-response in nature. The wintelligencew in 
such processing was argued to be not so much a property of 
the human's real-time information processing, but rather as 
a property of the design of the mechanism8 responsible for 
that processing. The fact that Crew E ' s  ability to perform 
at the level of Crew 2 could be attributed to parameter 
differences entirely within the domains of perception and 
action is consistent with these views. Specifically, if 
skilled ptocessinq relies increasingly upon (albeit complex) 
perceptual and action mechanisms, the obvious place to look 
for performance liaitinq constraints is the perceptual and 
action domains. 
If the performance limitations of the perceptual and 
action mechanisms cannot, on the other hand, account for all 
human performance limitations (as they could not for Crew 
1 1 ,  the next most obvious place to look is in the desiqn of 
the perceptual and action mechanisms themselves. As opposed 
to the mechanisms' performance characteristics, their design 
characteristics do not reflect limitations on the rate with 
vhich t h e  mechanlsas operate. Rather, the desiqn character- 
- .  
istics are concerned with the appropriateness of the higher- 
level strategies that the mechanisms can be described as 
iaplerentinq. 
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- - T h e  aos t  c r i t i ca l  vay i n  vhich des ign  flaws i n  these 
mechani8aB can y ie ld  sub-optimal performance 1 s  by t h e i r  not  
being a t tuned  t o  t h e  appropr i a t e  set  of concerns.  Thus ,  t h e  
crev 1 model was not  on ly  less e f f i c i e n t  i n  t h e  perceptua l  
and a c t i o n  d o w i n 8  t h a n  t h e  o the r  t v o  models, t h i s  model vas 
a t tuned  t o  a d i f f e r e n t  set of vorld a f fordances  than t h e  
o the r  t v o  models. The s e l e c t i o n  of a c t i o n  based on these 
af fordances  i n  t h e  Crev 1 model vas, i n  t u rn ,  less vel1 
a l igned  w i t h  t h e  task goa l s  t h a n  it vas  i n  t h e  o the r  t v o  
models . The assumptions of t h e  modeling framework vould 
suggest t h a t  t h e  attempt t o  i d e n t i f y  vhy Crev 1 a i g h t  have 
been sub-optimal i n  t h i s  regard vould have t o  t a k e  i n t o  
account t h e  historical  fo rces  i n  t h e  previous task exper- 
ience of Crev 1 t h a t  led t o  t h e  development of t h e  inap- 
p r o p r i a t e  perceptua l  and a c t i o n  mechan i s i s .  Such an  a n a l y s i s  
is beyond t h e  scope of t h e  p re sen t  vork. 
- .  
_* t 
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CHAPTER V I 1 1  
CONCLUSIONS 
The research products selected to be presented here as 
conclusions are those vith best chance of applying to 
skilled huran performance in a vide range of task environ- 
ments. These findings are intended to apply to skilled 
huran behavior in perceptually rich dorains that require the 
selection and execution of actions. The conclusions are 
also relevant to the assessment of alternative modeling 
approaches that were not specifically designed to describe 
cognition in such domains, but are nevertheless contended to 
serve as general purpose models of cognitive processing. 
It is clear that t h e  modeling framework used here falls 
far short of being an adequate theory of the organization of 
human perception, cognition, and action underlying skilled 
performance. This fact is true quite independently of any 
evidence provided for or against this framework in the 
erpirical portions of this research. Due in part to its 
rough qualitative form, it is not even clear what data could 
serve to falsify its major assuaptions, since any such 
failure could be due to an inappropriate translation of the 
qualitative claims into empirically testable hypotheses. 
2 5 1  
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Even worse, its intended domain of applicability is so broad 
that the framework cannot be easily made to apply to any 
concrete task environment without careful study of the 
perceptually available information and the human's cap- 
abilities for action in that environment. On the other 
hand, the framework has provided a way of structuring the 
approach for investigating a rather complex phenomenon, and 
this purely pragmatic benefit iq perhaps the research 
product vith the best hope for applicability beyond the 
artificlal laboratory task environment studied here. 
One major assumption of t h e  p r e s e n t  approach is t h a t  
much of the information processing work underlying skillea 
human performance can be performed by task-specific per- 
ceptual mechaniims that are sensitive to those aspects of 
the task environment that are highly relevant for the task 
of action selection. Using the terminology of ecological 
theories, the perceptual mechanisms have been described as 
mechanisms that are attuned to environmental affordances. 
These affordances are relationships between features of the 
task environment and the human's capabilities for action. 
Ecological terminology was used primarily to suggest that 
the assuaed functional role of perception is to rapidly 
provide information that is high relevant to the task of 
action selection, given that the context in which perception 
occurs is compatible vith this style of processing. 
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One glaring hole in the proposed framework is a lack of 
a specification of the properties of an environmental 
context that determine whether or not that context will 
support parallel processing. The clarification of this 
single issue is the subject of a large body of psychological 
research (e.g.8 Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977; Treisran and 
Gelade, 1980; Bgeth and Jonides, 1972; Fisher, 1982). The 
research of Shiffrin and Schneider has focused on the 
primary role that consistency o f  training plays on the 
development of parallel processing, or automaticity. 
Trelsran and Gelade's work, on the other hand, has focused 
primarily on the features of the stimulus display that 
either promote or disallow parallel processing. At this 
point, it is probably prudent to conclude that both training 
and contextual factors are relevant to the development of 
parallel processing. 
To cloud the issue even further, the proposed framevork 
can be interpreted in a way that does not even require 
perceptual processing to be parallel. The major requirement 
that has been rade here is that the perceptual processing 
underlying expertise is rapid, and does not require multiple 
dinensions of information to be overtly and effortfully 
integrated. In some situations, this condition can be ret 
without the assumption of parallellsr. Rather, this type of 
rapid perceptual processing is compatible with the as- 
surption that the perceptual systers mature by becoming 
254 
attuned to the most diagnostic features of an information 
array. - 
Specifically, the perceptual mechanisms might be 
assumed to become sensitive to the minimal set of features 
that can be used to distinguish between relevant affordance- 
related situations. Two complex situations, even ones of 
very high dimensionality, may yet be distinguishable by 
their value along only one of the information dimensions. 
Under this interpretation, a complex situation is not 
recognized quickly due to the fact that a complex array of 
inforration is processed in parallel. Rather it is recog- 
nized quickly because it is the only relevant situation that 
has a particular value along one of its many information 
dimensions. Here, the focus would be placed on how an 
expert's perceptual systems can exploit environments of high 
redundancy, rather than how their perceptual systems night 
process large arrays of information in parallel. This 
latter interpretation is particularly attractive in that it 
would be consistent with the assumption that the amount of 
"rav" information processed by perceptual systems remains 
invariant over experience level, but the expert's perceptual 
systems produce more relevant information due to their 
sensitivity to only the most diagnostic information present 
in the visual environment. 
If the proposed view of the role played by perception in 
expertise is subsequently found to be tenable, the following 
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implications for psychological modeling would result. 
First, the present view would encourage a holistic 
approach to the study of the perceptual, central, and action 
mechanisms underlying expertise. Before modeling central 
mechanisms, for example, careful attention vould have to be 
paid to identifying the information that the perceptual 
system is capable of providing to presumably simplify the 
t a s k  of action selection. It is a widely held principle in 
artificial intelligence that finding a beneficial probler 
representation can simplify the processes that manipulate 
that representation to find solutions. In short, an aouncea 
of representation is vorth a "pound" of search. Perceptual 
systems can be descrlbed .as the mechanisms that construct 
the problem representation used by the central systems. 
Ignorance of hov the perceptual systems might simplify an 
information processing task by constructing an effective 
problem representation might result in models of central 
processing that are more complex than necessary. 
Consideration, on the other hand, of hov perceptual 
system night construct easily usable representations may 
suggest simpler accounts of central mechanisms. This vas 
the approach used here, and it allowed for a rather simple 
central mechanism to perform most action selection tasks, 
including planning and coordination tasks that seem to be 
suggestive of central processing of some complexity. In 
computer science terminology, the distinction between 
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decision-making, planning, and coordination in the present 
model is a data, rather than process, distinction. That is, 
a unitary central process produces all three types of 
behavior; the type produced is determined by the data (the 
affordances) upon which the central BeChani88 operates. 
Perhaps the assumption that the model and human used the 
%amcw type of central processing is not crucial to the 
present argument. Rather, what would seem to be important 
1s that the modeling effort demonstrates that the assumption 
of simple central processing mechanisms in not Inconsistent 
with the existence of complex human behavior. 
Thus, the holistic approach vould dictate that modeling 
of central processing should not proceed in ignorance of the 
fundamental role of perceptual mechanisms as representation 
builders. Similarly, the holistic approach would also 
suggest that mode'ling of perceptual processing should be 
influenced by those processes that exist "behind" per- 
ception. That is, instead of viewing perceptual system as 
mechanisms that simply provide neutral descriptions of the 
environmental state of affairs, the role of action-oriented 
perception would be emphasized. While it may be useful (and 
perhaps necessary) to view some mechanisms of perception as 
being geared to providing a faithful picture of the external 
world, this research vould suggest that perception can do 
nuch more. Rather than serving the benign role as a data 
gatherlng agent for the intelligent central systems, the 
. 
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perceptual systems can be vieved as intelligent mechanisms 
in their own right (Runeson, 1977). They operate intel- 
ligently by providing information that is highly relevant 
for the task of action selection, in a way analoqous to an 
experienced secretary who right aid an executive by inte- 
grating knovledge of the executive's activities with the 
deluge of incoming messages, requests, and reports. 
If found adequate, the proposed framevork would 
therefore encourage an approach to investigating and 
modeling cognitive phenomena that views the perceptual, 
central, and action systems as tightly coupled. Note that 
this does not imply that these distinct systems cannot be 
decomposed for modeling purposes. But it has been suggested 
that the boundary lines that are drawn to reflect the 
decomposition may shift as a function of the experience 
level of the person being modeled. That is, an additional 
assumption of the proposed framework 1s that one of the 
primary psychological changes involved In skill development 
1s a shift to a greater reliance on the perceptual systems, 
with a commensurate lessening of the burdens on the central 
system. 
It 1s interesting to observe that a shift to a greater 
reliance on perceptual systems would appear to have benefits 
associated with reduced memory demands. As discussed above, 
a neglect of perceptual systems when describing central 
systems can result in solution techniques that are overly 
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complex. $or example, Simon ( 1 9 7 5 )  shows how the use of a 
perceptual strategy to perform the Tover of Hanoi problem 
can reduce the complexity of problem solving processes. In 
situations vhere possible perceptually-based solutions are 
ignored, though, the resulting "blind" models typically have 
another, yet related, undesirable feature. These models 
often require a large, often verbally represented, internal 
vorld representation (e.g., Winograd's (1972) SHRDLU 
program) A tremendous amount of logical reasoning and 
world knowledge are typically required in order to keep this 
representation internally consistent and externally valid 
(e.g., the "frame problem"). A sighted person, on the othct 
hand, can look and see the effects of his actions, can see 
the progression of events due to other causal agents, and 
can thereby avoid much of the effort and many of the dangers 
associated vith substituting a verbal representation of the 
vorld for the world itself. 
The proposed approach, of course, is not intended to 
represent a general solution to the frame problem, or other 
problem8 associated vith truth maintenance. Rather, what is 
suggested is that such problems might be largely irrelevant 
to the task of developing models of the cognitive processes 
characteristic of highly skilled behavior in perceptually 
rich task domains. Psychological processes might have a 
tendency to, where possible, substitute perceptual inference 
performed by searching the environment for logical inference 
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performed by searching through verbal descriptions, or 
representations of the environment. 
Due to the model's heavy reliance upon perceptual 
inference rather than logical inference, the current work 
encourages a view of representations as tightly coupled to 
the active processes of perception. This approach to 
specifying the nature of representations is in contrast to 
vieving representations as passive data structures that lie 
. doraant waiting to be "aatchad" with features in the vorld. 
For example, the model's internal representation (the 
dynamic set of affordances) might be described as being 
nvolatllem. This term is meant to express the fact that the 
model's internal representation is dynamically reconstructed 
each time the model mlooksn at the world display. The rode1 
does possess, of course, non-perceptual knowledge of world 
dynamics that it uses to create these affordances. This 
knowledge, though, is embodied in the constructive processes 
that generate the model's internal representation and should 
not be confused with the information that constitutes the 
modal's representation at any point in time. This view of 
representations as objects that are dynamically constructed 
from perceptual information also serves to emphasize the 
important role the environment can serve as an external 
memory store. 
To rake these claims more concrete, perhaps it 1s beat 
to see how the proposed fraaework might be applied for 
260 
describing perceptual and cognitive processes in a more 
familiar domain. Empirical results concerning the behavior 
of expert chess players were cited in Chapter IV in order to 
motivate the present approach. One relevant finding was 
that chess experts were better able to construct meaningful 
board configurations from memory than were players with less 
chess proficiency. A meaningful configuration was one that 
might naturally occur in a chess match between skilled 
opponents. On the other hand, when configurations were 
comprised of pieces placed in arbitrary or unnatural 
positions, experts vere found to be no better than the less 
experienced players at reconstructing these configurations 
from memory (Chase and Simon, 1973) The interpretation that 
was given for this result was that experts possessed 
superior pre-stored knowledge in the form of "chunked" chess 
positions that could be retrieved from long-term memory and 
rapidly deployed to encode the board position. Simon and 
Gilmartin (1973) have suggested that expert players may have 
accumulated about 50,000 such knowledge chunks. 
Simon's interpretation of these empirical results does 
not, though, yield a natural account of DeGroot's (1965) 
observation that, for an expert, only a fev candidate moves 
ever even mcome to mind", and Dreyfus' (1979) observation 
that what sets an expert chess player apart is his ability 
to "zero-in" on the most important information. Simon might 
suggest, though, that some unspecified pattern matching 
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process could be used to retrieve the appropriate chunks 
from long-term memory, and the activated chunks either are, 
or deteraine what, inforaation comes to mind. Predicting 
what information the expert will zero-in on in a given 
situation could presuaably be accoaplished with knowledge of 
the set of chunks possessed by the expert. 
A different interpretation of these findings can be 
given based on the modeling framework proposed in this 
research. This interpretation is incoapatible with Simon's 
hypothesis that chess expertise is due in large part to the 
accumulation of chunked board configurations in long-term 
memory. Rather, the proposed interpretation is that much o€ 
the HknovledgeH that chess experts have is literally in how 
they look at the board. This knowledge does not consist in 
stored patterns residing i n  long-term memory that must be 
matched with perceptual input, but in an array of chess- 
specific perceptual mechanisas that are sensitive to various 
features of the board configuration. Under this interpretat- 
ion, chess knowledge does not passively reside as a set of 
representations, or data structures, within the chess 
expert. Rather, chess knowledge could be described as the 
functional ability of the player's chess-specific perceptual 
systems to dynamically construct highly relevant information 
from board positions, whether actual or internally imaged. 
The perceptual mechanisms are assumed to process the 
board configuration rapidly, and, to some extent in paral- 
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lel. These mechanisms are assumed to be attuned to the 
affordances in the board configuration. The affordances are 
the features of the board that are highly relevant for the 
selection of a move or series of moves. The player would 
presumably also be sensitive to his opponent's action 
affordances. 
These hypotheses can be made more specific by reference 
to the model discussed in the previous chapters for describ- 
ing behavior in the laboratory task. As in the perceptual 
mechanisms used for describing scout and friendly vaypoint 
selection, it could be assumed that the chess expert uses a 
set of mechanisms that are each attuned to a different 
action-oriented feature of the task environment. For the 
waypoint selection model, these features were sensitive to 
world information relating to the search, locomotion, 
collision, and fuel-range affordances of world locations. 
For a chess model, the relevant affordances might relate to 
opportunities for center control, castling, mating, and the 
execution of various standard attacks and defenses. Each 
such mechanism might produce an independent mapping of the 
board that differentiates the board configuration to produce 
a scalar valued affordance map. As in the waypoint selec- 
tion model, these maps could then be superimposed to 
identify moves or complex actions that have high affordance 
values on many of the affordance dimensions. There is 
nothing in the proposed framework that would suggest that it 
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would be easy to rationally reconstruct the "computations" 
perforred by these perceptual mechanisms in the format of 
algorithms. 
To make the behavior of such a model consistent with 
the empirical claims made above concerning chess expertise, 
two additional assumptions would have to be introduced. The 
first concerns hypothesizing what it would mean for a move 
to "come to rind" in this model. A natural assurption vould 
be to identify "coming to rind" with the process of passing 
the most highly afforded actions to the selection, or 
central, systems. In the waypoint selection rodel, the 
peaks and ridges in the final affordance map vera passed to 
the selection mechanism for further processing. BY a 
process of search and evaluation, one of these candidate 
waypoints was selected to be the next craft waypoint. This 
search process evaluated the candidate waypoints by intro- 
ducing additional evaluative criteria to which the per- 
ceptual mechanisms were not sensitive. The evaluation of 
these additional criteria, concerning fuel maintenance and 
backtracking avoidance, could possibly have been performed 
in a perceptual node by human crevs, although perceptual 
mechanisms sensitive to these criteria could not be con- 
structed in this research. 
In a vay similar to the waypoint selection ~odtl, the 
moves that could be described as coring to mind in the chess 
model would be those with the highest overall affordance 
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value based on the outputs of perceptual processing. These 
moves vould be submitted to the central systems to be 
analyzed in more detail to determine the appropriate course 
of action. This analysis would, as in the vaypoint sclec- 
tion model, incorporate evaluative criteria to which the 
perceptual mechanisms were not sensitive, due either to 
insufficient maturity on the part of the perceptual mechan- 
isms, or the fact that the evaluation of certain criteria is 
incompatible with a perceptual processing mode. In the case 
of immature perceptual mechanisms, the final affordance map 
may be "flatter", or not as differentiated as the map 
produced by mature mechanisms. Depending on an assumption 
concerning a threshold affordance value that determines 
which moves come to mind, the central mechanisms of a model 
incorporating such a flat map may either be flooded with 
options to be evaluated, or it may not "see" many appro- 
pr late moves. 
Of course, another interpretation of unskilled chess 
behavior would be that the affordance map used by such 
players nay be as differentiated as an expert's nap, but the 
map does not capture the appropriate set of action afford- 
ances. For example, a less skilled player may not be 
sensitive to, for example, certain types of attacks or the 
value of center control. In such a' case, the candidate set 
of moves submitted to the central systems for further review 
might be distinct from the candidate set of moves considered 
265 
by the expert. A model based on this assumption would 
"focus-in", but it would focus-in on the wrong information. 
To describe to superior ability of chess experts to 
reconstruct meaningful board positions, a memory-related 
assumption would be required. One possible assumption would 
be that board configurations are memorable to the extent 
that the affordancc maps that are generated from then are 
highly differentiated or articulated. Perhaps the peaks or 
ridges in the map permit a chunking of information that 
enhances memorability. A less experienced chess player, 
with a flatter affordance map, would either lack or have 
less well articulated chunks than the expert. In the case 
of meaningless board configurations, neither the expert or 
non-expert would be expected to possess a highly differ- 
entiated map, since the normal patterns and "lines of force" 
to which the perceptual systems are sensitive would be 
lack ing . Therefore, the expert's superiority in board 
reconstruction would be negated. 
Hopefully, this appllcation of the modeling framework 
to chess playing has helped to communicate the assumptions 
of the proposed approach. While this is far from being a 
complete node1 of human chess playing, it is hoped that this 
exerclse has suggested that the modeling framework could be 
applied to describe perception and cognition in tasks that 
seem to require more than nsisaplyn perceptual-motor skill. 
Perhaps more importantly, this application has helped to 
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illustrate the vast array of issues left unaddressed within 
the prqposed modeling framevork, as assumptions had to be 
continually added to produce a model in agreement with the 
observable evidence. Whether the modeling framevork can be 
enhanced to provide a substantial theory of expertise, even 
in restricted task environments, and whether such a theory 
could survive empirical test, are questions still to be 
addressed. 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBJECTS 
I. Displays 
A .  Horizontal Map 
1 .- 
2 .  
3 .  
Terrain - The horizontal map depicts a 100 square mile 
(10 mile x 10 mile) overview of the entire area accessi- 
ble to the helicopters. If either ownship or any friend- 
ly craft exceeds the boundaries of this world, they will 
immediately be destroyed. There are three types of ter- 
rain: 
a. Open ground is represented as brovn regions on thi 
map. 
b. Lightly forested terrain is represented as light 
green regions on the map. 
c. Heavily forested terrain is represented as dark green 
regions on the map. 
The speed of the four friendly craft and the average 
speed of the ownship in automatic mode will progress from 
fastest to slowest in the following manner: above tree 
height or in open ground (fastest); in lightly forested 
terrain; in heavily forested terrain (slowest). The 
probability of being locked onto by enemy radar will a l s o  
decrease in a similar manner from above tree height or 
open terrain (most vulnerable) to heavy forest (least 
vulnerable 1 .  
Home Base - Home base is represented as a white circle on 
the horizontal map. Upon reaching this region, friendly 
craft and the ownship may be unloaded, repaired, refu- 
eled, and resupplied vith missiles. 
Scout Helicopter or Ovnship (FO) - The helicopter under 
your direct control is represented as a blue circle with 
the number zero. Your direction of motion is indicated 
by a small blue dot on the forward edge of the larger 
circle. 
2 7 3  
2 7 4  
4. Friendly Craft (Fl, F2, F3, F4) - Four friendly craft 
under your command are represented as four blue circles 
vith the numbers 1 through 4. Their direction of motion 
is indicated in the same manner as for ovnship. 
5 .  Enemies - In the "vorld" in which you will operate there 
are at least four stationary enemies represented as yel- 
lov circles, at least four slov moving enemy tanks repre- 
sented as orange circles, and at least four fast moving 
enemy helicopters represented as red circles. The direc- 
tion of motion of the orange and red enemies is repre- 
sented in the same manner as for the ovnship. These en- 
emies will not be visible on the horizontal map until 
they are detected by ovnship or by friendly craft (see 
details belov). 
6. Cargo - There are at least eight pieces of cargo in the 
"vorld" that are represented as gray circles on the map 
display, each vith a numerical identifier superimposed on 
it. The cargo vi11 not appear on the map until they are 
each discovered by the scout or friendly radar (see belov 
for details). 
7. Crosshairs - A pair of crosshairs is represented as a 
black cross on the map display. The position of the 
cross is controlled by the tvo-dimensional joystick to 
the right of the horizontal map display. This cross is 
used to specify navigational vaypoints for friendly craft 
and for ovnship in the automatic horizontal control mode. 
B. Text Display 
This display is used to create and modify lists of goals 
and actions for the four friendly craft. (See belov) 
C. Forvard Looking Display 
This display presents a view of the terrain immediately 
in front of the ovnship, vith the maximum vieving distance 
equal to approximately 0.40 miles. Ground is represented in 
brovn, trees are represented in green, and the sky is light 
blue. Enemies vi11 appear as yellov, orange, or red circles. 
Cargo will appear as gray circles. Friendly craft vi11 ap- 
pear as blue circles. In the upper right corner of the dis- 
play is a heading indicator, shoving the direction (north, 
east, south, vest) the ovnship is pointed. The Forvard Look- 
ing Display should be monitored so as to avoid collisions 
between the scout and either trees or frie.ndly craft. Scout 
collision vi11 result in its destruction and the termination 
of the session. 
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D. 
1. 
2 .  
Status Display 
The status display is immediately above the forward 
looking display and contains the following information: 
Goal Lists - A list of the top (first) four goals and 
their associated actions for each friendly craft appears 
at the top of the display. These lists are modified by 
means of the text display and keyboard. (See below for 
details. 1 
Flight Hanagement Information 
a. Fuel - Ownship and friendly ships will have a full 
load of fuel at the beginning of a mission. Rate of 
fuel expenditure will be increased by four multipli- 
cative factors: 
1. 
2 .  
3 .  
4 .  
Use of automatic horizontal control will increase 
the fuel expenditure rate by 100 % for the own- 
ship. 
Going at higher velocities will increase the fuel 
expenditure rate up to 100 % for maximum veloci- 
ty 9 
Carrying greater cargo weight will increase the 
fuel expenditure rate up to 100 % for the maximum 
possible weight. 
Each time a craft is hit by enemy fire and dam- 
aged, the fuel expenditure rate increases by 25 % 
up to the maximum of 100 % for four hits. 
The combination of these factors can vary the 
rate of fuel consumption by a factor of 8 for friend- 
ly craft; 16 for the ownship. 
Fuel can be replenished by returning to home 
base. If the ownship or any friendly ship has less 
than one-quarter tank of fuel, a warning will appear 
in the message area, first when the one-quarter mark 
has been reached, then periodically after until ei- 
ther that ship's fuel has been replenished or the 
ship runs out of fuel entirely. If ownship or any 
friendly craft runs out of fuel away from home base, 
that craft is no longer operable, except for unload- 
ing its cargo. 
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b.  Missiles - Ownship and f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  w i l l  have  f i v e  
missiles a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  a m i s s i o n .  One missile 
;is f i r e d  by  a f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  d u r i n g  a n  a t tack ( A )  ac- 
t i o n ,  and  one  missile is f i r e d  by  t h e  ownship  e a c h  
time t h e  t r i g g e r  on t h e  3 -d imens iona l  c o n t r o l  is 
p r e s s e d  (see below f o r  d e t a i l s ) .  I f  a f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  
is ordered t o  a t tack a n d  i t  h a s  no r e m a i n i n g  m i s -  
s i les ,  t h e  a t t a c k  a c t i o n  w i l l  n o t  t a k e  p l a c e ,  and  a 
w a r n i n g  w i l l  a p p e a r  i n  t h e  message area. Missiles 
can be  r e p l e n i s h e d  b y  r e t u r n i n g  t o  home b a s e .  
c. Weight  - The  w e i g h t  of  o v n s h i p  and  e a c h  of  t h e  f r i -  
e n d l y  c r a f t  d e p e n d s  on t h e  number o f  r e m a i n i n g  mis- 
s i l e s  a n d  t h e  amount of  cargo t h a t  h a s  been  loaded 
i n t o  t h e  s h i p .  Each missile we ighs  1 0 0  pounds.  The 
combined w e i g h t  of  c a r g o  and  missiles c a n n o t  exceed 
1 , 0 0 0  pounds .  I f  a f r i e n d l y  s h i p  or  ownsh ip  t r ies  t o  
l o a d  a p i e c e  of  cargo t h a t  would e x c e e d  t h i s  w e i g h t  
l i m i t a t i o n ,  t h e  l o a d  a c t i o n  w i l l  n o t  be  e x e c u t e d ,  and  
a warning will appear in the message area. Weight 
c a n  be decreased by  u n l o a d i n g  c a r g o  a n d  by j e t t i s o n -  
i n g  missiles. 
d .  Damage Count  - Each t i m e . o w n s h i p  o r  f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  is 
h i t  by enemy f i r e ,  t h e r e  is a 6 0  % c h a n c e  t h e  c r a f t  
w i l l  be  d e s t r o y e d .  I f  t h e  c r a f t  is n o t  d e s t r o y e d ,  
t h e  damage c o u n t  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  by o n e .  I f  t h e  damage 
c o u n t  reaches f i v e ,  t h e  c r a f t  w i l l  a l s o  be  d e s t r o y e d .  
Damage c a n  be r e p a i r e d  by  r e t u r n i n g  t o  home b a s e .  
e .  Ground Speed - Ground s p e e d  r a n g e s  f rom 0 t o  8 0  miles 
p e r  hour  i n  manual mode, and  0 t o  60 miles p e r  hour  
i n  a u t o m a t i c  h o r i z o n t a l  mode. The r a t e  of  f u e l  ex- 
p e n d i t u r e  i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  ground s p e e d .  The maximum 
s p e e d  f o r  a n y  f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  w i l l  decrease by  1 0  
miles p e r  hour  f o r  each i n c r e m e n t  i n  i ts damage 
c o u n t .  
f .  A l t i t u d e  - A l t i t u d e  r a n g e s  from 0 t o  2 0 0  f e e t .  Zero  
a l t i t u d e  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  ground l e v e l .  I n  manual 
v e r t i c a l  mode, i f  t h e  ownship  r e a c h e s  0 a l t i t u d e  a t  a 
d e s c e n d i n g  v e r t i c a l  v e l o c i t y  of greater t h a n  25 
f e e t / s e c o n d ,  t h e  ownship  w i l l  c r a s h  a n d  b e  d e s t r o y e d .  
Tree l e v e l  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  9 0  f e e t .  Above t h i s  a l t i -  
t u d e ,  ownship  and  f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  c a n  t r a v e l  w i t h  t h e  
same ease as  i n  t h e  open  ground a rea .  
g.  Vert ical  Rate - Ver t i ca l  r a t e  var ies  f rom - 4 0  
f e e t / s e c o n d  ( d e s c e n d i n g )  t o  t 4 0  f e e t / s e c o n d  ( a s c e n d -  
i n g ) .  
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h. 
i. 
j .  
Mode Indicators - The ownship's presently operating 
horizontal control mode (manual, automatic without 
;pathfinder, automatic with pathfinder) and presently 
operating vertical control mode (manual, automatic) 
are indicated. (See below for details). 
Points - Your overall goal is to accumulate as many 
mission points as possible over each 30 minute mis- 
sion. Points are awarded for delivering cargo to 
home base and destroying enemy craft. Points are de- 
ducted from current totals for losing any craft (in- 
cluding ownship) or for having a craft run out of 
fuel. 
Time Remaining - Each mission will last 30 minutes. 
The remaining number of minutes are indicated on the 
status display. 
3. Message Area - Warnings and error messages will appear i n  
this area under the following conditions: 
a. Any friendly craft or ownship is locked onto by enemy 
radar. The ownship or friendly craft symbol on the 
horizontal display will also begin to blink on and 
off to indicate that it is locked onto. 
If ownship or a friendly craft is vithin .40 
miles of an enemy, or, for the ownship, 1.5 miles 
while above tree level, then the probability of a 
lock-on during each one second interval is: 
1. 0.8 in open ground or above tree level 
2 .  0 . 6  - 0 . 8  in light forest depending on altitude. 
.The probability of a lock-on increases with alti- 
tude. 
3 .  0.1 - 0.8 in dense forest, again depending on al- 
titude. 
Once a lock-on occurs, the enemy craft will 
begin moving tovard the ownship or friendly craft. 
If the enemy is not the currently active goal for the 
friendly craft that is locked onto (see below for ex- 
planation), the friendly craft will automatically 
begin an escape maneuver, and the goal on which the 
friendly craft was working will be suspended. If  the 
, 
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enemy is t h e  s p e c i f i e d  g o a l  f o r  t h e  f r i e n d l y  c r a f t ,  
t h e n  t h e  f r i e n d l y  s h i p  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  normal  e x e c u t i o n  
: o f  t h e  g o a l .  Thus,  i f  you v a n t  a f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  t o  
a p p r o a c h  a n  enemy w i t h o u t  r u n n i n g  away, t h e  f r i e n d l y  
c r a f t  must  have  t h e  d e s i r e d  enemy s p e c i f i e d  as i ts  
c u r r e n t  g o a l .  
A lock-on may be b r o k e n  i n  t h e  f o l l o v i n g  ways: 
1. 
2 .  
The d i s t a n c e  be tween t h e  enemy and ownship  o r  
f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  e x c e e d s  .40  miles ( 1 . 5  miles f o r  
t h e  s c o u t  w h i l e  a b o v e  t ree  l e v e l ) .  S i n c e  t h e  en-  
emies' lock -on  r a n g e  var ies  f o r  t h e  s c o u t  depend-  
i n g  on v h e t h e r  i t  is a b o v e  t ree  l e v e l  ( 1 . 5  mile 
lock -on  r a n g e )  o r  belov t r ee  l e v e l  ( 0 . 4 0  mile 
r a n g e ) ,  t h e  s c o u t ,  i f  above  t r ee  l e v e l ,  c a n  break 
any lock -on  of  greater t h a n  0 .40  miles b y  des- 
c e n d i n g  t o  b e l o v  t r e e  l e v e l .  I f  t h i s  d o e s  n o t  
break a lock -on ,  t h i s  means t h a t  t h e  enemy is 
within 0.40 miles of the scout, and other action 
must  be t a k e n  ( f i g h t  o r  f l e e ) .  
I f  ownship  ( l o c k e d  o n t o  a t  less  t h a n  0 . 4  miles) 
o r  a f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  t r a n s i t i o n s  from open  g round  
or  f rom above  t r e e  l e v e l  i n t o  a n y  f o r e s t e d  re- 
g i o n ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  b r e a k i n g  t h e  lock-on  
r a n g e s  from 0 . 2  t o  0 .9  d e p e n d i n g  on a l t i t u d e  
( l o v e r  is b e t t e r )  and  d e n s i t y  of  f o r e s t  ( h e a v y  
f o r e s t  is b e t t e r ) .  
3.  I f  o v n s h i p  o r  a f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  t r a n s i t i o n s  from 
l i g h t  f o r e s t  t o  heavy  f o r e s t ,  t h e r e  is a l s o  a 0 . 2  
t o  0 . 9  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  b r e a k i n g  a lock -on ,  depend-  
i n g  on a l t i t u d e  ( l o v e r  is b e t t e r ) .  
I f  t h e  lock-on  is n o t  b roken  w i t h i n  a var iab le  
p e r i o d  of time (mean is 1 4  s e c o n d s ,  S.D. is 2 sec- 
o n d s ) ,  t h e  enemy v i 1 1  b e g i n  f i r i n g  missiles a t  t h e  
f r i e n d l y  or o v n s h i p  a t  i n t e r v a l s  i n i t i a l l y  e q u a l l i n g  
t h e  lock -on  p e r i o d ,  b u t  d e c r e a s i n g  s l i g h t l y  w i t h  each 
missile f i r e d .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  of  b e i n g  h i t  by  e a c h  
enemy missile d e p e n d s  on t h e  d e n s i t y  o f  t r ee s  and 
d i s t a n c e  from t h e  enemy. I f  o v n s h i p  o r  a f r i e n d l y  
c r a f t  is h i t ,  t h e r e  is a 0.6 p r o b a b i l i t y  of  b e i n g  
d e s t r o y e d .  O t h e r w i s e ,  t h e  h i t  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  
damage c o u n t  i n c r e a s i n g  b y  one .  
b .  Ovnsh ip  o r  a n y  f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  h a s  less  t h a n  
o n e - q u a r t e r  t a n k  of f u e l  r e m a i n i n g .  
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c. A craft attempts to load a piece of cargo and any of 
The ovnship is not at ground level, or a friendly 
is not ttdowntt. 
the following conditions occur: 
1. 
2. There is no cargo within 1/8 mile of the heli- 
copter. 
3. The weight of the cargo will exceed the heli- 
copter's carrying capacity. 
4. The scout is not stationary. 
d.' Any friendly craft is commanded to begin an attack 
action, and it has no remaining missiles (including 
ovnship). 
e. An invalid goal or action has been specified for a 
f. A friendly or ownship attack resulted in the. target 
friendly craft. 
being missed. 
9. An invalid button sequence has been entered. 
h. The pathfinder has failed to find a clear path from 
the scouts present position to the vaypoint specified 
by a Go To. 
i. The Auto/Go To button was pressed vhile the scout vas 
moving too fast for the horizontal automatic mode 
vith the pathfinder to be enabled. 
All messages will be accompanied by an audio alarm to 
alert you to the fact that a message is being displayed. 
Messages remain displayed for approximately 10 seconds, 
then disappear. The disappearance of a message does not 
indicate that the condition that generated the message 
has been resolved. 
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11. Control of Ownship 
A. Horizontal Control 
The pilot will be able to control his craft in either 
manual or automatic mode. The advantage of automatic 
horizontal mode is that it frees the pilot from the 
manual task of tree avoidance. The disadvantage is 
that flight will generally be slower than in the manual 
mode due to dependence on an unsophisticated path finder, 
which is not as skillful as the human pilot. The auto- 
matic horizontal flight mode will also expend more fuel 
per mile traveled. 
1. Automatic Mode (Row of three pushbuttons) 
a. Auto/Go To Pushbutton - Automatic flight to a 
given location will be accomplished by moving 
the crosshairs to the desired location on the 
horizontal map display using the two-dimensional: 
control stick, and the pushing the Auto/Go To 
pushbutton. A string of Go To commands can be 
entered by repeatedly positioning the crosshairs 
and pressinq Auto/Go To. Each successive waypoint 
alonq the ownships' path will appear on the horiz- 
ontal map display as a zero. 
1. If the ownship is stationary when the first Auto/ 
Go To is entered, the helicopter will auto- 
matically proceed toward the postion indicated by 
the crosshairs, avoiding trees in its path. Path 
finding (tree avoidance) will involve only the 
necessary deviations from a straight line between 
ownship's current and specified locations. 
2 .  I f  the ownship is moving at a ground speed of 
greater than approximately 20 mph when the first 
Auto/Go To is entered, the Go To point entered 
will not be accepted, the ship will come to a 
stop, and a message indicating that the scout was 
moving too fast for the pathfinder will be dis- 
played in the message area. This is because the 
ownship must be stopped or moving very slowly for 
the pathfinder to be effectively engaged for the 
initial Go To of a string of such commands. Once 
the ship comes to a stop, a Go To can then be en- 
tered, or the ship can be returned to manual con- 
trol, whichever is desired. 
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3. If the ovnship is above tree height vhen an 
Auto/Go To is entered, the pathfinder vi11 not be 
invoked and the ovnship will fly in a straight 
line to the indicated point. If the ovnship des- 
cends to belov tree height during this flight, no 
automatic tree avoidance vi11 be active as the 
craft continues along its route. If a string of 
Go To's is constructed in vhich the initial Go To 
vas entered while above tree height, then the en- 
tire string of Go To's will be flown without be- 
nefit of the pathfinder, regardless of the alti- 
tude at vhich subsequent Go To's vere entered. 
Thus, each Go To in the string will be treated as 
if it had been entered while the scout vas above 
tree level. 
4. When the craft finishes the last Auto/Go To, it 
will automatically stop. The ovnship will also 
stop automatically for short periods if the path- 
finder is slow in determining a path. There is 
no guarantee that a path can be found to any par- 
ticular point given. If no path is found, a mes- 
sage indicating this fact will be displayed in 
the message area, and the pathfinder vi11 turn 
itself o f f ,  erasing any string of Auto/Go TO'S 
entered after the point it was working tovards. 
The above restrictions for pathfinder initiation 
make it very advisable to check the pathfinder 
status on the status display vhenever the 
horizontal automatic mode is used. 
b. Stop Pushbutton - Pushing this button w i l l  stop hori- 
zontal motion; manual rotation will still be p o s s i -  
ble. If the ovnship is executing a string of Auto/Go 
To commands vhen the Stop Pushbutton is pressed, this 
action vi11 erase that string. 
c. Manual Pushbutton (Horizontal) - Pushing this button 
vi11 activate the horizontal manual control stick, 
and will a l s o  erase any string of Auto/Go To commands 
that may have been entered. 
2 8 2  
2. Manual Mode 
Manual Joystick (Horizontal) - The pilot will use a 
three-axis joystick as a rate controller. Rotation of 
the joystick will control the rate of rotation in the 
horizontal plane. The other two dimensions of the j o y s -  
tick control the direction and horizontal speed of the 
ownship. To move forward, backward, left or right, press 
the stick in the desired movement direction. The farther 
the stick is pushed from its upright resting position, 
the faster will be the the ownship's movement. Returning 
the stick to its upright resting position will cause the 
horizontal movement to stop. Also on this joystick are 
three buttons and a trigger. These are used for perform- 
ing the following actions: left thumb button - LOAD, 
middle thumb button - UNLOAD, right thumb button - JETTI- 
SON, trigger - fire a missile. These actions vi11 be 
described below. 
B. Vertical Control 
The pilot can control the vertical movement of the own- 
ship in either an automatic or manual mode, regard- 
less of which mode is being used for horizontal control. 
1. Automatic Mode (Row of Three Pushbuttons) 
a. Up Pushbutton - When this button is pressed, the own- 
ship will automatically bob-up and maintain a stan- 
dard altitude above tree height. 
b. Down Pushbutton - When this button is pressed, the 
ownship will automatically bob-down and maintain a 
standard altitude below tree heiqht. 
c. Manual Pushbutton (Vertical) - Pushing this button 
will activate the one-dimensional vertical control 
stick for manual vertical control. 
2. Manual Mode 
Manual Control Stick (Vertical) - The pilot will use 
the one-dimensional control stick as a rate controller. 
The control stick will control the ownship's rate of 
change of altitude. Push forward to ascend, and pull 
back to descend. The farther the control is from its 
resting position, the faster the ownship will move. Care 
must be taken when descending, as reaching 0 altitude at 
25 ft/sec or greater will result in the loss of the ovn- 
ship and premature termination of the mission. 
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111. Control of Friendly Craft 
To command the four friendly craft, it is necessary to 
specify a list of goals and the actions needed to ac- 
complish each goal. This is done through the text display 
and keyboard which are activated by the Text Pushbutton 
on the navigator's control panel, or by the Interrupt 
Pushbutton on either the pilot's or navigator's control 
panel. 
Text Pushbutton - Pushing any one of the friendly ship 
identifiers (Fl-F4) followed by the Text Pushbutton 
activates the text display and keyboard. These are used 
to create a new goal list for the specified friendly 
craft or to modify a goal than has not already begun 
execution. 
A. Plans of Action 
1. Goals 
a. E (Enemy) - One goal is to destroy enemies. There 
are a number of enemies scattered over the 100 square 
mile area accessible to the helicopters. These enem- 
ies will not be visible on the horizontal map display 
until the scout helicopter (ownship) is above tree 
level ( > 90 feet) and comes within 1.5 miles of 
them, or until a friendly craft (including the scout 
when it is below tree level) comes within . 4 0  miles 
of them. At these ranges, the scout or friendly 
craft radar will automatically discover the enemies, 
and display them on the horizontal map as yellow, or- 
ange, or red  circles. 
1. Y (Yellow) - One class of enemies are stationary 
and are represented on the horizontal map display 
as yellow circles with a numerical identifier. 
Once discovered, these yellow enemies will remain 
displayed on the horizontal map until they are 
destroyed. When each is destroyed, it will di- 
sappear from the horizontal map, and mission po- 
ints will be awarded. A friendly craft can al- 
ways escape a yellow enemy's lock-on by fleeing 
since they are stationary. 
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2 5  0 (Orange) - A second class of enemies are slow 
moving tanks, vhich are represented on the hori- 
zontal map display as orange circles vith a 
numerical identifier. The direction of motion is 
indicated by a small orange dot on the forvard 
edge of the larger circle. The displayed posi- 
tion of these orange enemies is accurate if they 
are vithin the radar range of the scout (1.5 
miles above tree level, . 4 0  miles below) or vith- 
ing radar ranqe of one of the friendly craft ( . 4 0  
miles). If  the enemies exceed these ranges, an 
approximate linear extrapolation of their move- 
. ment will be displayed for 30 seconds. This ex- 
trapolated position vi11 not be a true reflection 
of enemy craft location, but will be an estimate 
based on the craft's last observed direction and 
speed of motion. The fact that the enemy posi- 
tion displayed on the horizontal map is an extra- 
polation is indicated by the absence of the : 
'nose' or leading dot on the orange enemy symbol. . 
This 'nose' appears vhenever the enemy's position 
is beinq accurately displayed. After the 30 sec- 
ond extrapolation time, the orange symbol will 
disappear from the horizontal map. The orange 
symbol will also disappear i f  the enemy is des- 
troyed, and mission points will be awarded. A 
friendly craft can usually escape the lock-on of 
an orange craft by fleeing since they are slower 
than the friendlies. Exceptions to this are when 
a friendly craft is 'down' in a forested region, 
or when a friendly craft has suffered 3 or 4 
hits, in vhich case the friendly's speed vi11 be 
less than or equal to that of the orange enemy. 
3 .  R (Red) - A third class of enemies are fast mov- 
ing helicopters that are represented as red cir- 
cles vith a numerical identifier. The descrip- 
tion given above for the orange enemies also 
holds for the red enemies. The difference 
betveen the tvo classes of enemies is that the 
red enemies are faster and move more erratically 
than the orange. Thus, the extrapolation esti- 
mates of enemy craft position are less likely to 
be accurate for the red enemies than for the or- 
ange. Red enemies cannot be outrun by friendly 
craft since both have the same maximum speeds. 
As with yellov and orange enemies, however, 
lock-ons can be broken by the other means speci- 
fied on pases 9 - 10. 
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b. 
C. 
d. 
Cz(Cargo) - Another goal is to pick up cargo and re- 
turn them to home base. There are at least eight 
pieces of cargo scattered throughout the 100 square 
mile area accessible to the helicopters. Each piece 
of cargo will not be visible in the horizontal map 
display until the scout helicopter is above tree 
level and comes within 1.5 miles of it, or a friendly 
is above tree level and comes within 0.4 miles of it. 
At these ranges, 'radar' will automatically discover 
the cargo and it will be displayed on the horizontal 
map as a gray circle with a one or two digit numeri- 
cal identifier. Cargo remain displayed until they 
are loaded onto one of the friendly helicopters or 
onto the scout itself. The cargo will vary in 
weight; however, the weight will not be known until 
the cargo is loaded. Mission points vi11 be awarded 
for each piece of cargo that is delivered to home 
base. 
X (Home Base) - Another goal is to return to home 
base to: 
1. Drop off cargo 
2. Replenish fuel and missiles 
3. Repair damaqe to helicopters. 
Home base is represented as a white circle on the 
horizontal map display. 
S (Search) - Another goal is to have the friendly 
ship move about in an attempt to locate enemy craft 
and cargo. I f  a friendly craft comes within 0.40 
miles of an enemy, the enemy will appear on the hori- 
zontal map. I f  a friendly is above tree level (up) 
and comes within 0.40 miles of a cargo, the cargo 
will appear on the horizontal map. Stationary yellow 
enemies will remain displayed until they are des- 
troyed. Mobile orange and red enemies will remain 
displayed until the distance from the nearest friend- 
ly ship exceeds . 4 0  miles, and the distance from the 
ownship exceeds 1.5 miles when above tree level, . 4 0  
miles when below. A linear extrapolation of enemy 
movement will then be displayed for 30 seconds, after 
which the enemy will disappear from the horizontal 
map. 
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2 .  A c t i o n s  
a .  A ( A t t a c k )  - The i n d i c a t e d  f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  a s c e n d s  t o  
above t r ee  l e v e l ,  f i res  one  missile, and  d e s c e n d s  t o  
below t ree  l e v e l .  I f  t h e  f r i e n d l y  h a s  no missiles 
p r i o r  t o  t h e  a t t a c k ,  t h e n  t h e  a c t i o n  w i l l  n o t  be ac- 
c o m p l i s h e d  and  a w a r n i n g  w i l l  a p p e a r  i n  t h e  message 
area.  F r i e n d l i e s  and  t h e  s c o u t  must  be w i t h i n  . 4  
miles o f  a n  enemy t o  have  a c h a n c e  of  s u c c e s s f u l l y  
a t t a c k i n g  a n  enemy. Thus,  f o r  t h e  s c o u t ,  i f  i t  is 
above  t ree  l e v e l  and  is locked o n t o  by  a n  enemy a t  a 
r a n g e  o f  qreater t h a n  0 . 4  miles, a n y  a t t e m p t  t o  a t -  
tack t h e  enemy w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  a m i s s .  I f  a n  enemy is 
v i s i b l e  i n  t h e  f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g  d i s p l a y  of t h e  s c o u t ,  
t h e n  it is c l o s e  enough f o r  t h e  s c o u t  t o  have  a 
c h a n c e  t o  s u c c e s s f u l l y  a t t a c k  it, a l t h o u g h  a n  enemy 
need  n o t  be  v i s i b l e  t o  t h e  s c o u t  ( i . e .  be i n  f r o n t  
of  t h e  s c o u t )  f o r  i t  to be s u c c e s s f u l l y  a t t acked .  
A t t a c k s  c a n  be s u c c e s s f u l ,  i n  which case t h e  e n e m y :  
a t tacked  w i l l  be d e s t r o y e d ,  or t hey  c a n  r e s u l t  i n  a .  
miss, i n  which case t h e  a t t a c k i n g  f r i e n d l y  w i l l  still 
be i n  d a n g e r .  T h e  o n l y  means f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  
c h a n c e  of  a s u c c e s s f u l  a t tack  is t o  get  a s  c l o s e  t o  
t h e  enemy a s  p o s s i b l e  b e f o r e  i n i t i a t i n g  t h e  at tack. 
The p r o b a b i l i t y  of  a s u c c e s s f u l  a t t a c k  by a f r i e n d l y  
d e p e n d s  s o l e l y  upon d i s t a n c e  be tween t h e  f r i e n d l y  and  
t h e  enemy. As p r e v i o u s l y  s t a t e d ,  t h e  d a n g e r  t o  t h e  
f r i e n d l y  of  b e i n g  a t tacked  ( f i r e d  a t )  b y  t h e  enemy 
d e p e n d s  on t h e  t i m e  s i n c e  i t  was f i r s t  l o c k e d  o n t o  by 
t h e  enemy. The d a n g e r  t o  t h e  f r i e n d l y  of  b e i n g  d e s -  
t r o y e d  o n c e  f i r e d  a t  d e p e n d s  on how far  it  is from 
t h e  enemy and  t h e  t y p e  of  t e r r a i n  i n t e r v e n i n g  be tween 
t h e  f r i e n d l y  and  t h e  enemy. 
I t  is i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  i f ,  d u r i n g  a n  a t -  
t a c k  on a n  enemy, t h e  a t t a c k i n g  f r i e n d l y  misses t h e  
enemy w i t h  a miss i le ,  t h e  missi le  c a n  h i t  and  d e s t r o y  
a n y  f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  t h a t  may a l s o  be w i t h i n  r a n g e  of 
t h e  a t t a c k i n g  f r i e n d l y .  So i t  is p o s s i b l e  f o r  one  
f r i e n d l y  t o  d e s t r o y  a n o t h e r  w i t h  a missi le .  
b .  L ( L o a d )  - T h e  i n d i c a t e d  f r i e n d l y  c r a f t  l o a d s  cargo 
i f  t h r e e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a re  met: 
1. T h e  c a r g o  is w i t h i n  1 / 8  mile o f  t h e  h e l i c o p t e r .  
T h i s  w i l l  be  t r u e  i f  t h e  symbol s  f o r  t h e  f r i e n d l y  
c r a f t  and  t h e  c a r g o  o v e r l a p  by  more t h a n  one  h a l f  
on t h e  map d i s p l a y .  
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2% The friendly is "downt' 
3. The additional cargo veight does not exceed the 
helicopterts 1000 pound carrying capacity. 
If either of these conditions are not met, the load 
command will not be accomplished and a warning vi11 
appear in the message area. The goal string must ei- 
ther be fixed or aborted. (Reminder: In addition to 
these conditions, the scout must be stopped to load 
cargo. ) 
e. H (Hover) - The indicated friendly craft- maintains 
current position and altitude. Hovers can be termi- 
nated with S k i p ,  Interrupt, or Abort commands. 
d. U (Unload) - This action causes the indicated friend- 
ly to unload all cargo that it is currently carrying. : 
If the friendly or scout is not at home base vhen the * 
action is executed, then the cargo become available 
for other craft to load, and no points are avarded. 
This could be issued, for example, to reduce veight 
or i f  the friendly has run out of fuel. If  the fri- 
endly or scout is at home base, then mission points 
for the unloaded cargo vi11 be avarded, and the craft 
will be repaired and replenished with fuel and mis- 
siles. Thus, the unload command serves to unload any 
cargo under all circumstances, and also serves to re- 
plenish and repair the craft if it is at home base. 
e. P (Patrol) - The indicated friendly c r a f t  vi11 begin 
a circular flight path. Patrols can be terminated 
with Skip, Interrupt, or Abort commands. 
f. G (Go To) - The indicated friendly ship vi11 travel 
in a straiqht line from its current position to the 
position indicated by the crosshairs on the horizon- 
tal map vhen the G button vas ,pressed. The Go To po- 
sition is indicated on the map display by a black 
number corresponding to the friendly number for vhom 
the Go To was issued. A string of G commands can be 
entered by sequentially positioning the crosshairs at 
the desired waypoints, and pressinq the G button. 
9. J (Jettison) - The indicated friendly craft vi11 jet- 
tison or eject one missile for each J command, pro- 
vided it has one to jettison. This vould serve to 
liqhten the craft. 
, 
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h. A (Up) - The indicated friendly craft goes to an al- 
titude above tree level. 
i. v (Down) - The indicated friendly craft goes to an 
altitude below tree level. 
3. Format - The general format is to specify on each line 
of the text display a goal, followed by a colon, and 
then the desired actions separated by commas. In other 
words, the format of each line is 
qoal:action,action,action,etc. 
a. 
b. 
C. 
E (Enemy) - To enter an enemy as a goal, enter E, 
followed by one of the three color'symbols ( Y ,  0, R), 
and then the appropriate digits to identify the par- 
ticular enemy. These goal identifiers should then be 
followed by a colon and the action list. 
C (Carqo) - To enter a carqo as a qoal, enter C, fol- . 
lowed by a one or tvo digit number to identify the 
particular carqo. These qoal identifiers should then 
be followed by a colon and the action list. 
S (Search) - To enter search as a qoal, enter S, then 
a colon and the action list. Since the search goal 
is relatively unconstrained compared to the enemy, 
carqo and home (see below) qoals, it is useful for 
insertinq actions such as up or down into a goal 
list. For example, if a friendly craft is moving 
slowly throuqh a forested reqion because it is 
"dovn", its goal could be interrupted and the goal 
S:^ 
could be entered. After leaving the editor, the 'up' 
action would automatically be enabled since an inter- 
rupt was used (see below). It would execute, then 
the previous qoal could then be resumed by enabling 
it. 
d. X (Home Base) - To return to home base as a goal, 
enter X ,  then a colon, and then the action list. The 
X goal is different than the others in that it car- 
ries with it an implicit Go To which automatically 
brings the craft to home base. A usual action fol- 
lowing the X qoal is U. All actions entered in a 
home goal list will be executed after the friendly 
has returned home. 
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For example, commanding friendly craft F1 to attack 
red enemy number 6 might be accomplished as follovs: 
- On the navigator's panel press F1 followed by 
Text. 
- On the text keyboard type ER6:G,G,A 
The crosshairs on the horizontal map would be 
carefully positioned before entering each G. 
- Press Verify (See explanation below). 
- If there are no syntax errors, press Exit (See 
explanation below). The goal and actions will 
then disappear from the text display and appear 
in the rectangle for F1 on the status display. 
4. Editing Functions 
In writing the goals and actions on the text dis- . 
play, the following editing functions vi11 be useful: 
a. Arrovs ( ->,  <-, ", v 1 - Pressinq each of these but- 
tons moves the text .cursor (the blinking rectangle) one 
space to the riqht, left, up, or dovn. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
Open Line - Pressinq this button sets up a nev blank 
line at the cursor's present vertical position. This 
command is useful for entering a nev goal into an al- 
ready existing list of goals. 
Delete Line  - Pressing this button erases the line at  
the cursor's present vertical position. 
Insert Character - Pressing this button puts a tempo- 
rary filler character at the cursor's present posi- 
tion, shifting any characters t o  the right of the 
cursor over one space to the right. 
Delete Character - Pressing this button erases the 
character at the cursor's present position, and 
shifts any characters to the right of the cursor one 
space to the left. 
Next Line - Pressing this button moves the cursor to 
the beginning of the next line. 
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9. 
h. 
Verify - Pressing this button checks the line at the 
cursor's present vertical position for syntax errors 
such as a missing colon, missing comma, incorrect 
goal specification, etc. It also gives the coordi- 
nates of each Go To command in that line. Each new 
line should be verified in this manner. 
Exit - Pressing this button terminates text editing 
and places the new list of goals in line for execu- 
tion as indicated on the status display. No more 
than nine goals may be listed for a single friendly 
.craft at any given time. Only the top four goals 
will appear on the status display. Whenever a goal 
is completed, it will be removed from the status dis- 
play 
There are two additional buttons on the text key- 
board - Reset and Repaint. Occasionally, the keyboard 
vi11 lock during use and will not accept any input. To 
remedy this, the Reset button should be pressed. : 
However, doinq so causes the computer to output a message . 
to the text display. This message can be removed and the 
screen restored to its pre-locked state by pressing the 
Repaint button. 
A qoal list can contain as many as nine goals of up 
to 18 characters each. The editor has a nine row by 18 
column 'window' in which to enter goals and actions. Any 
attempt to move the cursor beyond this window will result 
in a 'beep' alarm being sounded from the text keyboard. 
This alarm will also sound if an attempt is made to enter 
a character on top of another, with the exception of the 
temporary filler character generated by the 'Insert Char- 
acter' function. 
8 .  Modifying Onsoins Action Plans 
The pushbuttons mentioned next should be preceded by an 
identifier. The identifiers are: 
F1 - Friendly ship 1 
F2 - Friendly ship 2 
F3 - Friendly ship 3 
F4 - Friendly ship 4 
1. Abort Pushbutton - Pressing this button cancels the 
currently active or top goal. The friendly ship then 
waits for an Enable to beqin the next goal, if any. 
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2. 
a. 
b. 
3 .  
4 .  
Skip Pushbutton 
If the friendly ship is performing some action vhen 
this button is pressed, the friendly ship will stop 
its current action and begin the next action for that 
goal. For example, pressing this button can termi- 
nate a Hover or a Patrol of the friendly ship. 
If the friendly ship has just completed an action 
vhen the skip pushbutton is pzessed, the friendly 
ship will skip the next action and begin the next ac- 
tion after that. 
Enable Pushbutton - There are two uses of Enable: 
a. To initiate an attack. 
b. To begin a nev goal. 
Prior to a and b the friendly ship will stop and 
vait until the Enable pushbutton is presse 
Interrupt Pushbutton - At any time, either the pilot 
or navigator can interrupt a currently executing 
goal and the naviqator can insert, via the text 
display and keyboard, a nev goal/action list which 
will then become the currently executing action. The 
previous goal/action list will be placed second in 
line after the new qoal/action list, and will consist 
of the goal identifier and any actions that had not 
been already completed at the time of the interrupt. 
Pressing the Interrupt Pushbutton performs the fol- 
lowing: 
a. Suspends the currently active goal/action list. 
b. Turns on the text display, leaving the top line 
blank for the interrupt goal/action list. 
Pressing the Exit button on the text keyboard after 
an interrupt qoal/action list has been entered per- 
forms the follovinq: 
a. Turns off the text display. 
b. Enters the added qoal/action list at the top the 
line for execution, moving all previous lists 
dovn one rov. 
c. Enables the top goal/action list automaticallv. 
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Once it has begun execution, the interrupt goal/ 
action list can be controlled in the same manner 
as regular lists. 
5. Status Pushbutton - Pushing this button vi11 shov 
the status of the identified friendly ship on the 
set of status indicators for approximately 10 
seconds. After this time, the craft's information 
vi11 automatically disappear and return to the 
ovnship status. The status indicators display fuel 
remaining, altitude, vertical rate, ground speed, 
number of missiles remaining, weight capacity 
remaining, and damage count information that existed 
for the friendly ship at the time the Status Push- 
button vas pressed. If, after pressing the Status 
Pushbutton for a friendly, ovnship status is 
desired before the 10 seconds has elapsed, then the : 
ovnship status can be reinstated by pressing the FO . 
identifier folloved by the Status Pushbutton. This 
is the only use for the FO identifier button. 
